Board of Education of Calloway Cty. v. Talbott
| Decision Date | 11 June 1935 |
| Parties | Board of Education of Calloway County et al. v. Talbott, Auditor of Public Accounts. |
| Court | United States State Supreme Court — District of Kentucky |
1. Constitutional Law; Schools and School Districts. — Common school teachers are state "employees," rendering services for state for public purpose, so as to be entitled to salaries provided for by enactments which Legislature may, in accordance with Constitution, appropriate and distribute on per capita basis to all teachers of common schools of commonwealth (Constitution, secs. 3, 171, 183-187).
2. States; Taxation. — If appropriation or tax to pay bounty or claim not binding in law, but just and equitable in character, and involving moral obligation, enacted within constitutional authority of Legislature, is not paid when act is later declared unconstitutional, knowledge of constitutional invalidity will not be imputed in advance of court decision, to those acting under provision, so as to preclude them from having moral claim based on their reliance on appropriation, for which Legislature may subsequently make appropriation and direct its payment (Constitution, sec. 171).
3. States. — Legislature may make appropriation in recognition of moral or equitable obligation, such as just man would be likely to recognize in his own affairs, whether by law he is required to do so or not (Constitution, sec. 171).
4. Taxation. — Taxation to raise money to pay claim based on "moral obligation," and not enforceable at law, is for a "public purpose," and is proper unless forbidden by some constitutional provisions (Constitution, secs. 3, 171).
Term "moral obligation" is defined as a duty which would be enforecable at law were it not for some positive rule which exempts the party in that particular instance from legal liability; also as one which cannot be enforced by action, but which is binding on party who incurs it in conscience and according to natural justice. A "moral obligation" means that some direct benefit was received by the state as a state, or some direct injury has been suffered by the claimant under circumstances where, in fairness, the state might be asked to respond, and there must be something more than a mere gratuity involved.
5. Constitutional Law; States. — Appropriation may be made by Legislature by way of gratuity in recognition of public services (Constitution, secs. 3, 171).
6. Constitutional Law. — What the Legislature could have authorized, it can ratify if it can authorize at time of ratification.
7. Constitutional Law. — Power of Legislature to validate by curative act is limited to case of omissions or irregular exercise of power, and if Legislature is without constitutional power, it cannot by subsequent act cure want of power to act in first instance or validate act that it is forbidden by Constitution to enact.
8. States. — Legislature may make appropriation for whatever purposes taxes may be laid, which is not expressly or by clear implication prohibited by Constitution, and, when so prohibited, Legislature cannot circumvent Constitution by curative act.
9. Constitutional Law; States. — Obligation incurred in reliance on appropriation made in violation of Constitution cannot be a debt incurred for "public purpose," for payment of which provision by curative act may be made (Constitution, secs. 3, 171).
10. States; Taxation. — Power of taxation for purposes contemplated by Constitution, and privilege of making an appropriation to be distributed as therein provided, is unlimited in Legislature, but such power does not exist for purpose not sanctioned by Constitution, or expressly prohibited.
11. Constitutional Law; States. — Where appropriation of general fund to equalize common school teachers' salaries violated constitutional provision requiring distribution of common school fund according to census of pupils, Legislature held without power to make subsequent appropriation to pay portion of teachers' salaries, fixed in anticipation of unconstitutional act, which remained unpaid because of invalidity thereof (Acts 1934, Ex. Sess., c. 12; Acts 1930, c. 36; Constitution, secs. 3, 171, 183-187).
Appeal from Franklin Circuit Court.
RICHARD PRIEST DIETZMAN, WEBB & WEBB and JAMES GARNETT, Jr., for appellants.
BAILEY P. WOOTTON, Attorney General, and WILLIAM R. ATTKISSON, Assistant Attorney General, for appellee.
Affirming.
The perplexing question confronting us is the constitutional validity of chapter 12, Act of Extra Session 1934 of the General Assembly, entitled:
"An Act to appropriate to school teachers in forty-three counties and twelve graded school districts of the Commonwealth the amount due such teachers for services rendered as specified in contracts with the boards of education of the said counties. * * *"
Section 1 lists 43 counties and 12 graded school districts and appropriates to the teachers of these various county and graded school districts for the specific purpose of paying the teachers in those county and graded school districts "so listed for the part of the wages or salaries due them and now unpaid." It directs the auditor of public accounts to draw his warrant upon the treasurer of the commonwealth in favor of the boards of education of those county and graded school districts, and enjoins upon these boards the duty of distributing "to the various teachers of the respective county and graded school districts, the wages and salaries to which they are shown to be entitled and unpaid for said school year"; 50 per cent. to be paid during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1935, and 50 per cent., during the fiscal year ending June 30, 1936.
The auditor contends that the fund appropriated by the act, as soon as appropriated, became a part of the common school fund, as this term is defined by section 184 of the Constitution, and that section 186 of the Constitution imperatively requires a distribution of the common school fund on the census of pupil children for each year. It is also his insistence that the act does not come within the purview of the Governor's call of the Extra Session of 1934 (Acts 1934, Ex. Sess., p. VII).
The Board of Education of Calloway county insists that the sums listed in the act "are not an appropriation of the common school fund and thus required to be distributed per capita, but is the payment of a bonus in recognition of a moral obligation to pay for public service performed." And that, in this view, the act is constitutional. Likewise, it insists that the act is within the Governor's call of the Extra Session.
To appropriately consider the questions thus presented, it is essential to review and interpret the present, and the antecedent, act and statutes in pari materia with the provisions of the Constitution relative thereto.
A casual reading of the title of the act discloses that its intent and purpose is to appropriate to school teachers of the designated county and graded school districts the amount due them for services rendered, as specified in contracts with the boards of education. The context thereof discloses more specifically its intent and purpose is to appropriate out of the general fund "for the part of the wages or salaries due" them "to which they are shown to be entitled and unpaid for said School Year" in the county and graded school districts listed in the act.
It is apparent that the title of the act, as well as the body, denies to the teachers in all other county and graded districts of the commonwealth the benefit of the appropriation. Also, that the services of the teachers in those county and graded school districts were rendered under contracts with the boards of education, and that the fund is appropriated to pay "wages and salaries to which they are shown to be entitled and unpaid for said School Year."
Section 171 of the Constitution, in part, reads:
"Taxes shall be levied and collected for public purposes only and shall be uniform upon all property of the same class subject to taxation within the territorial limits of the authority levying the tax; and all taxes shall be levied and collected by general laws."
Section 183 declares it the duty of the General Assembly, by appropriate legislation, to provide for an efficient system of common schools throughout the state.
Section 184 stipulates for the issuance of bonds of the commonwealth in favor of the boards of education for the sum therein designated, together with certain stock in the bank of Kentucky, shall be held by the board of education inviolate for the purpose of maintaining a system of public schools. The interest and dividends, "together with any sum which may be produced by taxation or otherwise for purposes of common school education, shall be appropriated to the common schools, and to no other purpose."
Section 185 enjoins upon the General Assembly the duty to make provision by law "for the payment of the interest of said school fund, and may provide for the sale of the stock in the Bank of Kentucky; and in case of a sale of all or any part of said stock the proceeds of sale shall be invested by the sinking fund commissioners in other good interest-bearing stocks or bonds which shall be subject to sale and reinvestment, from time to time, in like manner, and with the same restrictions."
Section 186 provides "each county in the Commonwealth shall be entitled to its proportion of the school fund on its census of pupil children for each school year."
Section 187 deprives the General Assembly of making a distinction in the distribution of the school fund on account of race or color, and requires the maintenance of separate schools for white and colored children.
Section 3 of the Bill of Rights is in this language:
"All men, when they form a social compact, are equal; and no grant of exclusive, separate public emoluments or privileges shall be made to any man or set of men, except in consideration of public services."
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