Bludworth v. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc.
| Decision Date | 16 October 1985 |
| Docket Number | Nos. 84-2112,84-2367,s. 84-2112 |
| Citation | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 2360,476 So.2d 775 |
| Parties | 10 Fla. L. Weekly 2360, 12 Media L. Rep. 1264 David H. BLUDWORTH, Appellant, v. PALM BEACH NEWSPAPERS, INC., etc., et al., Appellees. |
| Court | Florida District Court of Appeals |
David H. Bludworth, State Atty., and Pablo Perhacs, Asst. State Atty., West Palm Beach, for appellant.
L. Martin Reeder, Jr., and Thomas R. Julin of Steel Hector Davis Burns & Middleton, Palm Beach, for appellees.
This is a consolidated appeal of an order, requiring the state attorney to release to the news media all information furnished defense counsel in a criminal investigation, and of another order ordering release of a medical examiner's scene investigation report on the same legal basis. We affirm.
This appeal arises from the state attorney's investigation of the circumstances surrounding the death of David Kennedy, whose body was discovered in a hotel room on Wednesday, April 25, 1984. Personnel of the Palm Beach Police Department, Palm Beach County State Attorney's Office, and the County Medical Examiner's Office immediately began investigating, and various newspaper and other media personnel sought unsuccessfully to get information from the official agencies conducting the investigation.
On Friday, April 27, 1984, Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., and Tony Wharton, later joined by the Miami Herald Publishing Company, filed an emergency complaint to enforce the public records law, and sought a peremptory writ of mandamus for the release of information by the public agencies. The state attorney was one of the named defendants. On the same day the trial court issued a rule to show cause, returnable later that day, pursuant to section 119.11, Florida Statutes (1983). After hearing, the court ordered the defendants to release the information listed in section 119.011(3)(c) as not included in the definitions of "criminal intelligence information" and "criminal investigation information" as those terms are used in the public records law. The information excluded from those definitions, and therefore required by the above order to be released, goes to the time, place and nature of a reported crime, identity of a person arrested or of a crime victim (except of sexual battery or child abuse), the crime charged, documents given or required by law or agency rule to be given to the arrested person, and informations and indictments unless excepted by section 905.26, Florida Statutes (). The court further ordered an in camera inspection of the medical examiner's report, showing the cause of Kennedy's death, so that the court could determine whether that report was exempt from disclosure because of a criminal investigation exemption. A subsequent order, based on a May 3, 1984, in camera inspection and filed May 15, 1984, stated the finding that the medical examiner's report did contain active criminal intelligence or investigative information and that the statute therefore permitted the officials to exercise their discretion to determine whether these records, exempt from disclosure, should be released. In the instant situation the court determined that the defendants acted within their discretion. The court indicated, however, that a document might be exempt at one time and cease to be so at another time. It also indicated that parts of the report in this instance appeared releasable, but it did not seem practical at the time to release parts while withholding other parts. The order stated that there must be a compelling government interest in restricting public access to government-held information in order to withhold such information, and that the mere existence of a criminal investigation does not automatically establish such a compelling interest.
On May 14, 1984, Peter Andrew Marchant and David Linwood Door were charged with conspiracy to sell cocaine and sale of cocaine. On May 16, 1984, the state attorney held a press conference at which it was revealed that the two men had been arrested; and that the medical examiner's autopsy report concluded Kennedy died from ingestion of three drugs, cocaine, demerol and mellaril. The chief of police investigating the Kennedy death, Joseph L. Terlizzese, announced a little while later that Kennedy had died between 2 and 3 a.m. of the morning on which his body was found.
The officials continued to refuse to release the records containing the information revealed at the press conference and thereafter, and the plaintiffs went back to court to seek an order requiring release of the Kennedy autopsy report. Upon a May 23, 1984, in camera hearing, the court concluded that the autopsy report no longer posed a threat to the criminal investigation, and there was no compelling reason to continue to withhold it. Although a former statutory provision constituted an exception of medical examiner's records from the public disclosure requirements of the public records act, the court found that section had been expressly repealed by section 406.17 of the Medical Examiners Act, Florida Statutes (1983). The court ordered the state attorney to release the autopsy report.
On September 24, 1984, the plaintiffs filed a motion for release of additional public records. The state attorney's office had revealed that various materials had been given to Marchant's and Dorr's lawyers for inspection, pursuant to Florida Rule of Criminal Procedure 3.220, but the state attorney's office refused the media access to the same materials. In their motion before the court the plaintiffs appealed to the authority of the opinion in Satz v. Blankenship, 407 So.2d 396 (Fla. 4th DCA 1981), petition for review denied, 413 So.2d 877 (Fla.1982).
Mrs. Rose F. Kennedy was permitted to intervene in the hearing on the news media's motion. The hearing was held September 28, 1984. Mrs. Kennedy objected to the release of certain documents. She is not a party to this appeal.
On October 1, 1984, the trial court entered an order requiring the state attorney, pursuant to Blankenship, to release to the plaintiffs all information already shared with the criminal defense counsel. The court stated that by virtue of Blankenship material released to criminal defendants under rule 3.220 could not, as a matter of law, remain exempt from disclosure under the public records law.
After the vacation of the automatic stay the state attorney obtained under Florida Rule of Appellate Procedure 9.310(b)(2) as then written, the state attorney applied to this court for a stay pending appeal of the above order. This court granted the state attorney a temporary stay. On October 11, 1984, this court issued an order denying the stay. Bludworth v. Palm Beach Newspapers, Inc., No. 84-212 (Fla. 4th DCA Oct. 11, 1984), reiterated that under Blankenship disclosure of the items disclosed to the criminal defendants was required. The court also said the motion to stay was insufficient because it did not state why the trial court's order would result in irreparable injury.
The state attorney then filed a new motion for a stay in the trial court and a motion for a protective order in the Marchant-Dorr criminal proceeding. The first of these motions was denied and the state attorney released the stated records. In an additional order of October 12, 1984, the trial court mandated that any records thereafter released by the state attorney to defense counsel in State v. Marchant be revealed to the public unless the state attorney moves to withhold on a theory the records in question are exempt.
When the state attorney refused to make public the medical examiner's crime scene report after it had been shared by the medical examiner with criminal defense counsel, the plaintiffs requested an order of the court directing the state attorney to make that report and other records available for inspection and copying. This motion was granted, as to the medical examiner's report, on October 24, 1984, again on the authority of Blankenship. This order is the basis of the second appeal in this consolidated case. As to other documents whose release plaintiffs sought, the trial court found those still qualified as active criminal investigative information which the defense had not yet received.
The issue is whether section 119.011(3)(c)5, Florida Statutes (1983), which excludes from the definitions of "criminal intelligence information" and "criminal investigation information" "[d]ocuments given or required by law or agency rule to be given to a person arrested," should be construed narrowly so as to refer only to such information as shows the basis...
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