Blume v. Lightle

• Decision Date: 14 October 1929
• Docket Number: 140
• Citation: 20 S.W.2d 630,180 Ark. 136
• Parties: BLUME v. LIGHTLE
• Court: Arkansas Supreme Court

20 S.W.2d 630

180 Ark. 136

BLUME v. LIGHTLE

No. 140

Supreme Court of Arkansas

October 14, 1929

Appeal from White Circuit Court; W. D. Davenport, Judge; affirmed.

Judgment modified and case affirmed.

John E. Miller, for appellant.

Brundidge & Neelly, for appellee.

MEHAFFY J. HART, C. J., and SMITH, J., think the judgment should be affirmed.

OPINION

MEHAFFY, J.

This is an action for $ 100 per month damages for the rental value of property in Searcy, Arkansas, belonging to the appellees. Appellees, who were plaintiffs below, allege that the appellants were indebted to them in the sum of $ 1,090 balance of rent due on the theater building in Searcy, for the months of February, March, April, May, June, July, August, September, October and November.

The appellees had brought suit in the White Circuit Court in January, 1928, to recover the possession of the theater building, and damages for the unlawful detention of same. The appellants filed bond, and retained possession. The cause was tried, and resulted in a judgment for appellees for the possession of the property, and $ 150 for the retention of the possession of the property for the month of January, 1928. There was an appeal prosecuted to this court, and the judgment of the circuit court was affirmed. Blume v. Lightle, 177 Ark. 1134, 10 S.W.2d 45.

The facts are stated in the opinion above referred to, and it is not necessary to restate them here, but only the facts that have developed since the affirmance of the case in this court need be stated here.

After the affirmance of the case referred to by this court, the present case was tried, and it was agreed that the appellants had paid $ 150 a month for all the time that the theater building had been detained, but it is the contention of the appellees that they were entitled to $ 250 a month, and the case was tried before the circuit judge sitting as a jury, and the court found that the appellees were entitled to $ 250 a month during the time the building was detained by appellants; and, as they had only received $ 150, judgment was given for $ 100 a month during the time the building was wrongfully detained.

There are but two questions in the case. First, whether the judgment for possession and $ 150 a month for the property during January is a bar to plaintiff's right to recover in this case. In other words, the appellants contend that the identical question was determined in the trial of the former suit that is involved here. That is, the amount of damages per month that appellees were entitled to. And the second question is, if the appellees were entitled to recover here, whether they recover up to the time possession was delivered to them, which was on the 12th of the month, or recover for that entire month.

Res judicata is a doctrine of peace and the foundation principle upon which the doctrine rests is that parties ought not to be permitted to litigate the same issue more than once; that when a right has been judicially determined by a court of competent jurisdiction, or if an opportunity for such trial has been given, the judgment of the court should be conclusive upon the parties. Public policy and the interest of litigants alike require that there should be an end to litigation, and the peace and order of society demand that matters distinctly put in issue and determined by a court of competent jurisdiction shall not be retried between the same parties in a subsequent suit. 15 R. C. L. 953.

It has been said that the doctrine of res judicata is not to be applied to a denial of justice...