Board of County Com'rs of Clark County v. CMC of Nevada, Inc.
| Decision Date | 13 October 1983 |
| Docket Number | No. 13491,13491 |
| Citation | 670 P.2d 102,99 Nev. 739 |
| Parties | BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF the COUNTY OF CLARK; David Canter, Robert Broadbent, Manuel Cortez, Jack Petitti, Richard Ronzone, Woodrow Wilson and Thalia Dondero, as the members of said Board; Planning Commission of the County of Clark; Jack Ross, Robert Georgeson, Artoro Cambeiro, Richard Davis, Diane Dixon, Tex King and Ray E. Willis, as members of said Commission; and Robert Weber, Building Inspector of Clark County, Appellants, v. CMC OF NEVADA, INC., a Nevada corporation, and Charter Medical Corporation, a Delaware corporation, Respondents. |
| Court | Nevada Supreme Court |
Robert J. Miller, Dist. Atty., John F. Whisenhunt, and Stanley W. Parry, Deputy Dist. Attys., Las Vegas, for appellants.
Beckley, Singleton, DeLanoy & Jemison, Las Vegas, for respondents.
Appellants seek relief from the district court's order mandating appellants' approval of respondents' application for architectural supervision and issuance of a building permit. We conclude that the district court erred in granting mandamus and therefore reverse.
Respondent CMC of Nevada, Inc. (CMC) is the owner of certain real property situated adjacent to the Desert Springs Hospital in Clark County, Nevada. On April 13, 1979, CMC applied for a C-P zoning change on the subject property for the purpose of constructing "parking lot facilities." Thereafter, on June 5, 1979, appellant Clark County Board of Commissioners (Board) approved the requested zone change. Two months later, respondents applied to the Clark County Planning Commission (Commission) for a conditional use permit and variance to construct and maintain, within 5 feet of the side property line, an 80 bed psychiatric hospital on the property which had been previously zoned C-P. On October 2, 1979, the Board followed the recommendation of the Commission and approved the applications for a conditional use permit and variance. The variance was modified, however, so as to require a minimum setback of 15 feet from the side property line.
The public notice for the use permit and variance described the proposed facility merely as a hospital, not a psychiatric hospital.
Prior to obtaining a building permit, CMC applied for architectural supervision. 1 The application was filed on October 20, 1980, in furtherance of the use permit and variance previously granted. On November 20, 1980, after public notice, the matter of architectural supervision came before the Commission in a public hearing. 2 The hearing resulted in a refusal to approve CMC's plans, assertedly due to an inadequate setback or "buffer" between the proposed project and an adjacent elementary school. 3 The Board unanimously concurred with the action and recommendation of the Commission on January 20, 1981. As a result of the foregoing action, the Clark County building inspector refused to issue the building permit which was requisite to the commencement of construction of the psychiatric hospital.
On the assumption that the Board's approval of the conditional use permit and variance would enable them to proceed, respondents expended in excess of $120,000 and entered into construction commitments of over $2,000,000 in furtherance of the proposed project. 4
Respondents sought to break the impasse by filing suit and requesting mandamus to force County authorities to favorably act upon CMC's application for architectural supervision and to require the County to issue a building permit. The district court held that the Commission's discretion under the architectural supervision ordinance, Chapter 29.52 (Ordinance), was limited to considerations which were of an "aesthetic or appearance" nature and that the action of the Board and Commission in refusing to approve CMC's plans was arbitrary, capricious and an abuse of discretion. The district court then ordered that a peremptory writ of mandate issue requiring the County to "grant" CMC's application for architectural supervision and to issue a building permit.
Appellants claim entitlement to relief on the primary contention that the lower court was unduly restrictive in its construction of the county ordinance respecting architectural supervision. We are asked to construe the language of the Ordinance to permit the imposition of non-aesthetic requirements, such as an enlarged buffer zone, thus entitling the Commission and the Board to impose substantive modifications to plans and specifications which are approved in the course of granting a zone change, use permit or variance.
The scope and effect of the Ordinance are threshold issues on appeal. If we were to accept the limited construction of the district court, respondents' right to proceed with the project would be apparent. It is conceded that the Commission found no problems with the appearance of the planned facility. Thus, in undertaking architectural supervision, if the Commission's function under the Ordinance is confined to project aesthetics, CMC should have received the necessary plan approval.
We do not agree with the district court's conclusion. In our view, the Ordinance was not enacted to merely provide perfunctory review and endorsement of plans previously submitted in support of a conditional use permit request. First, we observe that the Commission may require architectural supervision in any given instance irrespective of the substantial conformity of the plans to those submitted and approved in connection with the granting of a conditional use permit. Section 29.52.010(c). This grant of discretion in the Commission is provided in order to promote the purposes of the zoning title in accordance with Section 29.01.020. The latter section specifies that the purpose of the title is to promote "the health, safety, morals or general welfare of the present and future inhabitants of Clark County ...." It further indicates, in part, that the title is designed "to ensure that the development of land is commensurate with the character and the physical limitations of the land", "to take into account ... the relative suitability of such land for such development" and "to promote health and the general welfare." Further, the referenced general purpose section of title 29 reflects consideration in its enactment for "encouraging the most appropriate use of land throughout Clark County."
The Commission could hardly function in effective promotion of the recited purposes of the zoning title if it were restricted solely to considerations of aesthetics. We must conclude that subsection (c) of the Ordinance validly recognizes authority and discretion in the Commission to require whatever measures are necessary to satisfy the concerns which prompted an imposition of architectural supervision.
Respondents nevertheless contend, and the district court agreed, that the following language of the Ordinance makes clear its narrow purview:
The planning commission shall consider these drawings, plans and sketches in an endeavor to provide that such buildings, structures and other improvements shall be designed and constructed so that they will not become unsightly, undesirable or obnoxious in appearance to the extent that they will hinder the orderly and harmonious development of the county, limit the opportunity to attain the optimum use and value of land and improvements, impair the desirability of living conditions in the same area or adjacent agricultural or residential areas, or otherwise adversely affect the general prosperity or welfare. (Emphasis supplied.)
It is argued, as held by the lower court, that the words "unsightly", "undesirable" and "obnoxious" are all modified or defined by the prepositional phrase "in appearance". Such a construction would supply redundancy to the word "unsightly". It would likewise deprive the term "undesirable" of meaningful import since it would be merely repetitive of the term "unsightly", and thus also redundant. The term "obnoxious", however, invited modification since it may connote in general, an offensive, disgusting, reprehensible, harmful, odious or objectionable nature which, unless so modified, may potentially cast County action approving a conditional use permit in a position of obloquy. See Webster's Third New International Dictionary.
Courts must construe statutes and ordinances to give meaning to all of their parts and language. State ex rel. List v. AAA Auto Leasing, 93 Nev. 483, 568 P.2d 1230 (1977); Nevada State Personnel Division v. Hashins, 90 Nev. 425, 529 P.2d 795 (1974). The court should read each sentence, phrase, and word to render it meaningful within the context of the purpose of the legislation. See State Gen. Obligation Bond v. Koontz, 84 Nev. 130, 437 P.2d 72 (1968). A reading of legislation which would render any part thereof redundant or meaningless, where that part may be given a separate substantive interpretation, should be avoided.
Our review of the Ordinance in question reveals that the district court's construction unnecessarily renders the word "undesirable" meaningless, at the expense of a reading which would render the language significant within the context of the stated policy of promotion of the public safety, health and welfare. We find such an interpretation unacceptable and hold that the prepositional phrase "in appearance" modifies only the term "obnoxious".
The above construction of the Ordinance will subserve the purposes of its enactment thereby allowing the Commission to provide meaningful assurance that the public health, safety and welfare will be promoted, and that land will be accorded its most appropriate use. Such a construction will also give effect to the unquoted part of the Ordinance quoted above:
To this end the planning Commission shall suggest any changes in the plans of such proposed buildings, structures and other improvements which it may deem necessary to accomplish the purposes of this chapter,...
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