Rubio v. Turner Unified School Dist. No. 202

• Decision Date: 28 September 2006
• Docket Number: Civil Action No. 05-2522-KHV.
• Citation: 453 F.Supp.2d 1295
• Parties: Lorenzo E. RUBIO, as next friend for Z.R., a minor, Plaintiff, v. TURNER UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 202, et al., Defendants.
• Court: U.S. District Court — District of Kansas

453 F.Supp.2d 1295

Lorenzo E. RUBIO, as next friend for Z.R., a minor, Plaintiff, v. TURNER UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 202, et al., Defendants.

Civil Action No. 05-2522-KHV.

United States District Court, D. Kansas.

September 28, 2006.

COPYRIGHT MATERIAL OMITTED

Chuck N. Chionuma, Lyra L. Johnson, Margaret L. Pemberton, Chionuma & Associates, P.C., Kansas City, MO, for Plaintiff.

Gregory P. Goheen, McAnany, Van Cleave & Phillips, P.A., Kansas City, KS, for Defendants.

MEMORANDUM AND ORDER

VRATIL, District Court.

Lorenzo E. Rubio, as next friend and father of Z.R., a minor, filed suit against the Turner Unified School District No. 202, the district superintendent, the Turner Board of Education, its members, and the principal and several teachers at Endeavor Alternative School. Plaintiff alleges that by prohibiting students from speaking Spanish at Endeavor Alternative School, defendants violated Z.R.'s rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq.¹ This matter is before the Court on Defendants' Motion To Dismiss (Doc. # 6) filed January 24, 2006; Defendants' Motion For Sanctions (Doc. # 20) filed February 17, 2006; and Defendants' Motion To Strike Plaintiffs Amended Complaint (Doc. # 32) and Plaintiffs Motion For Leave To File Amended Complaint (Doc. # 33), both filed March 6, 2006. For reasons set forth below, except as to plaintiff's Title VI claim against the School District, the Court sustains defendants' motion to dismiss as to all claims and all defendants. In addition, the Court sustains defendants' motion to strike, sustains in part plaintiff's motion to amend and overrules defendants' motion for sanctions.

Standards For Motions To Dismiss Under Rule 12(b)(6)

A Rule 12(b)(6) motion should not be granted unless it appears beyond doubt that plaintiff can prove no set of facts in support of his claim which would entitle him to relief. Conley v. Gibson, 355 U.S. 41, 45-46, 78 S.Ct. 99, 2 L.Ed.2d 80 (1957); GFF Corp. v. Associated Wholesale Grocers, Inc., 130 F.3d 1381, 1384 (10th Cir. 1997). The Court accepts as true all well-pleaded factual allegations in the complaint and draws all reasonable inferences from those facts in favor of plaintiff. See Shaw v. Valdez, 819 F.2d 965, 968 (10th Cir. 1987). In reviewing the sufficiency of plaintiff's complaint, the issue is not whether plaintiff will prevail, but whether he is entitled to offer evidence to support his claims. See Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 236, 94 S.Ct. 1683, 40 L.Ed.2d 90 (1974). Although plaintiff need not precisely state each element of his claims, he must plead minimal factual allegations on those material elements that must be proved. See Hall v. Bellmon, 935 F.2d 1106, 1110 (10th Cir.1991).

Factual Background

Plaintiffs amended complaint alleges the following facts:²

Plaintiff is the father and next friend for Z.R., a minor who attends high school at Endeavor Alternative School ("Endeavor") in the Turner Unified School District No. 202 (the "District"). Bobby Allen is the district superintendent. Jennifer Watts is the principal and Susan Serzyski is a teacher at Endeavor.

During the 2005-06 school year, Watts, Serzyski and other teachers at Endeavor repeatedly prohibited Z.R. and others of Hispanic origin from speaking Spanish on school premises. During the school lunch hour, on November 28, 2005, Watts told Z.R. not to speak Spanish. One school period later, Serzyski ordered Z.R. not to speak Spanish in the hallway and told him to go to the principal's office. Watts then told Z.R. that he was not in Mexico and that he should speak only English on the school premises. Watts immediately suspended Z.R., told him to call his father and ordered him to leave school immediately to begin his out-of-school suspension. Later that day, Watts gave plaintiff a document which stated that Z.R. could not speak Spanish on school premises and that he was suspended for doing so.

The following morning, November 29, 2005, plaintiff went to the superintendent's office and left a copy of Watts' written statement that Z.R. was not to speak Spanish on the school premises. Allen later contacted plaintiff and asked if he had retained a copy of Watts' written statement.

On December 12, 2005, plaintiff filed suit against the District, Allen, Watts, Serzyski, the Turner Board of Education, the individual members of the Turner Board of Education, and Does 1 through 5, unknown teachers at Endeavor. Plaintiff alleges that because of race and national origin defendants prohibited Z.R. from speaking Spanish at school and suspended him. Plaintiff alleges that because Z.R.'s suspension remains in his school records, defendants violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d et seq., by depriving Z.R. of potential educational and employment opportunities. See Count I of the Amended Complaint (December 16, 2005) (Doc. # 5).³ Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, plaintiff alleges that defendants violated Z.R.'s right to equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. See Count II of the Amended Complaint (December 16, 2005) (Doc. # 5).

Defendants seek to dismiss plaintiffs claims because (1) the claims against the superintendent, board members and teachers acting in their official capacities merely duplicate the claims against the District; (2) the Turner Board of Education lacks the capacity to be sued under Kansas law; (3) the complaint does not state a claim against the Doe defendants; (4) the District cannot be liable under Section 1983 for the acts by Watts because she lacked final policymaking authority; (5) plaintiff has not stated an equal protection claim because outside the educational setting, English-only policies have been upheld; (6) Watts and Serzyski are entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs claim under Section 1983; and (7) Title VI applies only to intentional discrimination and the District cannot be held liable for the acts of a school principal under a theory of respondeat superior.⁴

Analysis

I. Official Capacity Claims

Plaintiff has filed suit against the superintendent and the individual board members only in their official capacities. Plaintiff has filed suit against Watts, Serzyski and Does 1 through 5 in their official and personal capacities. Defendants argue that the claims against the individuals acting in their official capacities should be dismissed because they duplicate the claims against the District. The Court agrees, because official capacity suits are merely another way of pleading an action against the entity of which an officer is an agent. Kentucky 9.1. Graham, 473 U.S. 159, 165, 105 S.Ct. 3099, 87 L.Ed.2d 114 (1985). As long as the government entity receives notice and an opportunity to respond, an official capacity suit is treated as a suit against it. Id. at 165-66, 105 S.Ct. 3099. In suits in which a government entity is a party, the Court has previously dismissed official capacity claims against individuals who are sued in their official capacities. See Sims v. Unified Gov't of Wyandotte County, 120 F.Supp.2d 938, 945 (D.Kan.2000) (official capacity claims dismissed as redundant). The Court therefore dismisses all claims against the individual defendants in their official capacities.

II. Turner Board Of Education As Separate Defendant

The Turner Board of Education concedes that it is the governing body of the Turner USD No. 202, but argues that as a matter of law, it lacks capacity to sue or be sued under Kansas law. Under Kansas law, a school district can sue and be sued in the name of the unified school district. See K.S.A. § 72-8201. A local unified school district in Kansas is considered a municipality for tax and budget purposes. See K.S.A. § 72-8204a. As the governing body of the unified school district, the board of education has final decision-making authority for the district. Without specifically addressing the issue, Kansas courts have permitted local school boards to sue and be sued as a separate legal entities. See, e.g., Unified Sch. Dist. No. 501, Shawnee County, Kan. v. Baker, 269 Kan. 239, 6 P.3d 848 (2000) (school district and board as plaintiffs); Bd. of Educ. of Unified Sch. Dist. No. 443, Ford County v. Kan. State Bd. of Educ., 266 Kan. 75, 966 P.2d 68 (1998) (board as plaintiff); Lanning By & Through Lanning v. Anderson, 22 Kan.App.2d 474, 921 P.2d 813 (1996) (board as defendant); Ware v. Unified Sch. Dist. No. 492, 902 F.2d 815 (10th Cir.1990) (school district and board as defendants). Even so, because the board of education is merely the governing body of the school district and is not a separate legal entity, any judgment against the board necessarily is against the school district. As with claims against individuals acting in their official capacities for a school district, a claim against a sub-unit of a school district is the equivalent of a suit against the school district itself. A suit against both entities is duplicative. See Whayne v. State of Kan., 980 F.Supp. 387, 391-92 (D.Kan.1997) (municipal police department is only sub-unit of city government and is not subject to suit); Foskey v. Vidalia City Sch., 258 Ga.App. 298, 574 S.E.2d 367, 370 (2002) (municipal board of education, unlike school district it manages, not body corporate and lacks capacity to sue or be sued); see also Willmschen v. Trinity Lakes Improvement Ass'n, 362 Ill.App.3d 546, 298 Ill.Dec. 840, 840 N.E.2d 1275, 1280-81 (2005) (corporate board of directors not distinct and separate legal entity); Flarey v. Youngstown Osteopathic Hosp., 151 Ohio App.3d 92, 783 N.E.2d 582, 585 (2002) (nonsensical to hold board of directors liable as collective entity). The Court therefore sustains the motion to dismiss of the Turner Board of Education.

III. Doe Defendants

Defendants argue that plaintiff's amended complaint does not state a claim on which relief can be granted as to Does 1 through 5 in their personal capacities. In the amended complaint, ...