Blume v. Chicago, M. & St. P. Ry. Co.

Decision Date23 June 1916
Docket NumberNos. 19,861 - (174).,s. 19,861 - (174).
PartiesMARY BLUME v. CHICAGO, MILWAUKEE & ST. PAUL RAILWAY COMPANY AND OTHERS.<SMALL><SUP>1</SUP></SMALL>
CourtMinnesota Supreme Court

C. J. Laurisch and Webber & Lees, for appellant.

J. W. Schmitt, S. B. Wilson and Kerr, Fowler, Schmitt & Furber, for respondent.

DIBELL, C.

This is an action to recover damages for injuries sustained by the plaintiff while a passenger on one of the defendant's trains. There was a verdict for the plaintiff. The defendant appeals from the order denying its motion for a new trial. The claims of error relate to the charge and exceptions were taken at the time.

1. The plaintiff got safely on the defendant's train at Minnesota Lake. Before she had taken a seat the train started. She claims that she was thrown down and injured by a sudden jerk of the train when it started. The court charged the jury that it was the duty of the defendant to stop its train at the station for a long enough time to permit passengers using due diligence to enter the train and find seats. This was not a correct statement of the law. It is the duty of a carrier to stop its train for a time reasonably sufficient to enable intending passengers to board with safety. It is not required, as a matter of law, to keep its train standing until they have had a reasonable time in which to get seated. 2 Shearman & Redfield, Negligence, § 508; 2 Hutchinson, Carriers, § 1111; 3 Thompson, Negligence, § 2857; Yarnell v. Kansas City, F. S. & M. R. Co. 113 Mo. 570, 21 S. W. 1, 18 L.R.A. 599; Louisville & N. R. Co. v. Hale, 102 Ky. 600, 44 S. W. 213, 42 L.R.A. 293; Illinois Cent. R. Co. v. Ball, 150 Ky. 531, 150 S. W. 668; L. & N. R. Co. v. Gaines, 152 Ky. 255, 153 S. W. 216. Opposed to these authorities are the following: I. & G. N. Ry. Co. v. Copeland, 60 Tex. 325; Gulf, C. & S. F. Ry. Co. v. Powers, 4 Tex. Civ. App. 228, 23 S. W. 325. In special cases, as when a passenger is sick or infirm or disabled, the carrier may owe a special duty greater than that stated.

2. The court charged the jury that to constitute a defense the negligence of the plaintiff must be the proximate cause of his injury. The correct statement is that the plaintiff's negligence, to prevent a recovery, must contribute proximately to the injury as a cause. 2 Dunnell, Minn Dig. § 7012. Whether taking the charge as a whole this inaccuracy should result in a new trial we do not determine.

3. The injury for which the plaintiff sues was sustained on February 21, 1914. The defendant claims that she was injured in a runaway of a team on April 10, 1914, and that her present condition is attributable in whole or in part to the runaway. To prove the fact of injury by a runaway it offered and there were received admissions made by the plaintiff to her physicians. The plaintiff denied that she was injured in a runaway or that she told her physician so. The court charged the jury that evidence of such admissions should be received with great caution. The cases do not agree upon the propriety of giving a cautionary instruction. Some hold that the question of the effect and weight of such admissions is for the jury, and that no charge relative to them should be given. Johnston v. Stone, 69 Miss. 826, 13 South. 858; Frizell v. Cole, 29 Ill. 465; Kauffman v. Maier, 94 Cal. 269, 29 Pac. 481, 18 L.R.A. 124; Castleman v. Sherry, 42 Tex. 59; Knowles v. Nixon, 17 Mont. 473, 43 Pac 628; Tobin v. Young, 124 Ind. 507, 24 N. E. 121; Shinn v. Tucker, 37 Ark. 580. Others hold that the court may, with propriety, give the jury rules helpful for their guidance in considering admissions. Allen v. Kirk, 81 Iowa, 658, 47 N. W. 906; State v. Jackson, 103 Iowa, 702, 73 N. W. 647; Nash v. Hoxie, 59 Wis. 384, 18 N. W. 408; Haven v. Markstrum, 67 Wis....

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