Board of County Commissioners v. Lewis
| Citation | 10 S.Ct. 286,33 L.Ed. 604,133 U.S. 198 |
| Parties | BOARD OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS v. LEWIS. 1 |
| Decision Date | 27 January 1890 |
| Court | United States Supreme Court |
G. C. Clemens, for plaintiff in error.
W. H. Rossington, for defendant in error.
This is an action on coupons. There were three classes of bonds, namely, court-house, bridge, and current-expense bonds. The circuit court held the latter void, the others valid, and judgment was rendered accordingly. Lewis v. Comanche Co., 35 Fed. Rep. 343. The county alleges error. Our inquiry, therefore, is limited to the bridge and court-house bonds.
The first and principal contention of the plaintiff in error is that at the time of the issue of these bonds there was no valid county organi ation, no corporate entity, capable of contracting; that the pretended organization in 1873 was fraudulent and void, and shortly thereafter abandoned, the county remaining unorganized until 1885, when, upon memorial presented and census taken, it was organized anew as in the case of an unorganized county. In order to fully understand the question here presented, a brief retrospect of the condition, the legislation, and judicial decisions of the state is necessary.
At the time of its admission into the Union in 1861, the settlements were confined to the eastern portion of the state, the west being wholly unoccupied. The territory of the state was divided into counties, those in the eastern portion being organized, and those in the western unorganized, the legislation as to the latter being limited to the matter of names and boundaries. Of course there were no courts in these unorganized counties, for the machinery was wanting; there were no county buildings, county officers, orjurors. So they were by statute attached to the organized counties for judicial purposes. It was foreseen that they would, in course of time, become occupied, and that provision must be made for their organization as political subdivisions of the state. So, by the constitu- tion, in section 1 of article 9, power was given to the legislature in these words: 'The legislature shall provide for organizing new counties, locating counties, and changing county lines.' The first legislature, on the 4th day of June, 1861, passed an act entitled 'An act relating to the organization of new counties.' This was amended in 1872, and under the act as so amended the county of Comanche was organized. Section 1 of this chapter prescribes the proceedings, and is as follows: Laws 1872, p. 243.
Obvio sly, full control over the matter of organization of new counties was, by the constitutional provision quoted, given to the legislature, as was held by the supreme court of the state in the case of State v. Commissioner, 12 Kan. 426, in which case the court says:
In the fall of 1873 proceedings looking to the organization of Comanche county were had, which were in form in full compliance with the requirements of section 1, above quoted. These proceedings closed, as required, with the proclamation of the governor, and upon the face of the papers was presented a clear case of a regular and valid organization. But, while these proceedings were regular on their face, the agreed statement of facts shows that 'said organization was effected solely for purposes of plunder, by a set of men intending to secure a de facto organization and issue the bonds of said county, register and sell them to distant purchasers ignorant of the facts, and enrich the schemers, while plundering the future inhabitants and tax-payers of the county; and upon the consummation of said scheme, in the spring or early summer of 1874, all of said schemers, together with those who were the said de facto officers of the said county, left said county, and never returned, and said county remained with said organization totally abandoned until in February, 1885, when said county was, upon memorial presented and census taken, organized as in cases of unorganized counties.'
If these were all the facts a very interesting inquiry would arise as to how far an organization fraudulent in fact but regular in form, and duly approved by the executive, could bind the county by an issue of bonds prima facie valid, and passing into the hands of a bona fide holder. But that inquiry is not before us. The ample power delegated by the constitution to the legislature enabled it not only to organize a county in any manner it saw fit, but also to validate by recognition any organization already existing, no matter how fraudulent the proceedings therefor had been. This proposition has been distinctly ruled by the supreme court of the state. See the case in 12 Kan. supra. See, also, State v. Stevens, 21 Kan. 210, and State v. Yoxail, 40 Kan. 323, 19 Pac. Rep. 723.
Nor is this ruling peculiar to the jurisdiction of Kansas. It is universally affirmed that, when a legislature has full power to create corporations, its act recognizing as valid a de facto corporation, whether private or municipal, operates to cure all defects in steps leading up to the organization, and makes a de jure out of what before was only a de facto corporation. It is true that there must be a de facto organization upon which this recognition may act, as was held in State v. Ford Co., 12 Kan. 446; and in this case it appears from the findings, as well as from the testimony, that there was such de facto organization. There being this de facto organization, there was ample recognition by the legislature. The very matter appears which in the Harper County Case1 was, by the supreme court of Kansas, declared a legislative recognition sufficient to cure all defects, namely, an act detaching the c unty from an organized county to which, for judicial purposes, it had theretofore been attached, and establishing courts therein. This act was approved March 9, 1874, the day before these bonds were signed. But...
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Republic of Iraq v. ABB AG
...Similarly, the obligations of a foreign state are unimpaired by a change in that state's government. See Comanche County v. Lewis, 133 U.S. 198, 205, 10 S.Ct. 286, 33 L.Ed. 604 (1890). Because “the rights of a sovereign state are vested in the state rather than in any particular government ......
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Republic Iraq v. Abb AG, Docket No. 13–0618.
...(1927). Similarly, the obligations of a foreign state are unimpaired by a change in that state's government. See Comanche County v. Lewis, 133 U.S. 198, 205, 10 S.Ct. 286, 33 L.Ed. 604 (1890). Because “the rights of a sovereign state are vested in the state rather than in any particular gov......
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Flagg v. Sch. Dist. No. 70, Barnes Cnty.
...attempting to settle this point, we refer to some authorities bearing upon it. Lewis v. Commissioners, 105 U. S. 739; Comanche Co. v. Lewis, 133 U. S. 198, 10 Sup. Ct. 286;Bernards Tp. v. Morrison, 133 U. S. 523-527, 10 Sup. Ct. 333;Montclair v. Ramsdell, 107 U. S. 147, 2 Sup. Ct. 391;Dixon......