Board of Com'rs of Eagle County v. Evans

• Decision Date: 10 August 1936
• Docket Number: 13978.
• Citation: 99 Colo. 83,60 P.2d 225
• Parties: BOARD OF COM'RS OF EAGLE COUNTY et al. v. EVANS.
• Court: Colorado Supreme Court

60 P.2d 225

99 Colo. 83

BOARD OF COM'RS OF EAGLE COUNTY et al. v. EVANS.

No. 13978.

Supreme Court of Colorado

August 10, 1936

In Department.

Error to District Court, Eagle County; William H. Luby, Judge.

Proceeding under the Workmen's Compensation Act by W. F. Evans claimant, opposed by the Board of County Commissioners of the County of Eagle in the State of Colorado. From an order of the State Compensation Insurance Fund and Industrial Commission of Colorado denying an award, claimant appealed to the district court which held for claimant, and to review the judgment, the county, the commission, and the State Compensation Insurance Fund bring error.

Judgment reversed.

Paul P Prosser, Atty. Gen., Byron Rogers, Atty. Gen., and Louis Schiff, Asst. Atty. Gen., for plaintiff in error Industrial Commission.

Harold Clark Thompson, of Denver, for plaintiff in error State Compensation Insurance Fund.

Hume S White, of Eagle, for plaintiffs in error County Commissioners of Eagle County.

M. J. Mayes, of Glenwood Springs, for defendant in error.

HILLIARD Justice.

A proceeding under the workmen's Compensation Act (C.L. § 4375 et seq., as amended). The claimant, Evans, resident of Eagle county, was summoned and served as a juror at a term of the Fifth judicial district court held at said county, and alleged that in consequence of circumstances attending the service he was made sick and on return to his home had a chill, which was followed by pneumonia. He claims that under section 4383, C.L.1921, as amended by chapter 175, page 818, Session Laws 1931, he was an employee of the county and entitled to compensation benefits. The award of the commission was adverse to claimant, but the trial court adjudged in his favor. The county, the commission, and the State Compensation Insurance Fund challenge the judgment, and contend: (1) That the juror was not a county employee within the meaning of the Compensation Act; (2) that while serving as a juror claimant's employment was casual and not in the course of the usual occupation of the county; (3) that the disease of pneumonia, the basis of claimant's demand, was not caused by accident arising out of and in the course of his employment. We dispose of the case on the first point.

It appears that claimant, 70 years of age, summoned for June 11, 1933, served actively as a juror in the trial of a criminal case June 12, 13, and 14; that after midnight of the 13th, agreement not having been reached in the case, which had been submitted, the jury was lodged in the county jail for the remainder of the night; that the sheriff supplied the jurors with small matresses, but with no covering; that the next morning claimant suffered with a cold, which continued after his return home in the afternoon of that day (Thursday); that home remedies were administered and he appeared to be 'resting easy'; that Sunday, following, a doctor was called who said 'it looked like pneumonia,' as eventuated; that the 'crisis' came the next Tuesday or Wednesday night, after which claimant slowly improved for about two weeks; that after the pneumonia had seemingly run its course, claimant's lungs showed signs of congestion; that the doctor then advised that he be taken to the Oak Creek Hospital, which was done July 7, 1933, where, his illness persisting, he continued for about four weeks; that for a couple of months after his discharge from the hospital claimant could not sit up all day; that never thereafter was he able to work as Before .

In its formal award against claimant, the commission said: 'The disease of pneumonia for which claimant claims compensation was not contracted as the result of an accidental injury within the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act. Further, that claimant was not an employee of the County of Eagle, within the meaning of the * * * act and that if an employee of said County, such employment was but casual and not [in] the usual course of trade, business, profession or occupation of said County.' As applicable here, the statute (already cited) defines the term 'employee' as follows: '(a) Every person in the service of the State, or of any county, * * * under any appointment or contract of hire, express or implied, except an elective official of the State, or any county.'

We cannot think the status of a juror is that of an employee serving, to quote the statute, by 'appointment or contract of hire, express or implied.' Jurors are selected, summoned, and serve pursuant to statute. Sections 5839-5849, C.L.1921. Their compensation is fixed by like authority. Section 7905, C.L.1921, as amended; Sess. Laws 1929, p. 425, c. 119. It is true that except in instances where jury fees are taxed to parties litigant, the county must discharge that burden; but neither the service of the juror nor the obligation of the county, as we conceive comes of appointment or...