Blythe v. Kujawa

• Decision Date: 28 March 1929
• Docket Number: No. 27178.,27178.
• Citation: 224 N.W. 464,177 Minn. 79
• Parties: BLYTHE v. KUJAWA et al.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

224 N.W. 464

177 Minn. 79

BLYTHE v. KUJAWA et al.

No. 27178.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

March 28, 1929.

Appeal from District Court, Steele County; Fred W. Senn, Judge.

Action by John H. Blythe against Jan Kujawa and others. From an order modifying the judgment theretofore rendered, plaintiff appeals. Reversed.

Nelson & Nelson, of Owatonna, for appellant.

E. W. Richter, of Owatonna, Edgerton, Dohs & Edgerton, of St. Paul, and Meighen, Knudson & Sturtz, of Albert Lea, for respondents.

STONE, J.

Appeal by plaintiff from an order modifying the judgment.

The action began as one for the specific performance of a contract whereby the defendants Kujawa, husband and wife, sold and agreed to convey to plaintiff a farm in Steele county. The contract was made January 4, and plaintiff went into possession thereunder on March 1, 1926. Of the purchase price, $500 was paid upon the execution of the contract, and $4,500 was due March 1, 1926. The balance was to be covered by purchase-money note and mortgage. Because of the inability of the vendors to tender a marketable title, the $4,500 payment was not made as called for by the contract. Instead, and on February 26, 1926, it was placed with the defendant National Farmers' Bank of Owatonna, which has since gone into liquidation. That explains why the bank and its receiver, H. E. Skinner, are parties defendant. By their answer, defendants Kujawa, as vendors, acknowledged the claim of plaintiff to specific performance and tendered judgment accordingly. The case went to trial, and the only contested issue was as to the status and ownership of the $4,500 escrow payment to the bank. The decision (affirmed here, 175 Minn. 88, 220 N. W. 168) was that it was a special deposit by plaintiff and remained his property.

The original decision in plaintiff's favor was made September 9, 1927. It did not adjust satisfactorily the rights of plaintiff and defendants Kujawa (from now on the latter will be referred to as though they were the only defendants) under the contract. So, October 11, 1927, defendants moved for amendments of the findings and conclusions of law, among other things, to entitle plaintiff to specific performance "on paying within 30 days * * * the sum of $4,500 and interest, * * * and delivering to" defendants a purchase-money mortgage as required by the contract. The notice of motion proceeds then to ask that there be incorporated in the decision this provision: "But that in case plaintiff shall not pay * * * said sum and execute and deliver said mortgage * * * the defendants * * * are entitled to judgment canceling said contract as against the said plaintiff, and declaring that said defendants Kujawa are the owners of said premises free and clear from said contract or any rights on the part of the said plaintiff thereunder." After argument that motion was granted, January 20, 1928. The provision asked for by defendants, that upon 30 days' continued default by plaintiff the contract be canceled and defendants declared the owners of the premises, was included as prayed for.

Soon thereafter, plaintiff abandoned the farm. A son of defendants then moved onto and cropped it during the season of 1928. His possession has been and continues that of defendants'. April 7, 1928, judgment was entered (according to the record on the motion of the attorneys for the defendants), pursuant to the decision as it had been amended by the order of January 20, 1928. That judgment was, as defendants had asked that it should be, in the alternative, for a cancellation of the contract — that is, it provided that in default of the required payment by plaintiff, in which he did default, the contract should stand canceled and defendants be "declared the owners of said premises free and clear from said contract, or any rights on the part of said plaintiff thereunder."

Immediately after the case was remanded to the district court, September 1, 1928, there was made the motion by defendants, from the order granting which plaintiff has taken the present appeal. The motion was that the judgment, and with it the decision of the district court from which it resulted, should be amended by striking out the provisions for a cancellation of the contract upon continued default by plaintiff, and inserting instead provisions giving defendants the right to specific performance against plaintiff and judgment accordingly. The order appealed from granted that relief, so that, if it stands, defendants may assert that plaintiff is still bound by his contract and must take back and pay for the farm, notwithstanding the decision and judgment of cancellation formally asked for and obtained by defendants, and notwithstanding that the cancellation so decreed became an accomplished fact by plaintiff's abandonment of the farm and the resumption of possession by defendants.

1. The point is made that the judgment of April 7, 1928, was improperly entered. It is suggested that, inasmuch as defendant Skinner, as receiver, had perfected his appeal (from an order denying him a new trial) to this court before the entry of that judgment, the jurisdiction of the district court to enter it was questionable. That appeal was accompanied by a mere bond for costs. There was no supersedeas bond, and in consequence no stay of proceedings in the district court preventing the entry of judgment. G. S. 1923 § 9500; Scofield v. Scheaffer, 104 Minn. 127, 116 N. W. 211; Works v. Tiber, 169 Minn. 172, 210 N. W. 877.

2. The contract for deed gave to both parties, to plaintiff as vendee and to defendants as vendors,...