Bnsf Ry. Co. v. Cringle

• Decision Date: 30 December 2010
• Docket Number: No. DA 10–0161.,DA 10–0161.
• Parties: BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Petitioner and Appellant,v.Chad CRINGLE and Montana Department of Labor and Industry, Human Rights Commission, Respondents and Appellees.
• Court: Montana Supreme Court

359 Mont. 20

247 P.3d 706

2010 MT 290

BNSF RAILWAY COMPANY, a Delaware corporation, Petitioner and Appellant,

v.Chad CRINGLE and Montana Department of Labor and Industry, Human Rights Commission, Respondents and Appellees.

No. DA 10–0161.

Supreme Court of Montana.

Submitted on Briefs Oct. 6, 2010.Decided Dec. 30, 2010.

For Appellant: Benjamin O. Rechtfertig and Jeff Hedger, Hedger Friend, PLLC, Billings, Montana.For Appellees: Terry N. Trieweiler, Trieweiler Law Firm, Whitefish, Montana (Chad Cringle), Marieke Beck, Department of Labor and Industry, Helena, Montana.Justice BRIAN MORRIS delivered the Opinion of the Court.

[359 Mont. 21] ¶ 1 BNSF Railway Company (BNSF) appeals from the judgment of the First Judicial District Court, Lewis and Clark County, dismissing BNSF's petition for judicial review. We reverse and remand.

¶ 2 We review the following issue on appeal:

¶ 3 Does the 14–day filing deadline in § 49–2–505(3)(c), MCA, deprive a district court of jurisdiction over matters arising between the parties after the deadline has expired?

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND

¶ 4 The Montana Human Rights Bureau determined that BNSF unlawfully had discriminated against Chad Cringle (Cringle) when it denied him employment based solely on a statistical analysis of his height and weight ratio. BNSF appealed the decision to the Human Rights Commission (Commission) several days after the 14–day filing deadline of § 49–2–505(3)(c), MCA, had expired. Both the Commission and the District Court have refused to hear BNSF's reasons for missing the filing deadline based on their conclusion that § 49–2–505(3)(c), MCA, has removed their subject matter jurisdiction.

¶ 5 BNSF conditionally had offered Cringle employment as a track laborer. BNSF later denied Cringle employment after reviewing his height and weight. BNSF determined that Cringle presented a risk of harm to himself or others based on a statistical analysis of Cringle's height and weight. Cringle filed his complaint charging BNSF with unlawful discrimination in July 2008.

¶ 6 The Human Rights Bureau found reasonable cause to believe that unlawful discrimination had occurred and forwarded the complaint for a contested case proceeding. The Human Rights Bureau's hearing officer awarded summary disposition in favor of Cringle in May 2009. The hearing officer entered a final decision awarding damages to Cringle on September 2, 2009. The hearing officer also issued and served notice of the decision on September 2, 2009.

¶ 7 BNSF filed a notice of appeal and a request for an extension of time with the Commission on September 22, 2009. Cringle objected to BNSF's appeal and request for an extension of time. Cringle argued that the expiration of the 14–day filing deadline of § 49–2–505(3)(c), MCA, had rendered final the agency's decision. Cringle further argued that the filing deadline created a jurisdictional bar and deprived the Commission of authority to entertain BNSF's untimely appeal. The Commission denied BNSF's motion for an extension of time and dismissed BNSF's appeal. The Commission did not hear evidence regarding BNSF's reasons for missing the deadline. The Commission did not evaluate whether BNSF had good cause to support its motion and appeal.

¶ 8 BNSF filed a petition for judicial review in district court on November 2, 2009. BNSF argued that the Commission had authority to extend the 14–day filing deadline and had authority to hear BNSF's reasons why an extension should have been granted. BNSF acknowledged that it had received the hearing officer's final decision on September 3, 2009. BNSF mentioned in its brief that it had missed the appeal deadline due to its staff misfiling the decision or failing to calendar the appeal deadline.

¶ 9 Cringle moved to dismiss BNSF's petition for lack of jurisdiction and failure to state a claim for which relief could be granted pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1) and (6). Cringle relied on § 49–2–505(3)(c), MCA, to support his argument that the hearing officer's decision had become “final” and “not appealable to the district court” when BNSF missed the 14–day filing deadline. The District Court agreed with Cringle, concluded that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction, and dismissed BNSF's petition.

¶ 10 Cringle then filed an M.R. Civ. P. 60(b) motion for relief on March 23, 2010. Cringle advised the court that though it did not have jurisdiction to set aside the Commission's dismissal of BNSF's appeal, it retained jurisdiction to enforce the hearing officer's decision that had granted damages to Cringle and to award attorney fees. The court issued a nunc pro tunc order on March 29, 2010, to enforce Cringle's award of damages and determine the amount of attorney fees that BNSF owed to Cringle. The court entered judgment for Cringle on April 9, 2010. BNSF now appeals the court's conclusion that § 49–2–505(3)(c), MCA, deprived the District Court of jurisdiction.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

¶ 11 We review for correctness a district court's review of an administrative agency's decision. N. Cheyenne Tribe v. Mont. Dept. of Envtl. Quality, 2010 MT 111, ¶ 19, 356 Mont. 296, 234 P.3d 51. We review for correctness a district court's conclusions of law. Id. We review de novo a district court's determination regarding its subject matter jurisdiction. Koeplin v. Crandall, 2010 MT 70, ¶ 7, 355 Mont. 510, 230 P.3d 797.

DISCUSSION

¶ 12 Does the 14–day filing deadline in § 49–2–505(3)(c), MCA, deprive a district court of jurisdiction over matters arising between the parties after the deadline has expired?

¶ 13 BNSF argues that § 49–2–505(3)(c), MCA, does not place a jurisdictional limitation on the district court to entertain a petition for judicial review. Cringle responds that the legislature properly circumscribed the court's jurisdiction by enacting § 49–2–505(3)(c), MCA. We agree with BNSF. The legislature does not deprive the courts of subject matter jurisdiction when it enacts filing or notice deadlines. We have required accurate use of the term “jurisdiction” in our more recent history. Davis v. State, 2008 MT 226, ¶ 23, 344 Mont. 300, 187 P.3d 654; Miller v. Eighteenth Jud. Dist. Ct., 2007 MT 149, ¶ 43, 337 Mont. 488, 162 P.3d 121; State v. Clark, 2008 MT 317, ¶ 21, 346 Mont. 80, 193 P.3d 934 (Nelson & Morris, JJ., concurring); Steab v. Luna, 2010 MT 125, ¶ 24, 356 Mont. 372, 233 P.3d 351. We have emphasized the importance of not confusing the situation of a claimant's untimely filing with the district court's subject matter jurisdiction. See Miller, ¶¶ 43–44; Davis, ¶¶ 19, 22–23.

¶ 14 We have concluded that “categorical time prescriptions” do not “withdraw” or “circumscribe” the district courts' subject matter jurisdiction. Miller, ¶ 45; Davis, ¶ 23. In Davis, we overruled “ Gray, Pena, Wells, and other cases to the extent they have held that the Legislature limited district courts' subject matter jurisdiction” by enacting statutory time bars. Davis, ¶ 23. We since have consistently confirmed that statutory filing deadlines do not affect a district court's subject matter jurisdiction. State v. Johnston, 2008 MT 318, ¶¶ 18–19, 346 Mont. 93, 193 P.3d 925; Cobb v. Saltiel, 2009 MT 171, ¶ 33–34, 350 Mont. 501, 210 P.3d 138. See also Lorang v. Fortis Ins. Co., 2008 MT 252, ¶¶ 58–62, 345 Mont. 12, 192 P.3d 186; Clark, ¶¶ 19–32 (Nelson & Morris, JJ., concurring).

¶ 15 The Montana Constitution establishes the subject matter jurisdiction of the district courts. Mont. Con. art. VII, § 4; Miller, ¶ 45. Article VII, Section 4(1) provides that district courts have “original jurisdiction [...] in all civil matters and cases at law and in equity.” Article VII, Section 4(2) also provides that “[t]he legislature may provide for direct review by the district court of decisions of administrative agencies.” Subject matter jurisdiction involves the court's fundamental authority to hear and adjudicate cases or proceedings. Lorang, ¶ 57 (citations omitted). Subject matter jurisdiction “can never be forfeited or waived, nor can it be conferred by the consent of a party.” Davis, ¶ 20 (quoting Miller, ¶ 44).

¶ 16 We have called procedural time bars by several names. We characterized the one-year time bar for post-conviction relief in § 46–21–102, MCA, as a “rigid, categorical time prescription.” Davis, ¶ 23. We also described the judicially-enacted 60–day time bar in Miller as “a categorical, but nonjurisdictional, time prescription.” Miller, ¶ 48. We have recognized the federal courts' use of the term “claim-processing rule” to describe procedural time bars. Miller, ¶ 44 (referencing Kontrick v. Ryan, 540 U.S. 443, 454–56, 124 S.Ct. 906, 915–16, 157 L.Ed.2d 867 (2004)); Davis, ¶ 13 (referencing Eberhart v. U.S., 546 U.S. 12, 13, 126 S.Ct. 403, 403, 163 L.Ed.2d 14 (2005)). We also have referred to such a deadline as a “time limit,” “statute of limitation,” “time bar,” “procedural bar,” “rigid statutory prescription,” “period of limitation,” “notice requirement,” or “procedural requirement.” Molnar v. Mont. Pub. Serv. Commn., 2008 MT 49, ¶ 9, 341 Mont. 420, 177 P.3d 1048; State v. Redcrow, 1999 MT 95, ¶¶ 34, 41, 294 Mont. 252, 980 P.2d 622; Johnston, ¶ 19; Rohlfs v. Klemenhagen, LLC, 2009 MT 440, ¶¶ 29, 33, 354 Mont. 133, 227 P.3d 42.

¶ 17 These “periods of limitation” are scattered throughout the Montana Code Annotated and are “too numerous to mention.” Rohlfs, ¶ 33 n. 2. We have distinguished these “categorical time prescriptions” from “jurisdictional provisions” that “delineat[e] the classes of cases (subject-matter jurisdiction) ... falling within a court's adjudicatory authority.” Miller, ¶ 43 (citing Kontrick, 540 U.S. at 455, 124 S.Ct. at 915). Regardless of the label, none of the judicially or statutorily created procedural deadlines deprive a district court of subject matter jurisdiction. Miller, ¶ 45; Davis, ¶ 23; Johnston, ¶ 21.

¶ 18 Procedural time bars are affirmative defenses that are subject to forfeiture and waiver. Marias...