Board of County Commissioners of Sheridan County v. Hanna
| Decision Date | 12 March 1901 |
| Citation | 9 Wyo. 368,63 P. 1054 |
| Parties | BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS OF SHERIDAN COUNTY v. HANNA |
| Court | Wyoming Supreme Court |
ERROR to the District Court, Sheridan County, HON. JOSEPH L STOTTS, Judge.
On motion of the county attorney to dismiss proceedings in error taken by the board of commissioners of a county from a judgment against it. The motion was resisted by the attorneys employed by the board to assist the county attorney, after the board had, by resolution, ordered that the services of said attorneys be dispensed with. The material facts are stated in the opinion.
Proceedings dismissed and cause remanded.
J. F Hoop, County Attorney, and W. S. Metz, for the motion.
Appelget & Mullen, in opposition to the motion, contended that the orders of the board, directing a dismissal and dispensing with their services, were not legal orders, and should not be considered, for the reason that one member voted against the orders, and one of the members voting for the orders was disqualified, on account of interest, from voting on the question; which left one vote for and one against the orders. It was further contended that, as their fees were conditioned upon a reversal of the judgment, if the case was dismissed they could not truly verify their claim for fees, and hence the statement in the resolution that their fees would be paid upon presentation of their claim was of no account, and did not secure their charges, and hence the board could not discharge them from the case.
Defendant in error having recovered a judgment in this cause, in the district court, against the plaintiff in error, the latter, by an order of the board, regularly entered, directed that an appeal be taken, and employed Appelget & Mullen to assist the county attorney in taking the appeal and prosecuting the same in this court. Said firm of attorneys had, under a similar employment, represented the county in the trial court, and were paid for those services. The order of the board, as entered, providing for their employment to assist in this court, fixed their fee at one hundred dollars, to be paid upon the disposition of the cause in this court, according to a written agreement between the board and said attorneys. By the affidavits of said attorneys filed herein, it is stated that said fee was to be paid only in case the judgment was reversed; and if unreversed, they were to be refunded the expense of preparing briefs.
When the cause was tried below, Charles Lenwood was county attorney, and as the case came here, said Lenwood as county attorney, and Appelget & Mullen were named as attorneys of record for plaintiff in error, and as such they had filed briefs herein upon the merits of the cause.
On the ninth day of January, of the present year, J. F. Hoop, as county attorney, filed a motion, waiving all error, and dismissing the appeal. Accompanying the motion was filed a certified copy of an order of the board of commissioners, made and entered January 7, directing the county and prosecuting attorney to dismiss this appeal. The same resolution directed said county attorney to notify Appelget & Mullen that their services were no longer required. The latter are here resisting the motion. They contest the validity of the order aforesaid, and a subsequent one to be referred to later on, discharging them from the case, and the validity of the orders of the board directing a dismissal of the error proceedings.
The matter was brought to the court's attention verbally, but not submitted, early in January, shortly after the filing of the motion to dismiss; and we then intimated that so far as the matter should be found to be within the power of the court, attorneys of record would be reasonably protected from unwarranted discharge in the absence of a settlement with them.
The attorneys opposing the motion of the county attorney, then stated that the material objection to the action of the board, was that it was had by the votes of two members only of the board, while the other member voted against it; and that one of the members voting to dispense with the services of said attorneys and to dismiss the appeal, was interested adversely to the county, in the judgment. The matter was set for hearing, and has been submitted upon affidavits and briefs. The defendant in error does not oppose a dismissal.
Upon the facts, therefore, as disclosed by the papers before us, the question is whether the proceedings should be dismissed, notwithstanding the objection of said attorneys.
Two resolutions of the board appear to have been entered on the same date, January 7, 1901. That which we suppose to have been the first one in point of time, referred to an agreement with Appelget & Mullen to assist the county attorney in appealing this case and prosecuting the same in the supreme court, and fixed their compensation at the sum of $ 100, to be paid, according to the agreement previously made, when the cause should be disposed of in this court. The other resolution provided for dispensing with the services of said attorneys, and directed a dismissal of the appeal by the county attorney. It is fair to assume that the first resolution was adopted by the board as formerly constituted, and the other by the board as composed of the newly elected members. The first order referred, as stated above, to a previous employment under a written agreement, and that there had been an omission to record the fact in the journal of the board.
The opponents of the motion to dismiss submit certain affidavits, and among other things it is shown that one Skinner, a member of the present board, who voted on January 7, to direct a dismissal of the appeal, stated at the time that he was one of the interested parties in the case, but believed he would have voted the same way if he were not.
On February 6, it appears that another resolution was adopted by the board, said Skinner and one other member voting for its adoption, and the third member recording his vote in the negative. That resolution covers the ground of the second order of January 7, but goes somewhat further. It is as follows:
...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Simon v. Chicago, Milwaukee & St. Paul Railway Co.
...84 N.Y.S. 460; Rogers v. O'Mary, 95 Tenn. 514, 32 S.W. 462; Southern Nat. Bank v. Curtis (Tex. Civ. App.) 36 S.W. 911; Sheridan County v. Hanna, 9 Wyo. 368, 63 P. 1054; Riehl v. Levy, 45 Misc. 425, 90 N.Y.S. 411; v. Curtiss, 72 Wash. 211, 130 P. 89. "The lien of an attorney entitled him to ......
-
Anderson v. Star-Bair Oil Company
...subject to the lien. Cunningham v. McCreedy, 61 Tenn. 141; Heister v. Den, 17 N. J. L. 438. Vanatta could not be discharged until paid. 9 Wyo. 368; 2 R. C. L. 1002. An lien is allowed by statute. 4885 C. S. If assignee takes the judgment subject to the lien, 14 L. R. A. (N. S.) 1101; 9 L. R......
-
State Board of Law Examiners v. Brown
...R. C. L. 486. Respondent's acts in this case constituted a suspendable or disbarable offense. Enos v. Keating, 39 Wyo. 217; Sheridan County v. Hanna, 9 Wyo. 368, 6 C. J. Section 1196, W. C. S. 1920, 6 C. J. 591; In re Tinney, 176 N.Y.S. 102; In re Vermilya, 211 N.Y.S. 36; In re Larson, (Min......
-
Wunnicke Finance Co. v. Tupper, 3062
...deprive the attorney of his compensation for the agreed amount of which the client is still liable.' See also Board of Com'rs of Sheridan County v. Hanna, 9 Wyo. 368, 63 P. 1054. We infer from the facts herein that the plaintiff knew nothing whatever about the fact that defendant was about ......