Board of Ed. of Scottsdale High School Dist. No. 212 v. Scottsdale Ed. Ass'n

• Citation: 17 Ariz.App. 504,498 P.2d 578
• Decision Date: 26 June 1972
• Docket Number: CA-CIV,No. 1,1
• Parties: , 81 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2138, 68 Lab.Cas. P 52,864 BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the SCOTTSDALE HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 212 et al., Appellants, v. SCOTTSDALE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Appellee, Lawrence K. Nelson et al., Appellants in Intervention. 1994.
• Court: Court of Appeals of Arizona

Page 578

498 P.2d 578

17 Ariz.App. 504, 81 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2138, 68 Lab.Cas. P 52,864

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the SCOTTSDALE HIGH SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 212 et al., Appellants, v. SCOTTSDALE EDUCATION ASSOCIATION, Appellee, Lawrence K. Nelson et al., Appellants in Intervention.

No. 1 CA-CIV 1994.

Court of Appeals of Arizona, Division 1, Department B.

June 26, 1972.

Moise Berger, Maricopa County Atty. by Albert Firestein, Chief Civil Deputy Atty., Phoenix, for appellants.

Lewis & Roca by John P. Frank and Mary M. Schroeder, Phoenix, for appellants in intervention.

Harrison, Myers & Singer by Mark I. Harrison, Phoenix, for appellee.

JACOBSON, Judge.

This appeal questions the right of a school board to enter into a 'collective bargaining agreement' with a teachers' organization purporting to bind all teachers in the school district as to wages, hours, conditions of employment, and methods of future negotiations between the parties.

The particular vehicle by which this appeal reaches us is by way of a special action filed in the Maricopa County Superior Court on February 23, 1972, by the appellee, Scottsdale Education Association (SEA) against the appellants, the Boards of Education of Scottsdale High School District No. 212 and Scottsdale Elementary School District No. 48 and the individual members thereof (collectively hereinafter referred to as the Board), seeking relief in the nature of mandamus to compel the Board to follow an 'impasse' procedure called for by a 'Professional Negotiation Policy' executed by SEA and the Board in 1971. On March 22, 1972 the trial court by way of minute entry indicated it was going to grant SEA the relief requested. On March 28, 1972, a taxpayer group attempted to intervene. By formal written judgments entered on April 5 and 6, 1972 the trial court denied the application to intervene, denied motions for new trial and objections to judgment and directed the Board to comply with the impasse procedures set forth in the policy agreement of 1971 and further prohibited the Board from negotiating contracts for the school year 1972--73 with all teachers in the school district, including those not belonging to SEA without first complying with the impasse procedure. This appeal was filed on April 6, 1972 and due to the importance of the issues presented and the limitations of time, this court granted an accelerated appeal. After oral arguments in that accelerated appeal procedure, this court entered an order denying the Board's request to stay the effect of the trial court's order.

The factual background giving rise to this litigation is as follows: In the spring of 1970, various labor disputes arose between the teachers employed by the Scottsdale School District and the Board concerning wages, salaries, hours of employment, and working conditions of teachers. In an attempt to settle these disputes the Board agreed to deal with a teachers' representative organization to be chosen by election of the teachers. An election was then held to determine whether SEA or the Scottsdale Federation of Teachers, AFL-CIO, would be the Exclusive bargaining agent for All teachers in future negotiations with the Board. SEA won that election.

Thereafter in the fall of 1970, SEA and the Board entered into negotiations culminating in August, 1971, in the agreement here under attack. The effective termination date of that agreement is July 31, 1972. This agreement, designated a 'Professional Negotiation Policy', is before the court in pamphlet form consisting of 65 pages and deals with such diverse matters as the amount of time the president of SEA may spend on association business with full pay (80 days), the size of classes, class books to be used, grievance procedures, salaries, hours, teacher selection, transfer of teachers, evaluation of teachers, reprimand of teachers, and the method to be followed in future negotiations.

Between January 4, 1972 and February 9, 1972 the parties through their negotiating teams, entered into negotiations for a 'successor agreement' for the school year 1972--73. Among the items which were negotiated were salaries for the 1972--73 school year. On February 9, 1972, the Board advised SEA that the Board's offer on salaries be either accepted or the 'impasse' procedure set forth in the agreement would be invoked. The impasse procedure outlined by the agreement calls for the convening of a three-member impasse panel consisting of one member appointed by the Board, one member appointed by SEA and one member selected by the first two. This panel is empowered to consider the matter upon which agreement cannot be reached and to report its findings and recommendations to the parties. These findings and recommendations are not binding upon the parties.

SEA agreed impasse had been reached on the issue of the salaries and notified the Board of its selection of its impasse panel member. However, on February 15, 1972, the Board met and in essence disavowed the 1971 agreement concerning impasse, unilaterally set teachers' salaries for the 1972--73 school year, and indicated its intentions to issue teachers' contracts for the coming school year based on such salaries. The special action by SEA to compel the Board to comply with the impass procedure and to restrain the Board from entering into teachers' contracts for the year 1972--73 followed.

We note initially that the only standing intervenors have before this court is to question the propriety of the trial court's action in denying them permission to intervene. In view of the lateness at which they sought to intervene in the trial (after minute entry of judgment) and the adequacy of representation by the named defendants, we find no abuse of discretion by the trial court in denying their motion to intervene. See Mitchell v. City of Nogales, 83 Ariz. 328, 320 P.2d 955 (1958).

Our ruling in this regard may be somewhat academic, as intervenors have filed herein a 'joint brief' with appellants and counsel for intervenors was appointed as a special deputy county attorney to argue the matter on appeal. It would thus appear that the intervenors' interests are more than adequately represented in this appeal.

The Board first attacks the procedure of SEA in bringing this suit as a 'special action', contending that in essence, what SEA is asking for is either 'a clear, unadulterated old-fashioned labor injunction' or an 'action for specific performance of a contract in a labor situation'. While this attack is not without some merit, because of the press of time on all parties requiring expeditious handing of this matter, and because of the importance of this issue to persons other than the immediate litigants before the court, we prefer to side-step the procedural problems and deal directly with the issues presented on the merits.

Upon analysis, we believe the merits of this action first present the question of whether the teachers may organize themselves for the purposes of collective bargaining.

The answer to this question seems to be relatively well settled--all citizens, be they public employees or not, have the right to peaceably assemble and organize for any proper purpose and to present their views to any public body, such a right being embodied within the first amendment to the United States Constitution. City of Springfield v. Clouse, 356 Mo. 1239, 206 S.W.2d 539 (1947); Norwalk Teachers' Ass'n. v. Board of Education, 138 Conn. 269, 83 A.2d 482 (1951). See American Federation of Labor v. American Sash & Door Co., 67 Ariz. 20, 189 P.2d 912 (1948).

We therefore hold that the teachers of the Scottsdale School Districts could legally organize themselves and designate a representative (SEA) to carry out their collective wishes, including bringing to the attention of the Board their positions concerning conditions of employment.

Having said this, may the Board bind itself with a collective bargaining agreement with that representative? We believe the answer to this question turns first on a definition of 'collective bargaining' and second upon the statutory authority of the Board to engage in that so-defined term.

From our reading of the cases, the term 'collective bargaining' can run the gauntlet from a teacher making known to the Board his or her desires concerning placing a blackboard in the classroom, to discussing and conferring with the Board as to a teachers' salary scale, to an agreement setting forth in exacting details the workings of the school system.

The Board seems to contend, however, that any definition of 'collective bargaining' is beyond the authority of the Board without specific legislation authorizing such procedure.

A.R.S. § 15--443 provides in part that '(t)he board of trustees may . . . enter into contracts with and fix the salaries of teachers . . . for the succeeding year. The contracts of all certified employees shall be in writing . . ..' Further, the Board is empowered by A.R.S. § 15--441 to 'prescribe and enforce rules for the government of the schools . . .' and the 'management' of the school is vested in the Board. A.R.S. § 15--545.

In our opinion, this power to hire teachers, fix their salaries and to control the operation of the school district, necessarily carries with in the implied power or authority, if the Board so desires, to consult and confer with an individual teacher in order for the Board to make a sapient judgment as to wages and working conditions. In this regard we see little difference between 1200 teachers individually making known their desires to the Board concerning their wages and working conditions, and a representative of those 1200 teachers making known the same desires.

As we stated in City of Springfield v. Clouse, Supra:

'Organization by citizens is a method of the democratic way of life and most helpful to the proper functioning of our representative form of government. It should be safeguarded and encouraged as a means for citizens to discuss their problems...