Bmc West Corp. v. Horkley
| Decision Date | 05 December 2007 |
| Docket Number | No. 33140.,33140. |
| Citation | 144 Idaho 890,174 P.3d 399 |
| Parties | BMC WEST CORPORATION, Plaintiff-Respondent, v. James H. HORKLEY and Joe's Filing Station, L.L.C., Defendants-Appellants. |
| Court | Idaho Supreme Court |
Swafford Law Office, Chartered, Idaho Falls, for appellant. Ronald L. Swafford argued.
Justin R. Seamons, Idaho Falls, for respondent. Justin R. Seamons, argued.
James Horkley and Joe's Filling Station, LLC (Horkley) hired Davies to construct two buildings in Rexburg, Idaho: a restaurant building and an insulated storage building. On an open account, Davies purchased materials from BMC West Corporation (BMC) to use for the project. Davies had opened an account with BMC on October 1, 1988, and BMC closed the account in August 2005. BMC acknowledges that Horkley paid Davies $111,335.91, of which $101,419.41 was for the restaurant and insulated storage building. Of the $101,419.41, Davies charged Horkley $27,992.48 for BMC materials furnished for the project as of January 29, 2005. For the subsequently purchased BMC materials, Davies charged Horkley $1,817.05. So, Davies charged Horkley a total of $29,809.53 for materials purchased from BMC.
In addition, Davies billed Horkley for substantial materials and rental costs from other suppliers separate from the materials purchased from BMC. On Davies' bills to Horkley, he identified the source of each particular charge. So, one could identify both the total amount Horkley was charged for BMC materials and the amount he was charged for materials or supplies purchased from others. Davies did not fully pay for the materials purchased from BMC. As a result, under I.C. § 45-501 and I.C. § 45-505, BMC filed liens on the land on which the buildings were located, and on the buildings themselves. Finally, BMC requested relief in the form of $10,471.80 for the balance on the account, and foreclosure on the liens. In his answer, Horkley opposed BMC's claims for relief. BMC then filed a motion for summary judgment on January 23, 2006, and Judge Moss granted the motion on March 21, 2006. On May 15, 2006, Judge Moss entered a judgment and decree of foreclosure in favor of BMC. From this decision, Horkley appeals to this Court.
The relevant payments from Horkley to Davies took place as follows:
09/10/04: $9,916.50 for the foundation for
the buildings. BMC argues that this payment
was for a separate project, even
though the buildings were constructed
atop the foundation, and Horkley does not
dispute BMC's argument
12/16/04: $35,000.00. Davies' bill to Horkley
indicates that this $35,000.00 was "paid
down," i.e., a down payment
02/02/05: $56,000.00
02/17/05: $10,419.41
Total: $101,419.41 ($111,335.91 counting
the inapplicable $9,916.50 from 09/10/04 for
the foundation)
Davies' payments to BMC occurred as follows:
09/03/04: $2,600.00.
09/30/04: $2,700.00.
10/28/04: $3,000.00.
11/30/04: $23,000.00.
01/31/05: $25,000.00.
Total: $56,300.00.
Davies submitted the first bill to Horkley on January 31, 2005. The bill stated that it represented charges "as of" January 29, 2005. At that time, Horkley had amassed $101,419.41 worth of labor and materials charges. The bill's total, though, was only $66,419.41, because Horkley was credited $35,000.00 for his December 16, 2004 down payment. Construction was not complete by January 31, 2005 (the date of the first bill). Instead, construction was completed several months later on April 27, 2005. Because additional work took place between January 29, 2005 (the date of the charges on the first bill) and April 27, 2005 (the date of completion), Horkley accumulated additional charges. Therefore, Davies sent Horkley a second bill on or about May 3, 2005, for approximately $29,809.53. Horkley objected to the amount he was charged for Davies' labor, and Davies agreed to reduce the bill to $21,452.24. Horkley denied that he owed Davies $21,452.24, and stated that he "would not pay any further amounts to him without supporting documentation and information."
The legal framework for our review of BMC's action against Horkley is outlined as follows. Because Horkley appeals from BMC's successful motion for summary judgment, we review this case under the standards governing review of motions for summary judgment. Under I.R.C.P. 56(c), summary judgment "shall be rendered forthwith if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law." The party seeking summary judgment faces the burden of proving the absence of material facts Tingley v. Harrison, 125 Idaho 86, 89, 867 P.2d 960, 963 (1994), but if "a party moves for summary judgment on the basis that no genuine issue of material fact exists with regard to an element of the non-moving party's case, the non-moving party must establish the existence of an issue of fact regarding that element." Farm Credit Bank of Spokane v. Stevenson, 125 Idaho 270, 273, 869 P.2d 1365, 1368 (1994). In other words, the non-moving party must "make a showing sufficient to establish the existence of an element essential to that party's case on which that party will bear the burden of proof at trial." Id. (internal quotations omitted).
Moreover, the non-moving party cannot withstand summary judgment when there is only a "slight doubt as to the facts," as "there must be sufficient evidence upon which a jury could reasonably return a verdict resisting the motion." Harpole v. State, 131 Idaho 437, 439, 958 P.2d 594, 596 (1998). Finally, "[a]ll disputed facts are to be construed liberally in favor of the non-moving party, and all reasonable inferences that can be drawn from the record are to be drawn in favor of the non-moving party." Bear Island Water Association, Inc. v. Brown, 125 Idaho 717, 721, 874 P.2d 528, 532 (1994).
"The right of a materialman to assert a lien against a structure for which materials have been furnished is a right granted and therefore determined by statute." Layrite Products Co. v. Lux, 91 Idaho 110, 113, 416 P.2d 501, 504 (1966). In Idaho, the right exists in I.C. §§ 45-501 and 505. Section 45-501 states in relevant part that "[e]very person performing labor upon, or furnishing materials to be used in the construction, alteration or repair of any . . . building . . . or any other structure . . . or who . . . improves any land . . . has a lien upon the same for the . . . materials furnished . . . ." Section 45-505 provides:
The land upon which or in connection with which any . . . building, improvement or structure is constructed, together with a convenient space about the same, or so much as may be required for the convenient use and occupation thereof, to be determined by the court on rendering judgment, is also subject to the lien, if, at the commencement of the furnishing of professional services or other work, [or] the furnishing of the material . . . the land belonged to the person who caused said . . . building, improvement or structure to be constructed, altered or repaired, or such person was acting as the agent of the owner, but if such person owns less than a fee simple estate in such land, then only the interest of the person or persons causing the services or improvement therein is subject to such lien.
"The purpose of these statutes is to compensate persons who perform labor upon or furnish material to be used in construction, alteration or repair of a structure." Franklin Building Supply Co. v. Sumpter, 139 Idaho 846, 850, 87 P.3d 955, 959 (2004). Materialman's lien laws are construed liberally "in favor of the person who performs labor upon or furnishes materials to be used in the construction of a building." Id. "To create a valid lien, there must be substantial compliance with the requirements of the statutes." Id.
"Statutes such as the Idaho provision which permit a lien for materials furnished usually apply only to furnishing for building purposes, and do not include a furnishing for general or unknown purposes . . . or on a general open account." Layrite, 91 Idaho 110, 113, 416 P.2d 501, 504. The "open account defense" is applicable "in situations when a person furnishing materials relies exclusively on the general credit of the purchaser, and does not look to the land, structure or building as additional security for the materials sold on credit." Great Plains Equipment, Inc. v. Northwest Pipeline Corp., 132 Idaho 754, 772, 979 P.2d 627, 645 (1999). In such a case, the materialman is not entitled to a lien. Id. In addition, the lien statutes do not apply to "a sale without any reference as to what shall be done with the material sold." Layrite, 91 Idaho 110, 113, 416 P.2d 501, 504.
So, to secure the protection of a mechanic's lien law, "[m]aterials must be furnished with special reference to their use in a particular building." Colorado Iron Works v. Riekenberg, 4 Idaho 705, 710, 43 P. 681, 683 (1896). Therefore, "a mere furnishing for building purposes generally is not sufficient." Layrite, 91 Idaho 110, 114, 416 P.2d 501, 505. As a result, "if a materialman sells his materials without any understanding as to their application the materialman can assert no lien upon the building upon which the materials may, in fact, be used." Id. However, "[w]here materials are furnished for use in a particular building, the fact that the materialman looks first or primarily to the contractor for payment and only subsequently to the building for security, would not of itself defeat the lien." Id.
Horkley argues that BMC's lien is invalid because BMC sold the building materials to Davies on an open account and therefore did not satisfy the requirement that BMC specifically refer to the materials' purpose. To support his claim that BMC purchased materials on an open account, Horkley notes that BMC applied Davies' payments with a "first in first out" (FIFO) method. BMC...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Petition for Writ Beck v. Elmore Cnty. Magistrate Court
...is "a formal declaration made in the presence of an authorized officer, such as a notary public." BMC West Corp. v. Horkley , 144 Idaho 890, 897, 174 P.3d 399, 406 (2007) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed. 2004)). Merely because a petition has been filed, does not necessarily mean tha......
-
Keith A. Sims, Dba Kasco of Idaho, LLC v. Aci Nw., Inc.
...a right granted and therefore determined by statute.’ In Idaho, the right exists in I.C. §§ 45–501 and 505.” BMC W. Corp. v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 890, 893, 174 P.3d 399, 402 (2007) (quoting Layrite Prods. Co. v. Lux, 91 Idaho 110, 113, 416 P.2d 501, 504 (1966)). “The purpose of these statutes......
-
Keith A. Sims, Dba Kasco of Idaho, LLC v. Aci Nw., Inc.
...a right granted and therefore determined by statute.’ In Idaho, the right exists in I.C. §§ 45–501 and 505." BMC W. Corp. v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 890, 893, 174 P.3d 399, 402 (2007) (quoting Layrite Prods. Co. v. Lux, 91 Idaho 110, 113, 416 P.2d 501, 504 (1966) ). "The purpose of these statute......
-
First Fed. Sav. Bank of Twin Falls v. Riedesel Eng'g, Inc.
...is "a ‘formal declaration made in the presence of an authorized officer, such as a notary public....’ " BMC West Corp. v. Horkley, 144 Idaho 890, 897, 174 P.3d 399, 406 (2007) (quoting Black's Law Dictionary (8th ed.2004)). An acknowledgement is not a verification by oath. ParkWest Homes, 1......