Board of Administration v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 31 July 1975
• Citation: 123 Cal.Rptr. 530,50 Cal.App.3d 314
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California, FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent; CITY OF SANTA MONICA and Dennis V. Rozsa, Real Parties in Interest. Civ. 46046.

Page 530

123 Cal.Rptr. 530

50 Cal.App.3d 314

BOARD OF ADMINISTRATION, PUBLIC EMPLOYEES' RETIREMENT SYSTEM, Petitioner, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of the State of California, FOR the COUNTY OF LOS ANGELES, Respondent CITY OF SANTA MONICA and Dennis V. Rozsa, Real Parties in Interest.

Civ. 46046.

Court of Appeal, Second District, Division 5, California.

July 31, 1975.

Rehearing Denied Aug. 26, 1975.

Hearing Denied Oct. 9, 1975.

Evelle J. Younger, Atty. Gen., Edward M. Belasco, Anne S. Pressman, Deputy Attys., Gen., for petitioner

Richard Knickerbocker, Santa Monica, for real parties in interest.

No appearance for respondent.

LORING, ^* Associte Justice.

This petition for Writ of Prohibition alleges that Board of Administration, Public Employees' Retirement System (Board) is a cross-defendant and respondent in two actions pending before respondent Court entitled 'Dennis V. Rozsa v. City of Santa Monica,' No. 33189 and 'City of Santa Monica v. Board of Administration of Public Employees' Retirement System,' No. C 108897; that said actions involve questions regarding Board's decision refusing to grant disability retirement to Dennis V. Rozsa (Rozsa) (who had been employed by the City of Santa Monica (City) as a police officer); that in the course of said two actions City submitted to Board 214 requests for admissions (attached thereto as Exhibit A); that over Board's objections respondent Court ordered Board to answer 59 requests for admissions.

The 59 requests for admissions were numbered 73--75, 77--84, 86--93, 111--118, 120--127, 174--181, 182--189, 191--198, and are too voluminous to incorporate in this opinion. In essence they sought to compel Board to admit the physical and mental processes by which it and its individual members arrived at Board's ultimate decision, that all members of the Board read its staff report, that Board's executive officer prepared Board's decision, that Board's decision was prepared prior to the oral hearing, that Board's decision, prepared by the executive officer, was read by each board member individually prior to the oral hearing, that each individual board member did not read the hearing record in its entirety, that each member of Board had a copy of the decision prepared by the executive officer before him during the oral hearing, that each individual board member did not read the prepared decision of Hearing Officer Leon B. Traub before the oral hearing, that each individual board member did not read or Consider any medical report of Dr. Louis Lemsky before the said hearing or the medical report or testimony of Dr. Morton D. Kritzer or the findings and award of the Workmen's Compensation Appeals Board prior to the oral hearing. Respondent Court struck the words 'or consider' from each interrogatory which included such words.

Board contends that respondent Court acted in excess of jurisdiction. We issued a Stay Order and an Alternative Writ of Prohibition. City answered, admitting the material allegations of the petition ¹ except that it denied that respondent Court acted in excess of jurisdiction. City alleges as affirmative defenses, Inter alia, that any error which respondent Court committed was not jurisdictional and that Board has an adequate remedy by appeal from any final judgment.

CONTENTIONS

Petitioner contends that:

Respondent Superior Court was without jurisdiction to compel board to disclose by admissions or otherwise how it and its individual members arrived at Board's ultimate decision.

FACTS

City's answer incorporates a copy of the proposed decision of Leon B. Traub, hearing By decision dated October 16, 1974, Board (in effect) refused to follow Hearing Officer Traub's decision but concluded that its decision of December 12, 1969, determined that Rozsa was not disabled for retirement purposes, that that decision was legally final, that applications by City and Rozsa subsequent to December 12, 1969 were denied.

                officer, Office of Administrative Hearings, dated June 21, 1974 (Exhibit B) and a copy of Board's decision denying the 'applications of Respondents' for the disability retirement of Rozsa (Exhibit D). 2  These documents indicate Rozsa was employed by City as a 'local safety member' under the Public Employees' Retirement System during the period May 1, 1949 to June 24, 1968, that on October 19, 1964, Rozsa filed an application for industrial disability retirement based upon an alleged injury which occurred August 19, 1957, the application was denied, an appeal was taken from the denial, the appeal was dismissed on January 21, 1968, because 'Rozsa returned to work on March 5, 1966,' (sic 1965) 3 that Rozsa allegedly 'reinjured his cervical spine and [50 Cal.App.3d 318] left upper arm and shoulder on July 5, 1965, March 19, 1966, and May 19, 1966' while performing duties as a police officer, that Rozsa became nervous and 'it became common for him to lose his calm.'  On May 22, 1968, a police surgeon discovered that Rozsa was suffering from high blood pressure--180/110, Rozsa's last day of work was June 29, 1968, that on February 13, 1969, City applied under Government Code section 21023 for disability retirement for Rozsa.  The application was denied, from which denial Rozsa appealed; the hearing officer's proposed decision denied Rozsa's appeal, Board adopted the proposed decision and denied Rozsa's appeal.  Rozsa petitioned for a reconsideration one day after Board's power to grant reconsideration had expired.  On June 21, 1971, Rozsa again applied to Board for disability retirement.  On August 12, 1971, the Board refused to consider the application filed June 21, 1971, because it had denied the original application December 12, 1969.  On August 4, 1972, City reinstated Rozsa to his position as of August 5, 1969, in reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in Boyd v. City of Santa Ana, 6 Cal.3d 393, 99 Cal.Rptr. 38, 491 P.2d 830, and notified the retirement system that Rozsa was an employee of City on leave of absence without pay.  On January 14 and 16, Rozsa and City, pursuant to instructions from Board's executive officers dated December 17, 1973, filed notices of appeal from the decision of August 12, 1971 denying the application of June 21, 1971; on June 21, 1974, the hearing officer found that Rozsa was permanently disabled as of June 24, 1968, that City's attacks on the decision of the Retirement System dated December 12, 1969 could be sustained and said judgment vacated because of extrinsic mistake of fact (citing authority) and negligence of an attorney (citing authority).  The hearing officer granted City's application for disability retirement of Rozsa Nunc pro tunc as of June 25, 1968
                

City now seeks to examine Board by way of Requests for Admissions in an effort to determine how Board and its individual members arrived at such decision and what documents, reports and records were considered by Board and its individual members in arriving at that decision. In effect City contends that Board and its members merely adopted the decision prepared by its Executive Officer prior to the oral hearing on October 16, 1974. Although City does not express its position in these precise terms, in ultimate effect City contends that Board did not exercise

its own independent judgment but merely 'rubber stamped' the decision of its Executive Officer.

DISCUSSION

The ultimate question involved in this proceeding is whether or not a court, in reviewing the decision of an administrative agency, may inquire into the physical and mental processes by which the agency and its members arrived at the decision. The answer is in the negative. We might well rest this decision on principles governing the separation for powers between the executive and judicial branches. But it is unnecessary to do so because the course of investigation which City proposed to pursue would have been improper if Board had been a full-fledged judicial body. The law is firmly established that if the Decision is right, the judgment or order will be affirmed regardless of the correctness of the grounds upon which the decision was reached. The superior court was called upon to review the Action of Board, not the Reasons for the action of the Process by which the Board or its individual members reached its conclusion. There can be no prejudicial error for erroneous logic or reasoning or the process by which the result is achieved if the decision itself is correct. In speaking of the decisions of a superior court, the Supreme Court in Davey v. Southern Pacific Co., 116 Cal. 325, 48 P. 117, said at page 329, 48 P. at page 117:

'. . . No rule of decision is better or more firmly established by authority, nor one resting upon a sounder basis of reason and propriety, than that a ruling or decision, itself correct in law, will not be disturbed on appeal remely because given for a wrong reason. If right upon any theory of the law applicable to the case, it must be substained regardless of the considerations which may have moved the trial court to its conclusion.'

In El Centro Grain Co. v. Bank of Italy, 123 Cal.App. 564 at 567, 11 P.2d 650 at 651, the court said: 'It is judicial action and not judicial reasoning which is the subject of review.' (Emphasis ours.)

In Niles Sand & Gravel Co. v. Alameda County Water Dist., 37 Cal.App.3d 924, 936, 112 Cal.Rptr. 846, 854 (footnote 12), the court said:

'Appellants pointed out at oral argument that the trial court had not viewed the situation as permitting invocation of the police-powers theory. Their observation is correct: the theory is not expressed in the court's findings or conclusions (quoted Supra), and the trial judge apparently disavowed it in his 'Memorandum Decision.' (See fn. 10, Ante.) However, the judge's view is not binding on appeal: accepting respondent district's argument based upon its police powers, we may cite it in support of the judgment under the familiar rule that we may affirm the latter, upon any valid ground...