Board of Ed'n v. Board oe Ed'n.

Decision Date19 November 1887
PartiesBoard of Ed'n v. Board oe Ed'n.
CourtWest Virginia Supreme Court

Schools and School-Districts Corporate Duties.

Public duties are required of such corporations as counties and districts, as a part of the machinery of the State government, and, in order that they may properly perform these duties, they are invested with certain corporate powers: but their functions are wholly of a public nature, and they are at all times subject to the will of the Legislature unless restrained by the Constitution. (p. 430.)

Schools and School-Districts Division of Distribution of Funds.

Upon the division of an old public corporation, and the creation of a new one, out of a part of its inhabitants and territory, the Legislature may provide for an equitable apportionment or division of the corporate property, and impose upon the new corporation or upon the people and territory thus disannexed, the obligation to pay an equitable portion of the corporate debts. (p. 430.)

Schools and School-Districts.

Where the Legislature does not prescribe any regulation for the apportionment of the property, or that the new corporation shall pay any portion of the debt of the old, the old corporation will hold all the corporate property within its new limits, and be entitled to all the debts due the old corporation, and be responsible for all the debts of the corporation, existing before and at the time of the division; and the new corporation will hold all the corporate property falling within its boundaries, to which the old corporation wall have no claim. (p. 431.)

Schools and School-Districts.

The powers exercised in the division of public corporations being purely legislative, the power to prescribe the rule by which the property of the corporation shall be divided, and the debts apportioned, being incidental to the power to divide the territory, must also be strictly legislative, and the courts have no authority over the subject, and can only construe the act of the Legislature, and see that the legislative will is carried into effect. (p. 433.)

Schools and School-Districts.

The Legislature had the right to confer its power to divide public corporations on the County Court, and though, in the act conferring such power, it gave no directions as to the apportionment of the property and debts of the old corporation, yet, as incident to the power granted, the County Court had the same power in that regard as existed in the Legislature before the act was passed; and if such court divide a district, and, the order making such division, is silent as to the apportionment of corporate property and debts, the same result will follow as if the district had been divided by the Legislature, and the act was silent as to the apportionment of the corporate property and debts of the old corporation. (p. 433.)

Schools and School-Districts.

The County Court of* Barbour, by authority vested in it by section 10, ch. 5, Acts 1881, divided the old education district of Bar- ker, and from said territory created a new district called "Valley District," and said order of division was silent as to the apportionment of the corporate property and debts of Barker district. At the time of such division, Barker district owed a debt of over $1,100.00, which it paid, and filed its bill against the board of education of the new Valley district for contribution. Held, that by said order of division, Barker district held all the corporate property within its new limits, and Valley district all the corporate property within its boundaries, and the old or Barker district was entitled to all the debts due it, before and at the time of the division, and liable to pay all its debts, and had no claim on Valley district for contribution, and the decree requiring Valley district to pay a part of the debt was reversed and the bill dismissed.

Dayton & Teter for appellant.

T. A. Bradford for appellee.

Johnson, President:

On the twenty seventh day of June, 1881, the County Court of Barbour county in proper form, and with proper parties before it, entered the following order: "That a new district be, and the same is hereby, established out of Barker district, including and composed of the territory of said Barker district lying on the west side of the Tygart's Valley river and bounded as follows. [Here the boundary is inserted.] Said district shall be known as and called 'Valley District'" etc.

Before the division, the Board of Education of the old or Barker district, had built a number of school-houses, and in payment of balance therefor had executed two promissory notes, one for $625.00, dated the eleventh day of December, 1869, payable five years after date, to Loronzo Denton and Daniel C. Wilmoth, with interest from date; the other for $475.00, bearing the same date, payable five years after date, to Daniel C. Wilmoth, with interest from date. The plaintiff Board of Education of Barker district filed its bill at January rules, 1884, in the Circuit Court of Barbour county, in which it set out the above facts, and exhibited a copy of the order of the County Court dividing said district, and also copies of said two notes. The bill further alleges that fifteen school-houses had been built in the said district, six in what is now the new district, and nine in the old; that the six cost $3,318.65, and the nine, $4,661.16; that the cost of building all said school-houses had long since been paid by the plaintiff, before the division, except the sum of $1,150.00, and that this debt would also have been paid before said division, but it was involved in a tedious chancery suit between other parties, and the said Barker district did not know to whom to make payment, and therefore chose to wait the termination of said suit; that at the time of the division, in 1881, the taxable property in what is now Barker district amounted to the sum of $156,910.29, and the taxable property in what is now Valley district to the sum of $100,-790.13, and that the aggregate of all the taxable property in the old territory of Barker district was, at that time, $257,700.42; and that the said debt of $1,150.00, (it should be $1,100.00,) with the interest thereon, constitutes a charge on all the property in both of said districts. The plaintiff represents that it "has paid nearly the whole of the said debt of $1,150.00, together with the interest thereon accrued, which amounts to a large sum of money, to wit, to the sum

of $, and for the balance it has levied a sufficient

sum upon the tax-payers of its district to liquidate the whole debt;" that it has by all the means in its power sought an amicable settlement of said debt with the defendant, but it, acting on the mistaken idea that the plaintiff is responsible for the whole debt, has refused to settle. The debt was incurred in 1869, long before the new district was created. The plaintiff is advised that it has a right to come into this court and ask that the said defendant be compelled to pay the plaintiff its just proportion of said debt, and interest thereon; "and that the portion of said debt which the said defendant should be required to pay should bear such a proportion to the whole debt as its taxable property bore to the aggregate amount of all the taxable property in both of said districts in the year 1881, which will be about $450, with interest thereon from the eleventh day of December, 1869." The prayer of the bill is that the cause be referred to a commissioner, with instructions to state and settle the accounts between the plaintiff and defendant, and that plaintiff should have a decree for the amount so ascertained, and for general relief. On the twelfth day of March, 1884, the defendant demurred to the bill, which was overruled.

On the nineteenth day of July, 1884, an order was made referring the cause to Commissioner J. L. Holt, who was directed to ascertain and report what proportion of the debt of $1,150.00, mentioned in the bill, the defendant ought to pay, and, in making said settlement, he should have reference to the taxable values in said district of Barker before the same was divided, and also the taxable values in both said districts since the division.

On the seventeenth day of October the defendant answered, insisting on its demurrer, and resting its defence on the ground that the better and more costly school-houses had been built in what is now Barker district, and that the house for which the debt was incurred is in the old territory, and that the district had collected debts due to it at the time of the division, and appropriated this money to its own use, etc.

Commissioner Hall made his report, to which there were exceptions, which were overruled; but at the October term,

1885, the court, after overruling the exceptions, referred the cause to Commissioner Peck, with the same instructions as to the former commissioner, and further to ascertain and report, "what proportion of credit said defendant is entitled to receive, if any, on account of any payments that may have been made to the plaintiff of debts due to the district of Barker" before the division. Commissioner Peck reported the amount due to Barker district on the eleventh day of May,

1886, $698.47.

To this report three exceptions were filed First, because the basis adopted by the commissioner is not the true basi« upon which the settlement should be made; second, because said commissioner has failed to report, as requested, the settlement upon a basis of population, enumeration, and area; third, because no notice is taken of, and credit given for, the largely disproportionate amount of repairs done in Barker over Valley district when the two were one district.

On the fourteenth day of July, 1886, the cause was heard, on papers formerly read, etc., and on the report of Commissioner Peck, and the exceptions thereto; which exceptions were overruled, and the report confirmed, and a personal decree...

To continue reading

Request your trial
1 cases

VLEX uses login cookies to provide you with a better browsing experience. If you click on 'Accept' or continue browsing this site we consider that you accept our cookie policy. ACCEPT