Board of Ed. of Fulton County v. Board of Ed. of College Park

• Decision Date: 11 April 1918
• Docket Number: 526.
• Parties: BOARD OF EDUCATION OF FULTON COUNTY ET AL. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF COLLEGE PARK.
• Court: Georgia Supreme Court

95 S.E. 684

147 Ga. 776

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF FULTON COUNTY ET AL. v. BOARD OF EDUCATION OF COLLEGE PARK.

No. 526.

Supreme Court of Georgia

April 11, 1918

Syllabus by the Court.

The act of the General Assembly approved August 14, 1908 (Laws 1908 p. 555), amending the charter of College Park, is not violative of paragraph 1 of section 4 of article 8 of the Constitution of Georgia (Civil Code 1910, § 6579), as special legislation upon a matter which is covered by general law.

Nor does the act violate paragraph 8 of section 7 of article 3 of the Constitution (Civil Code 1910, § 6437), in that it is an effort to create two corporations in the same act, thus referring to more than one subject-matter in the same law.

Where a municipality is authorized by the General Assembly to create a public school system coextensive with its corporate limits a part or all of which territory has theretofore been included within the system of public schools operated by the county, forming a portion of a school district, the municipality succeeds to the control of educational matters and to the title to the real estate held as public school property within its territory, holding such title as a statutory trustee or public agent.

None of the assignments of error require a reversal of the judgment of the court below.

Error from Superior Court, Fulton County; J. T. Pendleton, Judge.

Suit by the Board of Education of College Park against the Board of Education of Fulton County and others. Decree for plaintiff and defendants bring error. Affirmed.

Mayson & Johnson, of Atlanta, for plaintiffs in error.

Alfred C. Broom, of Atlanta, for defendant in error.

GILBERT J. (after stating the facts as above).

1. The act of the General Assembly approved August 14, 1908, amending the charter of College Park and providing for a system of public schools (Acts 1908, p. 555), is not violative of paragraph 1 of section 4 of article 8 of the Constitution of Georgia (Civil Code, § 6579), which grants authority to counties, militia districts, school districts, and municipal corporations to establish and maintain public schools in their respective limits by local taxation, upon certain conditions. The act of 1908 does not undertake to create a rural school district, such as is contemplated in what is known as the McMichael Act (Civil Code, § 1531 et seq.). This is obvious from the plain language employed therein. It is not, therefore, a provision by special act for a matter already covered by a general act of the General Assembly. It provides for a public school system by a municipal corporation, as authorized by the Constitution. Farmer v. Thomson, 133 Ga. 94, 65 S.E. 180; Burkhart v. Fitzgerald, 137 Ga. 366, 73 S.E. 583; James v. Blakely, 143 Ga. 122, 84 S.E. 431.

2. It is contended that the act of 1908, amending the charter of the city of College Park, as above stated, is in effect an effort of the Legislature to create two corporations in the same act, and that this is violative of paragraph 8 of section 7 of article 3 of the Constitution of Georgia (Civil Code, § 6437), which reads as follows:

"No law or ordinance shall pass which refers to more than one subject-matter, or contains matter different from what is expressed in the title thereof."

We think this contention is untenable. The matter of operating a system of public schools is certainly germane and bears a generic relation to the general purpose for which College Park was granted a municipal charter. Board of Education v. Barlow, 49 Ga. 232, 237, where the point is expressly ruled on. It is contended, however, that that case was decided prior to the adoption of the Constitution of 1877, and that the Constitution of 1868 did not contain the inhibition against the passage of laws containing more than one subject-matter. The vice of this contention is that the act in question does not contain more than one subject-matter. It does contain legislation in regard to different branches of the same subject-matter, all of which are within the legitimate domain of the varied functions necessary for the existence of a municipal corporation. See Welborne v. State, 114 Ga. 793, 817, 818, 40 S.E. 857; Mayor, etc., of Americus v. Perry, 114 Ga. 871, 877, 40 S.E. 1004, 57 L.R.A. 230; City of Cartersville v. McGinnis, 142 Ga. 71, 82 S.E. 487, Ann.Cas. 1915D, 1067. Members of a municipal school board or county board of education are public officers. Stanford v. Lynch, 147 Ga. 518, 94 S.E. 1001. These boards, and others that might be named, are quite uniformly held to constitute quasi corporations, public in their nature. McQuillin on Municipal Corporations, 5074; Whitehead v. Detroit, 139 Mich. 490, 102 N.W. 1028; City of Blakely v. Singletary, 138 Ga. 632, 75 S.E. 1054. When such a board is expressly made a body corporate, it may sue and be sued. Woodward v. Westmoreland, 124 Ga. 529, 52 S.E. 810, 4 Ann.Cas. 472. In the case of City of Blakely v. Singletary, supra, the board of education was not expressly made a corporate body; but in that case it was decided, nevertheless, that the members of the board were in the nature of statutory trustees and could legally bring mandamus proceedings against the city. Compare Gunnison v. Board of Education, 176 N.Y. 11, 68 N.E. 106, and authorities cited.

3. Where a municipality is authorized by the General Assembly to create a public school system coextensive with its corporate limits, a part or all of which territory has theretofore been included within the system of public schools operated by the county, forming a portion of a school district, the municipality succeeds to the control of educational matters and to the title to the real estate held as public school property within its territory, holding such title, of course, as a statutory trustee or public agent. The Legislature, it is universally conceded, has the power to provide for such division of the school property as may be located within the new territory between the county school board and the municipal board of education as it may deem just and equitable. Mount Pleasant v. Beckwith, 100 U.S. 532. 25 L.Ed. 699. In Hunter v. Pittsburgh, 207 U.S. 161, 178, 28 S.Ct. 40, 46 (52 L.Ed. 151), speaking of municipal corporations, the court said:

"The number, nature, and duration of the powers conferred upon these corporations and the territory over which they shall be exercised rests in the absolute discretion of the state. * * * The state, therefore, at its pleasure may modify or withdraw all such powers, may take without compensation such property, hold it itself, or vest it in other agencies, expand or contract the territorial area, unite the whole or a part of it with another municipality, repeal the charter, and destroy the corporation. All this may be done, conditionally or unconditionally, with or without the consent of the citizens, or even against their protest."

The same may be said of school districts and of the property which they hold. At most, it is a mere change from one trustee to another, where the General Assembly, in express terms or by necessary implication, transfers the title control, and use of public school property from a county board to a municipal board. Where, however, the lawmaking power fails to provide for such...