Board of Ed. of Central School Dist. No. 2 of Town of Oyster Bay v. Nyquist

• Decision Date: 26 September 1969
• Citation: 60 Misc.2d 967,304 N.Y.S.2d 441
• Parties: Application of the BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2 OF the TOWN OF OYSTER BAY, New York, Petitioner, v. Ewald B. NYQUIST, as Acting Commissioner of Education of the State of New York, Respondent.
• Court: New York Supreme Court

Page 441

304 N.Y.S.2d 441

60 Misc.2d 967

Application of the BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CENTRAL SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 2 OF the TOWN OF OYSTER BAY, New York, Petitioner, v. Ewald B. NYQUIST, as Acting Commissioner of Education of the State of New York, Respondent.

Supreme Court, Special Term, Albany County.

Sept. 26, 1969.

[60 Misc.2d 968] George C. Pratt, Mineola, for petitioner.

Robert D. Stone, Albany, for respondent.

Sneeringer & Rowley, Albany, for Cora Cullen, intervenor.

MEMORANDUM

JOHN T. CASEY, Justice.

This is a proceeding pursuant to Article 78 of the CPLR.

Petitioner, The Board of Education of Central School District No. 2 of the Town of Oyster Bay, New York (herein the Board) has instituted an Article 78 proceeding to set aside a decision of the respondent, the Acting Commissioner of Education (herein Commissioner). Petitioner contends the decision was arbitrary and capricious and was predicated upon errors of law. Respondent, in lieu of interposing an answer, has moved to dismiss the petition. The intervenor-respondent in this proceeding, Cora E. Cullen, was allowed to intervene by stipulation.

The decision which petitioner seeks to set aside had its genesis in a salary dispute between Cora Cullen and the Board. Cora Cullen was employed by the Board as a nurse-teacher for fifteen years and during her employment she was paid in accordance with a salary schedule which the Board had established for nurse-teachers. The amount of compensation she received under that schedule was in excess of the statutory minimum for a teacher (Education Law § 3102) but it was substantially less than a teacher was receiving in accordance with the salary schedule which the Board had adopted for teachers. Periodically, Cora Cullen requested the Board to reconsider its position and classify nurse-teachers as teachers and pay them accordingly. On several occasions, the Board considered her request but each time it refused to change.

On July 1, 1968 Cora Cullen retired. On January 27, 1968, prior to her retirement, she appealed the decision of the Board concerning her classification and salary to the Acting Commissioner of Education. In her appeal she sought back pay for fifteen years. More particularly, she demanded the difference between the amount she received as a nurse-teacher and the amount she would have received had she been paid in accordance with the salary schedule for teachers.

The Commissioner held she was entitled to back pay for the last six years of her employment. In reaching his decision, the Commissioner made several noteworthy observations. Initially, he noted that the obligation of the Board to compensate Cora Cullen was a continuing obligation and was governed by the six year statute of limitations for contract actions. Next, he observed that a nurse-teacher is an important member of the instructional team, has specific instructional functions, and possesses the educational preparation of a teacher. The Commissioner then found:

Where a board of education has adopted salary schedules providing for compensation at rates in excess of those required by statute, These schedules represent mandated salary for that particular district. Since no reasonable basis exists on the record presented before me which would justify placement * * * (Cora Cullen) * * * upon a schedule which provides for compensation at rates less than those prevailing for teachers with similar educational qualifications and experience the appeal must be sustained. (Emphasis added).

Before examining the questions presented by this motion a statement as to the availability of judicial review is necessary. A decision of the Commissioner of Education is 'subject to markedly limited judicial review as compared with other administrative agencies'. Ocean-Hill Brownsville Governing Bd. v. Board of Educ. of the City of New York, 23 N.Y.2d 483, 297 N.Y.S.2d 568, 245 N.E.2d 219. Under Section 310 of the Education Law, his decisions in an appeal are final and conclusive and not subject to question in any place or court whatever. Education Law § 310. Despite the blanket prohibition of that section, however, a court may review a decision by the Commissioner which is shown to be purely arbitrary. E.g., Board of Educ. of the City of New York v. Allen, 6 N.Y.2d 127, 188 N.Y.S.2d 515, 160 N.E.2d 60; Board of Educ. of the City School District of Mt. Vernon v. Allen, 58 Misc.2d 762, 296 N.Y.S.2d 890. A factual determination by the Commissioner is reviewable only '(if it depends) upon such arbitrary and naked power that no reasonable man could reach the result'. Cochran v. Levy, 175 Misc. 666, 668, 25 N.Y.S.2d 960, 963, aff'd, 263 App.Div. 921, 32 N.Y.S.2d 539; accord, Board of Educ. of Central School District No. 2, etc. v. Allen, 14 A.D.2d 429, 431--432, 221 N.Y.S.2d 587, 589--590, aff'd, 12 N.Y.2d 980, 238 N.Y.S.2d 968, 189 N.E.2d 500. Furthermore, it is of no consequence that the decision may have involved statutory construction by the Commissioner. Levitch v. Board of Educ. of the City of New York, 243 N.Y. 373, 153 N.E. 495; accord, Board of Educ. of Central School District No. 3 of Crown Point v. Nyquist, 42 Misc.2d 224, 227, 247 N.Y.S.2d 953, 955. Thus, as can be seen, the petitioner shoulders a substantial burden in this proceeding.

The Board argues that Sections 3102 and 3103 of the Education Law vest it with the power to classify occupations and establish salary schedules. It further argues that the sole limitation upon its exercise of this power is to refrain from establishing salary differentials based upon sex. Education Law § 3102(3); LaPenna v. Union Free School District No. 9, Town of Cheektowaga, 20 A.D.2d 366, 246 N.Y.S.2d 817. Those sections provide, inter alia, minimum salary schedules for teachers. These salary schedules, however, were not intended as actual salary schedules fitting the requirements of every locality, and each community may devise schedules to meet their special local conditions as long as salaries are not below the applicable state minimums. LaPenna v. Union Free School District No. 9, Town of Cheektowaga, supra. Furthermore, once a School Board has satisfied the statutory minimums it may provide for salary differentials to some teachers and not to others. The Sections do not, however, vest and power in a School Board to determine what parties are to be classified as 'teachers'. They merely provide the minimum salary schedules for 'teachers'. Indeed, the Legislature has defined 'teachers' in Section 3101; such action indicates a local board should not be vested with the absolute authority to classify an employee as a 'teacher'. In light of the above, this court concludes that Sections 3102 and 3103 of the Education Law do not vest a Board of Education with absolute power, subject to the single limitation concerning sex, to determine what employees are 'teachers'.

The second objection raised by the Board concerns the limitations upon the review by the Commissioner of a decision by the Board. Specifically, the Board maintains its decision with respect to Cora Cullen was reviewable only upon a showing of arbitrariness. The simple answer to this objection is that the Commissioner in his detailed opinion found the decision of the Board to be unreasonable and the Board, in this proceeding, has not established that the Commissioner was arbitrary in reaching that conclusion. Accordingly, this argument is not a sufficient predicate for judicial review. Schoening v. Board of Educ. of the City of New York, 8 Misc.2d 957, 960, 169 N.Y.S.2d 711, 713, aff'd, 7 A.D.2d 1015, 185 N.Y.S.2d 232. (Note, the Board of Education in this case is granted special powers under Sections of the Education Law).

Along the same lines, there are instances when the Commissioner may substitute his judgment for the judgment of a Board of Education even though the Board of Education has not acted arbitrarily. In Vetere v. Allen, which involved the adequacy of racially imbalanced schools, the Court of Appeals held that the Commissioner could substitute his judgment for the judgment of a...