Blow v. State, MM-60

Decision Date15 August 1980
Docket NumberNo. MM-60,MM-60
Citation386 So.2d 872
PartiesJerry BLOW, Appellant, v. STATE of Florida, Appellee.
CourtFlorida District Court of Appeals

Michael J. Minerva, Public Defender, and Louis G. Carres, Asst. Public Defender, for appellant.

Jim Smith, Atty. Gen., and A. S. Johnston, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

BOOTH, Judge.

This cause is before us on appeal from a judgment of conviction for escape, kidnapping and aggravated assault with a deadly weapon. Appellant contends that the 15-year sentence for aggravated assault exceeds the legal maximum of five years and that the trial court committed fundamental error in imposing judgment and sentence for aggravated assault because it was not a lesser included offense of the charge of armed robbery. We affirm the conviction of aggravated assault and remand for a correction of the sentence as to that offense. 1

The information charging armed robbery states, in pertinent part, that appellant "did then and there unlawfully by force and by putting (the victim) in fear, rob, steal and take away . . . certain personal property . . ., and in the course of committing said robbery the said Jerry Blow carried a firearm." (emphasis supplied) This charge is in the language of the robbery statute, Florida Statutes § 812.13.

The evidence showed that the defendant pointed a pistol at the victim and forced him to drive his vehicle into a wooded area. At charge conference, the court announced it would be giving the standard instruction on aggravated assault as a lesser included offense of the robbery charge. The trial court asked defense counsel if there were any exceptions or objections to the instructions as discussed, and defense counsel stated he had no objections. There was no objection raised when the court instructed the jury; and, when the court again asked if there were any exceptions or objections to the instructions as given, defense counsel stated there were none. There were no objections to the verdict form which listed aggravated assault as one of the crimes for which Blow might be convicted.

Appellant argues that aggravated assault was neither a crime charged nor a lesser included offense, because the information did not allege that appellant used the firearm or deadly weapon to commit an assault in the course of committing the robbery. Thus, he contends, relying upon Vitko v. State, 363 So.2d 42 (Fla. 2d DCA 1978), the aggravated assault was not a "category four" 2 lesser included offense, because the essential elements of the aggravated assault were not specified in the charge. We find reliance on Vitko misplaced. Vitko does not discuss whether or not the appellant objected to the aggravated assault instruction or what the evidence showed as to Vitko's use of the knife.

A person called on to respond to criminal charges has the fundamental right to be notified by the accusatory pleading of all offenses for which he may be convicted. Payne v. State, 275 So.2d 261 (Fla. 4th DCA 1973); Griffin v. State, 322 So.2d 587 (Fla. 4th DCA 1975). The Supreme Court, in Brown v. State, 206 So.2d 383 (Fla.1968), states: "(W)e are confronted by the organic requirement that the accusatory pleading apprise the defendant of all offenses of which he may be convicted." It follows that a defendant may be convicted only of a crime expressly charged, or which is included, necessarily or by pleading and proof, within the crime charged. Brown v. State, supra ; Rule 3.510, Fla.R.Crim.P. Here, we find that the allegations of the information satisfied defendant's fundamental right. The allegation that he carried a firearm in the commission of the offense was sufficient to apprise him of the lesser included charge; and, in the absence of objection by the defendant, the trial court properly charged on aggravated assault.

Determination as to whether a particular crime is a "category four" lesser included offense, requiring a jury instruction, is often difficult. Difficult as the question is, however, the trial court must act to either give or not give the charge, knowing that, whichever the decision, error may be claimed under the existing case law. 3 Compare, Hammer v. State, 343 So.2d 856 (Fla. 1st DCA 1976), cert. den. 352 So.2d 175 (Fla.1977), relying upon State v. Terry, 336 So.2d 65 (Fla.1976), with State v. Wilson, 276 So.2d 45 (Fla.1973). The defendant should not be permitted to stand mute and have the benefit of the lesser charge and grounds to attack his conviction of the lesser offense, as well. See, Wilson v. State, 383 So.2d 670 (Fla. 5th DCA 1980).

Here, the trial court determined that aggravated assault was a lesser included offense of first degree robbery as charged. For all that appears at trial, defendant knew full well that he was charged with armed robbery, and could be convicted of aggravated assault as a lesser offense. Proof at trial supported the conviction, and there was ample opportunity for objection to the charge. Under these circumstances, we think the appellant had the duty to raise objection, if any, at the time the court announced it would instruct as to aggravated assault and to inform the court that he had no notice he could be convicted of that offense.

Accordingly, the judgment is affirmed and...

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