Board of Educ. of Unified School Dist. No. 443, Ford County v. Kansas State Bd. of Educ.

• Decision Date: 30 October 1998
• Docket Number: No. 80000,80000
• Parties: , 130 Ed. Law Rep. 308 BOARD OF EDUCATION OF UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 443, FORD COUNTY, Kansas, Appellant, v. KANSAS STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Appellees.
• Court: Kansas Supreme Court

Page 68

966 P.2d 68

266 Kan. 75, 130 Ed. Law Rep. 308

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 443, FORD COUNTY, Kansas, Appellant, v. KANSAS STATE BOARD OF EDUCATION, et al., Appellees.

No. 80000.

Supreme Court of Kansas.

Oct. 30, 1998.

Syllabus by the court

1. When an administrative agency decision is appealed to the district court pursuant to K.S.A. 77-601 et seq., and then appealed from the district court to this court, we review the administrative agency's decision as though the appeal has been made directly to us and we are subject to the same limitations of review as the district court.

2. Administrative boards and agencies may not rule on constitutional questions. Therefore, the issue of constitutionality must be raised when the case is on appeal before a court of law. This court reviews de novo the district court's findings involving issues of constitutionality.

3. The legislature shall provide for intellectual, educational, vocational and scientific improvement by establishing and maintaining public schools, educational institutions, and related activities which may be organized and changed in such manner as may be provided by law.

4. The legislature shall provide for a state board of education which shall have general supervision of public schools, educational institutions, and all the educational interests of the state, except educational functions delegated by law to the state board of regents. The state board of education shall perform such other duties as may be provided by law.

5. Local public schools under the general supervision of the state board of education shall be maintained, developed, and operated by locally elected boards. When authorized by law, such boards may make and carry out agreements for cooperative operation and administration of educational programs under the general supervision of the state board of education, but such agreements shall be subject to limitation, change, or termination by the legislature.

6. The test for determining whether a state law violates the Contract Clause of the United States Constitution is: (1) whether the state law has, in fact, operated as a substantial impairment of a contractual relationship; (2) whether there is a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the legislation; and (3) whether the adjustment of the contracting parties' rights and responsibilities is based upon reasonable conditions and is of a character appropriate to the public purpose justifying the legislation's adoption.

7. Legislation may still be upheld as constitutional, despite a substantial impairment finding, if there is a significant and legitimate public purpose behind the legislation, and if the impairments to the contracting parties' rights and responsibilities are based upon reasonable conditions and are of a character appropriate to the public purpose to justify the legislation's adoption.

8. The Contract Clause of the United States Constitution does not operate to obliterate the police power of the states. The interdiction of statutes impairing the obligation of contracts does not prevent the State from exercising such powers as are necessary for the general good of the public, though contracts previously entered into between individuals may thereby be affected. This power, which in its various ramifications is known as the police power, is an exercise of the sovereign right of the government to protect the lives, health, morals, comfort, and general welfare of the people, and is paramount to any rights under contracts between individuals.

9. The constitutionality of a statute should be considered in any action where it is necessary in order to determine the merits of the action or where the issues cannot be intelligently decided without doing so, notwithstanding the failure of the parties to raise the constitutional question, failure to plead the question, or failure to present the question to the trial court.

10. A statute is presumed constitutional and all doubts must be resolved in favor of its validity. If there is any reasonable way to construe a statute as constitutionally valid, the court must do so. A statute must clearly violate the constitution before it may be struck down. This court not only has the authority, but also the duty, to construe a statute in such a manner that it is constitutional if the same can be done within the apparent intent of the legislature in passing the statute.

11. Where a constitutional provision is self-executing, the legislature may enact legislation to facilitate or assist in its operation, but whatever legislation is adopted must be in harmony with and not in derogation of the provisions of the constitution.

Ken W. Strobel, of Williams, Strobel, Malone, Mason & Ralph, P.A., of Dodge City, argued the cause and was on the brief for appellant.

Ward Loyd, of Ward Loyd Law Offices, L.L.C., of Garden City, argued the cause, and Bradley W. Maudlin, of the same firm, was with him on the brief for appellees Southwest Kansas Area Cooperative District No. 613 and Identified Member School Districts.

Dan Biles, of Gates, Biles, Shields & Ryan, P.A., of Overland Park, argued the cause, and Rodney J. Bieker, general counsel for the Kansas Department of Education, was with him on the brief for appellee Kansas State Board of Education.

ABBOTT, Justice:

This is an appeal by Unified School District No. 443 (USD 443), Ford County, Kansas. USD 443 asserts that the 1987 amendment to K.S.A. 72-8230 unlawfully impairs its right to unilaterally terminate its participation in an interlocal cooperative agreement with 15 other school districts. The statute at issue extended an interlocal agreement between the districts that terminated by its own terms in 1989. USD 443 argues that the amended statute violates both the United States and Kansas Constitutions.

I. BACKGROUND

Both Kansas and federal law require that school districts provide certain special education services to "exceptional children" or other qualifying students enrolled in their respective districts, i.e., K.S.A. 72-966(a) and 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The term "exceptional children" encompasses a wide spectrum of children from those who have severe physical or mental challenges to gifted children.

School districts in Kansas may provide the education services for exceptional children in one of three ways (or a combination of the three):

1. By a "stand alone" program, i.e., where the district provides the educational programs and services to only its own students;

2. Through a cooperative, i.e., one district serves as a sponsoring district and other districts share the cost;

3. Through an interlocal agreement (also a cooperative but referred to as an "interlocal"), i.e., an independent legal entity known as an "interlocal" provides the special education services to all member districts. Both the "cooperative" and "interlocal" are created by contractual agreements among the member districts which are participating in the programs.

USD 443 appears to be the only district in Kansas with a full-time equivalent enrollment of over 3,000 students that does not have a "stand alone" or "cooperative" program to provide the required education services.

USD 443 and some of the districts involved in this case formed an interlocal. The interlocal entity formed is Southwest Kansas Area Cooperative District No. 613 (SKACD). SKACD was a successor to a cooperative district in which Dodge City had been the sponsoring district. In the late 1970's the interlocal was formed. As required by the law in effect at that time, the agreement was limited to a term of years (not less than 3 nor more than 5). After several successor agreements, the 16 school districts involved in this case signed an interlocal agreement in 1986, which by its express terms was to expire June 30, 1989.

In 1987, the legislature amended K.S.A. 72-8230(a) in pertinent part as follows:

"(5)(A) The duration of a school district interlocal cooperation agreement for joint or cooperative action in providing special education services shall be perpetual unless the agreement is partially or completely terminated in accordance with this provision. This provision applies to every school district interlocal cooperation agreement for the provision of special education services entered into under authority of this section after the effective date of this act and to every such agreement entered into under this section prior to the effective date of this act, and extant on the effective date of this act, regardless of any provisions in such an agreement to the contrary." (Emphasis added.) L.1987, ch. 276, § 1.

Thus, by such amendment, the 1986 interlocal agreement to which USD 443 was a party became, by operation of law, a perpetual agreement and could be terminated only by approval of the State Board of Education (State Board) in accordance with the procedures as set forth in the statute. Consequently, USD 443 was statutorily prohibited from unilaterally withdrawing from the interlocal agreement effective June 30, 1989 (the expiration date), by virtue of the above statutory amendments.

The legislative history shows that when the committees were considering the 1987 amendment, Gary Bishop, Director of SKACD, appeared before a legislative committee and spoke in favor of the amendment in question. He testified that additional units "may be responsible for additional costs" and that "coop break-up may not always be for sound educational reasons." He also testified that since the State pays about one-half of the total cost, it should have some control over the make-up of the special education administrative units.

SKACD apparently functioned well until sometime in the 1990's. Although it is of no import to this opinion, SKACD's relations with USD 443 did not improve when SKACD responded to USD 443's demand for rent for some 5,000 square feet of space owned by USD 443 and used as SKACD's administrative offices...