Board of Com'rs of Vance County v. Town of Henderson

Citation79 S.E. 442,163 N.C. 114
PartiesBOARD OF COM'RS OF VANCE COUNTY v. TOWN OF HENDERSON.
Decision Date24 September 1913
CourtNorth Carolina Supreme Court

Appeal from Superior Court, Vance County; Cline, Judge.

Action by the Board of Commissioners of Vance County against the Town of Henderson. From a judgment in favor of plaintiff defendant appeals. Reversed.

Where the language of a statute is free from ambiguity and conveys a definite and sensible meaning, the court should not hesitate to give it a literal interpretation merely because they may question the wisdom or expediency of the enactment.

This action was brought to recover certain expenses incurred and paid by the county of Vance in executing the provisions of law in regard to quarantine during an outbreak of smallpox in said county and in the town of Henderson, which is in the said county, in the years 1911 and 1912. The complaint is lengthy, and necessarily so, but we need not set out even the substance of all the allegations in order to show clearly the matter involved in the appeal. Defendant demurred, and, as the complaint is thereby admitted for the purpose of deciding the question of law presented in the case, it may be briefly stated, as appears therefrom, that the county, between June 1, 1911, and October 1, 1912, removed to its pesthouse outside the corporate limits of Henderson, and cared for, a number of smallpox patients from the town, and also had under its care in the town, at the same time, other patients who were treated at their homes in Henderson under the county quarantine; the total number of patients being 62. The county paid out for the care and cure of these patients the sum of $1,814.12 and made a proper demand for the same, but payment was refused by the defendant. What is actually due would, of course, have to be ascertained by a jury or otherwise if the defendant is liable at all. The county had a quarantine officer, but the city of Henderson had none at the time stated. The court overruled the demurrer, and defendant appealed.

Henry T. Powell and T. M. Pittman, both of Henderson, for appellant.

A. C. & J. P. Zollicoffer, of Henderson, for appellee.

WALKER J. (after stating the facts as above).

Our opinion is that the city of Henderson is not liable for the amount paid by the county of Vance on account of the maintenance and care of the persons afflicted with smallpox while they were quarantined, nor for any part of it. The plaintiff's claim is based upon the provisions of Revisal, § 4508, and this, with the statute cited by defendant (Acts of 1911, c. 62, § 2, ratified March 7, 1911) will be discussed presently.

The counties, cities, and towns of the state have only such powers and capacities as have been conferred upon them by law. Dillon on Mun. Corporations (5th Ed.) § 59; Fidelity Co. v. Flemming, 132 N.C. 337, 43 S.E. 899; State v Webber, 107 N.C. 962, 12 S.E. 598, 22 Am. St. Rep. 920; Harrington v. Greenville, 159 N.C. 634, 75 S.E. 849. "It has been too often decided to be now questioned that the liability of towns to support poor persons is founded upon and limited by statute and is not to be enlarged or modified by any supposed moral obligation." Smith v. Colerain, 9 Metc. (Mass.) 492. In an action to recover the expenses of caring for a smallpox patient, Justice Hoke, for this court, said: "So far as municipal obligation is concerned, it is accepted doctrine that the care and support of the indigent and infirm is a matter of statutory provision." Copple v. Commissioners, 138 N.C. 131, 50 S.E. 574. But it is unnecessary to pursue this line of thought any further, as the plaintiff bases his right of recovery upon the statute. The Legislature, some years ago, provided an entire scheme for the preservation of the public health in the proper exercise of its police power, and especially for quarantining and caring for persons afflicted with smallpox and other contagious and infectious diseases. This statute will be found in Revisal of 1905, vol. 2, c. 95. In section 4508 of that chapter it is enacted that "the expense of the quarantine and of the disinfection shall be borne by the householder in whose family the case occurs, if able, otherwise by the city, town or county of which he is a resident." There was a superintendent of health for Vance county, who was also quarantine officer of the county, duly appointed according to law, and there was a superintendent of health for the town of Henderson, but he had not been appointed quarantine officer.

By the Acts of 1911, c. 62, the Legislature adopted a new scheme for the preservation of the public health, and especially for a system of quarantine by which persons are allowed to be isolated and treated, for the purpose of preventing the spread of contagious and other diseases, and it concludes with this section: "All laws and clauses of laws in conflict with this act are hereby repealed." It is provided by section 15 of the act as follows: "The duties of the municipal health officer, within the jurisdiction of the town or city for which he is elected, shall be identical with those of the county superintendent of health for the county, with the exception of the duties of the county superintendent of health pertaining to the jail, convict camp, and county home. The authorities of any city or town shall have the power to assign the duties of quarantine officer to the municipal health officer, and in such cases the municipal health officer shall faithfully perform the duties of the quarantine officer as prescribed in sections twenty and twenty-one of this act." And in section 21 there is this provision: "All expenses of quarantine and disinfection shall be borne by the town or county employing a quarantine officer."

We conclude from a perusal of the two statutes (Revisal, c. 95 § 4508, and Acts of 1911, c. 62, § 21) that, if the former statute ever imposed any liability upon a city without a quarantine officer, the Legislature intended to establish a new rule of liability by the latter section for the expenses of quarantining diseased persons and to require that they shall be paid by the county which has a quarantine officer, unless the town in that county, where the expenses are incurred, has appointed a quarantine officer and undertaken for itself, by a system of quarantine, to isolate or segregate persons having contagious and other diseases, which are mentioned in the act, within its corporate limits, or, if possible, to take charge and supervision of the patients at their respective homes; but if it should elect, as in this case, not to exercise its power of appointing a quarantine officer for said purpose, it is the duty of the county to perform this service, the expenses thereof to be paid by the county which has a quarantine officer. In other words, the town is entitled, under the provisions of the new act, to the same rights in respect to quarantine and the prevention of the spread of diseases as any other part of...

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