Board of Education of City of Minneapolis v. Public School Employees' Local Union No. 63, AFL, 35506

• Citation: 233 Minn. 144,29 A.L.R.2d 424,45 N.W.2d 797
• Decision Date: 02 February 1951
• Docket Number: No. 35506,35506
• Parties: , 29 A.L.R.2d 424 BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS v. PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYEES' UNION LOCAL NO. 63, AFL et al.
• Court: Supreme Court of Minnesota (US)

Page 797

45 N.W.2d 797

233 Minn. 144, 29 A.L.R.2d 424

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF CITY OF MINNEAPOLIS v. PUBLIC SCHOOL EMPLOYEES' UNION LOCAL NO. 63, AFL et al.

No. 35506.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Feb. 2, 1951.

Syllabus by the Court.

In an action brought by the board of education of Minneapolis to restrain and enjoin Public School Employees' Union Local No. 63, AFL, and its officers from striking, said union being composed of janitors and janitor-engineers employed by the board, Held that M.S.A. c. 185, entitled, 'Injunction and Restraining Orders Relating to Labor Disputes,' Minnesota's so-called 'Little Norris-LaGuardia Act,' applies, and, since the action was not brought in compliance with that act, the restraining order theretofore issued ex parte was properly vacated and set aside, and the petition for a temporary injunction properly refused. John F. Bonner, City Atty., D. J. Shama, Asst. City Atty., Minneapolis, for appellant.

John A. Goldie and Samuel I. Sigal, Minneapolis, for respondents.

Hall, Smith & Hedlund, Minneapolis, William Gunn, St. Paul, Sherman Child, Minneapolis, amicus curiae.

MAGNEY, Justice.

In an action brought by the board of education of Minneapolis to restrain and enjoin Public School Employees' Union Local No. 63, AFL, and its officers from striking, the court issued a temporary restraining order on January 5, 1951. Upon the hearing of a motion by the board for an order continuing in force such restraining order pending determination of the action, the court on January 22, 1951, discharged and vacated the temporary restraining order and denied the board any relief. The board appeals.

Plaintiff obtained an ex parte temporary restraining order without notice to defendants, and without the making of findings of fact as a basis for such ex parte order as required by M.S.A. §§ 185.13 and 185.14. At the hearing on the temporary injunction, defendants appeared specially and objected to the jurisdiction of the court, claiming that the complaint upon its face shows that the subject of the action is a labor dispute within the meaning of M.S.A. c. 185, and thus that the complaint fails to plead the express statutory prerequisites which are a condition precedent to the granting of any injunctive relief in labor disputes under the act. Defendants also moved for a dismissal of the complaint and all proceedings thereunder and that the ex parte restraining order be vacated.

The board of education of Minneapolis maintains and operates 94 school buildings and one administration building. There are approximately 63,000 day-school students and 5,000 evening adult students enrolled. The board employs a total of 3,713 persons, of which approximately 445 are employed as janitors and janitor-engineers. The latter are members of defendant union and are classified as civil service employes.

The board receives approximately 30 percent of its income from state aid and about two percent from federal aid. The balance is made up from tax levies. For the year 1951, the board voted to grant the janitors and janitor-engineers a three percent increase in wages. Engotiations for an increase had been carried on for several months. The employes involved were dissatisfied with the increase granted and served a strike notice on the board stating that on January 8, 1951, they would strike. On the oral argument it appears that after the filing of the order on January 22, 1951, defendants did cease work.

Both parties appear to concede that since January 23, 1951, defendants have been keeping the buildings heated to a temperature high enough to prevent damage from freezing. Because of this fact, at the presentation of the appeal to this court, considerable argument developed as to whether such activity or action on the part of defendants constituted an ordinary strike. Counsel for the board contend that what defendants are doing is a limited work program with an unlawful taking over of the properties. Counsel for defendants insist that their actions constitute an ordinary strike.

Consideration of that situation is not before this court. The question before us is not the propriety of the court's action in the light of what has actually occurred. On January 22, 1951, when the court made its order, no strike had yet occurred. The temporary restraining order was issued upon a verified complaint that a strike was about to occur. In vacating that order and refusing to continue said order in force until final judgment herein, the court treated the original order as an order to restrain a threatened strike. In reviewing the court's decision, we too must assume that the relief which plaintiff sought was a restraining order and temporary injunction to prevent a threatened strike. The sole question presented by this appeal is whether the court was deprived of jurisdiction to grant the relief sought because of M.S.A. c. 185. That chapter, entitled 'Injunctions and Restraining Orders Relating to Labor Disputes,' is Minnesota's 'Little Norris-LaGuardia Act,' popularly so called because of its near identity to the federal Norris-LaGuardia Act, 47 Stat. 70, c. 90, 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 101 to 115.

Section 185.10 of our statute provides:

'No court of the state shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order, or temporary or permanent injunction, in any case involving or growing out of any labor dispute, to prohibit any person or persons participating or interested in such dispute, * * * from doing, whether singly or in concert, any of the following acts:

'(1) Ceasing or refusing to perform any work or to remain in any relation of employment;'

The act in § 185.18, subd. 4, defines the term 'labor dispute' in part as follows: 'The term 'labor dispute' includes any controversy concerning terms or conditions of employment, * * *.'

Whether this is a labor dispute must be determined by the complaint herein. It incorporates the strike notice sent to the board, wherein it is stated in substance that Local No. 63, since September 12, 1950, had repeatedly requested the board for an increase in wages and that because of lack of action by the administration a strike vote was taken. The only controversy between the board and the employes relates to wages, which is clearly a controversy concerning terms of employment. It seems impossible to characterize the disagreement as spelled out in the complaint as anything but a labor dispute between the board of education, a public body, and a labor union composed of its employes.

Relying mainly upon the decision of the United States Supreme Court in United States v. United Mine Workers of America, 330 U.S. 258, 67 S.Ct. 677, 91 L.Ed. 884, plaintiff contends that M.S.A. c. 185 has no application to the case at bar. The United Mine Workers case arose in 1946, when, under the War Labor Disputes Act, 57 Stat. 163, c. 144, 50 U.S.C.A. §§ 1501 to 1511, the federal government had seized and was operating the major portion of the country's bituminous coal mines. A dispute arose over the terms of an agreement between the government and the miners, and in anticipation of a strike the government secured a temporary restraining order. The miners ignored the restraining order and went on strike. In an action to punish the United Mine Workers and its president for contempt, a decision was rendered against the union, which was taken directly to the United States Supreme Court for review by certiorari. In the Supreme Court the justices split three ways on different aspects of the case, but a majority of five justices were of the opinion that the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which restricts the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes, had no application to the facts of that case. The majority of the court refused to apply the Norris-LaGuardia Act, relying in the main on a general doctrine excluding the government from the operation of a statute in which it is not named and on the legislative history of the act. Undoubtedly as a result of the decision in that case by the United States Supreme Court (filed March 6, 1947), where the court split on the question involved here, the congress of the United States included § 305 of Title III in the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947, enacted June 23, 1947, 61 Stat. 136, c. 120, 29 U.S.C.A. § 188, which reads: 'It shall be unlawful for any individual employed by the United States or any agency thereof including wholly owned Government corporations, to participate in any strike. Any individual employed by the United States or by any such agency who strikes shall be discharged immediately from his employment, and shall forfeit his civil service status, if any, and shall not be eligible for reemployment for three years by the United States or any such agency.'

Thus, the federal government has, by this legislation, set at rest the question whether the Norris-LaGuardia Act applies in a situation involving a strike against the government as an employer by making such strikes unlawful. Congress must have considered the need for such clarifying legislation in view of the...