Blunt v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist.
Decision Date | 12 September 2014 |
Docket Number | Nos. 11–4200,11–4201,11–4315.,s. 11–4200 |
Citation | 767 F.3d 247 |
Parties | Amber BLUNT, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated; Crystal Blunt; Michael Blunt, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated; S.H.; W.W.; Eric Allston, on his own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Lydia Johnson, on her own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Linda Johnson; Carol Durrell, on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor daughter S.H.; Chantae Hall, and on behalf of all others similarly situated; June Coleman, on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor son, R.C., and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Lynda Muse, on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor daughter Q.G. and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Christine Dudley, on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor daughter W.W. and on behalf of all others similarly situated; The Concerned Black Parents of Mainline Inc.; The Mainline Branch of The NAACP v. LOWER MERION SCHOOL DISTRICT; The Lower Merion School Board; Pennsylvania Department of Education Linda Johnson, Lydia Johnson, Carol Durell, Chantae Hall, S.H., Christine Dudley, W.W., Eric Allston, June Coleman, R.C. Lynda Muse, and Q.G., Appellants in No. 11–4200. Amber Blunt, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated; Crystal Blunt; Michael Blunt, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated; S.H.; W.W.; Eric Allston, on his own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Lydia Johnson, on her own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Linda Johnson; Carol Durrell, on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor daughter S.H.; Chantae Hall, and on behalf of all others similarly situated; June Coleman, on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor son, R.C., and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Lynda Muse, on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor daughter Q.G. and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Christine Dudley, on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor daughter W.W. and on behalf of all others similarly situated; The Concerned Black Parents of Mainline Inc; The Mainline Branch of the NAACP v. Lower Merion School District; The Lower Merion School Board; Pennsylvania Department of Education Amber Blunt, Crystal Blunt, Michael Blunt and Concerned Black Parents of Mainline Inc., Appellants in No. 11–4201. Amber Blunt, on behalf of herself and all others similarly situated; Crystal Blunt; Michael Blunt, on their own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated; S.H.; W.W.; Eric Allston, on his own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Lydia Johnson, on her own behalf and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Linda Johnson; Carol Durrell, on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor daughter S.H.; Chantae Hall, and on behalf of all others similarly situated; June Coleman, on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor son, R.C., and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Lynda Muse, on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor daughter Q.G. and on behalf of all others similarly situated; Christine Dudley, on her own behalf and on behalf of her minor daughter W.W. and on behalf of all others similarly situated; The Concerned Black Parents of Mainline Inc; The Mainline Branch of the NAACP v. Lower Merion School District; The Lower Merion School Board; Pennsylvania Department of Education Lower Merion School District, Appellant in Appellant in No. 11–4315. |
Court | U.S. Court of Appeals — Third Circuit |
OPINION TEXT STARTS HERE
Patrick Castaneda, Matthew A. Goldberg, Carl W. Hittinger, (argued), John D. Huh, Lesli C. Esposito, Nathan P. Heller, DLA Piper, Philadelphia, PA, Attorneys for Appellants Linda Johnson, Lydia Johnson, Carol Durrell, Chantae Hall, S.H., Christine Dudley, W.W., Eric Allston, June Coleman, R.C., Lynda Muse, and Q.G.Jennifer R. Clarke, (argued), Benjamin D. Geffen, Sonja D. Kerr, Barbara E. Ransom, Public Interest Law Center of Philadelphia, Philadelphia, PA, Judith A. Gran, Reisman, Carolla & Gran, Haddonfield, NJ, Attorneys for Appellants Amber Blunt, Crystal Blunt, Michael Blunt and the Concerned Black Parents of Mainline Inc.
Jenna B. Berman, Michael D. Kristofco, (argued), Wisler Pearlstine, Blue Bell, PA, Attorneys for Appellees Lower Merion School District and Lower Merion School Board.
Amy C. Foerster, Saul Ewing, Harrisburg, PA, M. Abbegael Giunta, Howard G. Hopkirk, (argued), Office of Attorney General of Pennsylvania, Harrisburg, PA, Attorneys for Appellee Pennsylvania Department of Education.
BEFORE: McKEE, Chief Judge, and AMBRO and GREENBERG, Circuit Judges.
TABLE OF CONTENTS I.
255 |
II.
257
III.
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
264
IV.
265
V.
266
VI.
SUMMARY OF THE LAW
267
A. |
The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act
267 |
B.
Class Actions and Res Judicata (Claim Preclusion) Defenses
276
1. |
Claim Preclusion
276 |
2.
Application of Res Judicata (Claim Preclusion) in Class Actions
277
I. |
Standing
ANALYSIS
280
A. |
The Effect of the Gaskin Settlement on the Claims Against the PDE
281 |
B.
Whether Appellants Established a Prima Facie Case of Racial Discrimination
293
1. |
The MAP Presentation
295 |
b.
Daniel Reschley's Report
295
2. |
Whether the District Court Properly Viewed the Evidence in the Light Most Favorable to the Plaintiffs as Non–Movants and Whether Plaintiffs Established a Prima Facie Case of Discrimination
296 |
3.
Statistical Evidence
299
VIII. |
I. INTRODUCTION
In what may be an oversimplification, we introduce our opinion on this appeal by setting forth that the central controversy is a dispute over whether African American students in the Lower Merion School District (“LMSD”) public schools in Montgomery County, Pennsylvania, were deprived of appropriate educational services due to racial discrimination and segregation in violation of federal law. The plaintiffs unsuccessfully brought this action pursuant to the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”), 20 U.S.C. § 1400 et seq.; the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101, 12132; § 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (the “RA”), 29 U.S.C. § 794(a); Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VI”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000d; 42 U.S.C. § 1983; and state law, claiming that African American students in the LMSD suffered from such discrimination.1 They now appeal from portions of the District Court's orders on federal issues entered at various times during the course of the litigation. We, however, are not concerned with the substance of the state law claims on this appeal as the District Court did not exercise jurisdiction over those claims.
This case encompasses a myriad of legal issues, including standing to bring suit, application of a statute of limitations, res judicata (claim preclusion), application of disability laws, appropriateness of education provided to students, anti-discrimination laws, and sections of the Code of Federal Regulations implementing the applicable laws. The case on appeal also includes a cross-appeal by the LMSD, but we will dismiss the cross-appeal without deciding it on the merits as it is moot. The District Court found that the plaintiffs did not present sufficient evidence to survive LMSD's motion for summary judgment on the discrimination charges and the Court dismissed plaintiffs' other claims for other reasons. Thus, the Court did not find that there had been any violations of federal law.
Plaintiffs, now appellants, appeal from the District Court's October 20, 2011 Memorandum and Judgment Order granting a final summary judgment to defendant LMSD and against all the plaintiffs in the case remaining at the time that the Court granted summary judgment, the Court already having dismissed several of the parties and claims from the case by previous orders.2 Appellants also appeal from rulings in two intermediate orders that became final at the time of the entry of the October 20, 2011 Memorandum and Judgment Order, namely: the dismissal of all claims of plaintiffs, now appellants, Amber Blunt, a now former student at LMSD, and Crystal and Michael Blunt, her parents, in the District Court's memorandum and order of February 15, 2008, the “February 15, 2008 Order”; the dismissal of all plaintiffs' claims against the Pennsylvania Department of Education (“PDE”) in the District Court's order and memorandum of August 19, 2009, the “August 19, 2009 Order”; and the dismissal of plaintiff Concerned Black Parents of Mainline Inc. (“CBP”) as a party in the District Court's August 19, 2009 Order for lack of standing. Appellants' No. 11–4201 br. at 1.
Plaintiffs, with the exception of the CBP and the mainline branch of the NAACP (the “NAACP”), are present and past African American students of the Lower Merion Township public schools, who were placed in remedial classes after being identified as learning “disabled” under the IDEA and/or those students' parents. The plaintiffs repeatedly used the term “disabled” to describe the student plaintiffs throughout the pleadings, a term consistent with the IDEA, a statute under which they were making claims, as the IDEA safeguards the rights of...
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