Bluitt v. Arco Chemical Co., a Div. of Atlantic Richfield Co.
| Decision Date | 14 November 1985 |
| Docket Number | No. 84-2705,84-2705 |
| Citation | 777 F.2d 188 |
| Parties | 39 Empl. Prac. Dec. P 35,842, 3 Fed.R.Serv.3d 893 Eartha Lorraine BLUITT, Plaintiff-Appellant, v. ARCO CHEMICAL COMPANY, A DIVISION OF ATLANTIC RICHFIELD COMPANY, Defendant-Appellee. Summary Calendar. |
| Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Fifth Circuit |
Anthony P. Griffin, Inc., Anthony P. Griffin, Galveston, Tex., for plaintiff-appellant.
William Beteet, Jr., Houston, Tex., for defendant-appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of Texas.
Before RUBIN, JOHNSON, and JONES, Circuit Judges.
Eartha Lorraine Bluitt appeals from the district court's order dismissing with prejudice her employment discrimination case. Pursuant to rules 37(b)(2), 26(f) and 16(f) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, the district court found that Bluitt and her counsel willfully and contumaciously failed to comply with the court's orders concerning discovery, and that she answered interrogatories propounded to her evasively and in bad faith. Because the district courts are imparted discretion in deciding such matters, we may alter such a dismissal only if we find that the court abused its discretion when, as a sanction for Bluitt's failure to comply with the court's discovery orders, it dismissed her complaint. Whether or not the members of this appellate court would themselves have acted in like fashion under the same circumstances is not controlling. Having reviewed the entire record, we conclude that the discretion conferred upon the district court was ample enough to authorize the action it took, and we affirm its judgment.
The complaint in this action was filed June 29, 1983. It alleged that Arco Chemical Company violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 1 when it discharged Bluitt because of her sex. On October 24, 1983, the first pretrial conference was held and the trial date was set for May 21, 1984. On April 4, the district court granted Bluitt's motion to suspend the docket control order and granted Arco's motion to compel her to fully answer interrogatories by April 6, 1984.
By June 20, 1984, the interrogatories were still not answered satisfactorily and a conference was held to discuss Bluitt's delay in completing discovery. The court awarded monetary sanctions against Bluitt's attorney and again ordered her and her attorney to fully answer the interrogatories.
Another conference was held on September 26, 1984. The court again ordered Bluitt to specifically and fully answer the interrogatories by October 8, 1984, or "suffer dismissal" of the cause of action. The court noted that two interrogatories contained information that went to the heart of Bluitt's claim and that Arco, without such information, could not properly prepare its case. Part of the exchange that occurred between the court and Bluitt's lawyer during this hearing follows:
The Court: I'll give you ten days to answer or I'll dismiss it in accordance with what he's requested. The information is buried here in a bunch of mishmash that doesn't make any sense. I'm tired and I'm fed up with these conferences with you and I'm not going to put up with any more. You've got ten days to answer--
Mr. Griffin: Which interrogatory are you talking about?
But, those interrogatories named A, B, C, D, whatever, under A you answer what he asks you in A. Under B, what he asks in B. And in C, answer what he asks you in C. Don't put it all in one paragraph and just mishmash the thing, it doesn't make any sense. I don't want to have any more meetings about it. Next time I'm not going to have any more meetings. I'm going to rule on this on the record after you get your answer. I'll just rule on that.
The court thus gave counsel a clear command and an unambiguous warning of the consequences that might ensue if the two interrogatories were not answered.
On November 1, 1984, the court granted the defendant's motion to dismiss. In its Memorandum and Order of Dismissal, the court found that the plaintiff and her attorney "violated both the spirit and the letter of Rules 33 and 16" of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure. The court stated
[t]he Plaintiff answered the two interrogatories but did not do so fully or specifically. In particular, the Plaintiff names one individual as the "main perpetrator" but does not list the other perpetrators. No dates are furnished. Statements allegedly made are set forth in a very general, rambling fashion, but there is no indication of the identity of the speakers. Finally, the Plaintiff simply refuses to name any male employees she alleges were treated similarly by the Defendant. These answers smack of evasiveness and bad faith on the part of the Plaintiff and her counsel.
* * *
* * *
In light of the entire record in this case, the court concludes that this evasive and contumacious conduct has resulted, at least in part, from intentional misconduct. The imposition of a sanction less harsh than dismissal would be futile since previous orders entered herein have been disregarded.
In Batson v. Neal Spelce Associates, Inc., 2 we recently reviewed the scope of appellate review in determining whether a dismissal pursuant to Fed.R.Civ.P. 37(b)(2)(C) constitutes an abuse of discretion. The court discussed the factors to be considered in reviewing the district court's action:
In determining whether a district court abused its discretion, our precedent has addressed a number of considerations. First, dismissal is authorized only when the failure to comply with the court's order results from willfulness or bad faith, and not from the inability to comply. National Hockey League [v. Metropolitan Hockey Club, Inc.], 427 U.S. at 640, 96 S.Ct. [2778] at 2779 [49 L.Ed.2d 747 (1976) ]; see also Marshall v. Segona, 621 F.2d 763, 767 n. 8 (5th Cir.1980). Next, dismissal is proper only in situations where the deterrent value of Rule 37 cannot be substantially achieved by the use of less drastic sanctions. Marshall, 621 F.2d at 768. Another consideration is whether the other party's preparation for trial was substantially prejudiced. Finally, dismissal may be inappropriate when neglect is plainly attributable to an attorney rather than a blameless client, or when a party's simple negligence is grounded in confusion or sincere misunderstanding of the court's orders. Marshall, 621 F.2d at 768; Silas v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 586 F.2d 382, 385 (5th Cir.1978). 3
The district court specifically found that plaintiff and plaintiff's attorney's failure to comply with the court's discovery orders resulted from willfulness or bad faith. Substantial evidence in the...
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