Board of Ed. of School Dist. of Philadelphia v. Philadelphia Federation of Teachers Local No. 3, AFT, AFL-CIO

• Decision Date: 03 October 1975
• Docket Number: AFL-CIO
• Citation: 346 A.2d 35,464 Pa. 92
• Parties: , 90 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2879 BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellant, v. PHILADELPHIA FEDERATION OF TEACHERS LOCAL NO. 3, AFT,
• Court: Pennsylvania Supreme Court

Page 35

346 A.2d 35

464 Pa. 92, 90 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2879

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the SCHOOL DISTRICT OF PHILADELPHIA, Appellant, v. PHILADELPHIA FEDERATION OF TEACHERS LOCAL NO. 3, AFT, AFL-CIO.

Supreme Court of Pennsylvania.

Argued April 11, 1975.

Decided Oct. 3, 1975.

[464 Pa. 93] Vincent J. Salandria, Philadelphia, for appellant.

Leonard M. Sagot, Randall J. Sommovilla, Thomas W. Jennings, Philadelphia, for appellee, Philadelphia Federation of Teachers, Local No. 3 AFT, AFL-CIO; Teitelman, Sagot, Herring, Jennings & Luber, Philadelphia, of counsel.

Before EAGEN, O'BRIEN, ROBERTS, POMEROY, NIX and MANDERINO, JJ.

OPINION OF THE COURT

ROBERTS, Justice.

This appeal presents the important question of whether a school district may agree in a collective bargaining agreement to submit to arbitration the propriety of discharging a non-tenured teacher. The court of common pleas held that it may do so. We agree, and therefore affirm.

The collective bargaining agreement between the Philadelphia Board of Education and the Philadelphia Federation of Teachers provides that '(a) teacher or other employee who does not have tenure shall not be subjected to discipline or discharge except for just cause.' It also establishes a comprehensive grievance procedure, terminating in arbitration. ¹ On July 8, 1974, the board notified Edgar Vahey, a non-tenured teacher, that he was suspended from his position pending dismissal. The union asserted that this was improper under the agreement and, pursuant to the grievance procedure, demanded arbitration and initiated the procedure for the selection of arbitrators. The board then filed a complaint in equity seeking to enjoin the arbitration on the ground that the agreement to submit employee discharges to arbitration was an unlawful delegation of the exclusive power of the board. The union filed preliminary objections in the nature of a demurrer, and these were sustained. This appeal followed. ²

The board maintains that the provisions of the collective bargaining agreement here involved illegally delegate to an arbitrator the powers conferred exclusively on the board by sections 510 and 514 of the Public School Code of 1949. ³ Consequently, it is argued, those provisions are invalid under section 703 of the Public Employee Relations Act ⁴ (PERA) insofar as they provide for arbitration of grievances concerning discharge of non-tenured teachers. ⁵

We cannot agree.

This Court has recently discussed the meaning of section 703 in Pennsylvania Labor Relations Board v. State College Area School District, --- Pa. ---, ---, 337 A.2d 262, 269 (1975) (filed April 17, 1975). There Mr. Justice Nix wrote for the Court:

'The mere fact that a particular subject matter may be covered by legislation does not remove it from collective bargaining under section 701 if it bears on the question of wages, hours and conditions of employment. We believe that section 703 only prevents the agreement to and implementation of any term which would be in violation of or inconsistent with any statutory directive. The distinction between this view and that expressed by the majority of the Commonwealth Court (as we understand it) is best illustrated by an example. Under section 1142 of the Public School Code, a minimum salary scale is set forth. Section 1151 provides that school boards may pay salaries in excess of the minimum salary. Framing the issue in accordance with the formulation suggested by the majority in the Commonwealth Court, section 1142 created a duty not to pay below the minimum scale and section 1151 granted the employer the prerogative to pay more than the minimum rate. Clearly, the parties are precluded from agreeing to a rate lower than the minimum scale but even though the statute vested in the public employer the prerogative to pay a higher rate to do so as a result of collective bargaining is not 'in violation of, or inconsistent with, or in conflict with' the statute in question. The mere fact that the General Assembly granted the prerogative to the employer does not exclude the possibility that the decision to exercise that prerogative was influenced by the collective bargaining process.

'. . .. Section 703 merely prevents a term of a collective bargaining agreement from being in violation of existing law. Cf. Board of Education, City of Englewood v. Englewood Teachers Ass'n., 64 N.J. 1, 311 A.2d 729 (1973); Board of Education of Union Free School District #3 v. Associated Teachers of Huntington, Inc., 30 N.Y.2d 122, 331 N.Y.S.2d 17, 282 N.E.2d 109 (1972); Joint School District #8 v. Wisconsin Employment Relations Board, 37 Wis.2d 483, 155 N.W.2d 78 (1967). If however the General Assembly mandates a particular responsibility to be discharged by the board and the board alone, then the matter is removed from bargaining under section 701 even if it has direct impact upon 'wages, hours and other terms or conditions of employment."

The issue then is whether the challenged provisions of the collective bargaining agreement delegate to the arbitrator a responsibility which the General Assembly has commanded shall be 'discharged by the board and the board alone.' ⁶ In deciding this question, other provisions of the PERA are of particular significance because the PERA itself altered the board's previously exclusive control of most subjects within its competence and '(repudiated) . . . the traditional concept of the sanctity of managerial prerogatives in the public sector.' Id. at ---, 337 A.2d at 267.

The General Assembly, far from forbidding arbitration of disputes arising out of a collective bargaining agreement, expressly commands it in section 903 of the PERA, which provides, in pertinent part:

'Arbitration of disputes or grievances arising out of the interpretation of the provisions of a collective bargaining agreement is mandatory. . . . (T)he final step (of the grievance procedure) shall provide for a binding decision by an arbitrator. . . .' ⁷

This policy is even stronger than that embodied in federal labor policy. See United Steelworkers v. American Manufacturing Co., 363 U.S. 564, 80 S.Ct. 1343, 4 L.Ed.2d 1403 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 S.Ct. 1347, 4 L.Ed.2d 1409 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S. 593, 80 S.Ct. 1358, 4 L.Ed.2d 1424 (1960). Federal policy merely favors the submission of disputes to arbitration, while the PERA requires it.

It is not difficult to perceive the reasons for the statutory requirement that grievances be submitted to arbitration. If a dispute arises as to the interpretation or application of the agreement there must be a mechanism for resolving the dispute or the agreement is meaningless. Historically, the primary means of resolving such disputes was the strike, and many agreements in the private sector retain this mechanism for at least some types of dispute. ⁸ However, resolution of all disputes by resort to economic force is costly to the parties, and more importantly, to the public. The General Assembly therefore chose to make the widely used procedure of labor arbitration mandatory under the PERA. This brings the special expertise of labor arbitrators to bear on the often difficult problems of administering the collective bargaining agreement while assuring parties that their agreement will be effective and guaranteeing both the parties and the public that such disputes will not disrupt peaceful labor relations or interrupt public services. ⁹ The board, however, maintains that the subject matter of this dispute requires that it be excluded from the general mandate to arbitrate. It bases this contention on sections 510 and 514 of the Public School Code of 1949. ¹⁰ We conclude that these provisions do not preclude the submission to arbitration of this type of dispute.

Section 510 empowers the board to 'adopt and enforce' regulations 'regarding the management of its school affairs and the conduct and deportment of all . . . teachers . . . during the time they are engaged in their duties . . ..' Clearly the requirement of 'just cause' for discipline does not infringe upon this prerogative of the board, for violation of a valid regulation adopted by the board would surely be 'just cause' for discipline. ¹¹ Thus, the power of the board to adopt and enforce regulations is not impaired by the requirement of 'just cause' for discipline of a teacher.

The other statutory provision relied upon by the board, section 514, empowers the board (subject to certain procedural requirements) 'to remove any of its . . . employees . . . for incompetency, intemperance, neglect of duty, violation of any of the school laws of this Commonwealth, or other improper conduct.' ¹² This provision is the very antithesis of one entrusting the board with broad discretion to formulate and implement educational policy. The board is empowered to act only for reasons specified in the statute and its action is subject to judicial review. Hutnik v. Duquesne School District, 8 Pa.Cmwlth. 387, 302 A.2d 873 (1973); see Local Agency Law, Act of December 2, 1968, P.L. 1133, §§ 7, 8, 53 P.S. §§ 11307, 11308 (Supp.1974).

Moreover, the collective bargaining agreement is susceptible of at least two constructions which fully protect the authority of the board. ¹³ These stem from consideration of the procedure formerly in effect.

When a school board heretofore sought to dismiss a non-tenured teacher, the teacher was notified of the charges and afforded a hearing before the board, which then acted upon the proposed dismissal. As this Court stated in Brentwood Borough School District Appeal, 439 Pa. 256, 262--63, 267 A.2d 848, 851 (1970):

'At the hearing that board plays a dual role. It acts as both prosecutor and as judge, and because of this it can never be totally unbiased.'

The defects of this procedure from the standpoint of the teacher have long been evident. While there is an opportunity for...