Board of Education of Sauk Centre v. Moore

• Decision Date: 01 January 1872
• Citation: 17 Minn. 391
• Parties: BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE OF TOWN SAUK CENTRE v. ALEXANDER MOORE.
• Court: Minnesota Supreme Court

Page 391

17 Minn. 391

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF THE OF TOWN SAUK CENTREv.

ALEXANDER MOORE.

Supreme Court of Minnesota.

Appeal by defendant from an order of the district court, Stearns county, denying a new trial.

Wm. S. Moore, for appellant.

Kerr & Collins, for respondent.

RIPLEY, C. J.

Plaintiff is incorporated by chapter 92, Sp. Laws 1869, and brings this action for a balance of $950, alleged to be due it from defendant upon the sale to him of certain of its bonds to the amount of $2,000, payable in lumber and brick at certain specified prices.

The answer denies all the allegations of the complaint, and defendant then alleges that the bonds in question were delivered to him upon an agreement between one Calvert, said board, and this defendant, that Calvert should make and have ready for use and delivery to said board by the next spring 200,000 brick, at $10 per thousand, payable in advance by the delivery of said bonds to defendant, in consideration of defendant's guaranty of Calvert's performance and his agreement to take the same at par in payment of certain indebtedness of Calvert to him, and of any necessary advances by him to Calvert to enable him to make and deliver said brick, and to be by him held to indemnify him against said guaranty and applied in payment of said indebtedness and advances, which together had equaled the amount of said bonds, and that Calvert performed his part of the contract.

After verdict for plaintiff, defendant moved for a new trial on the ground of error in law occurring at the trial, and that the verdict is not supported by the evidence, and is contrary to law, which was denied. Upon this appeal we will first dispose of the objection, which arises under the second ground of the motion that the said special act is void as repugnant to article 8, §§ 1, 3, and article 10, § 2, of the constitution of Minnesota.

Said section 1 is in these words: "The stability of republican form of government depending mainly upon the intelligence of the people, it shall be the duty of the legislature to establish a general and uniform system of public schools.

"Sec. 3. The legislature shall make such provisions, by taxation or otherwise, as, with the income arising from the school fund, will secure a thorough and efficient system of public schools in each township in the state."

The object is to insure a regular method throughout the state whereby all may be enabled to acquire an education which will fit them to discharge intelligently their duties as citizens of the republic.

The present general laws respecting public schools, it is not denied, answer these requirements of the constitution. They not only, however, provide for the creation from time to time of independent school-districts, but recognize, as a part of the state system of public schools, a great many just such school-districts as those created by this special act and established by these special acts prior to the passage of the general law. We are unable to see wherein this special act infringes upon this system.

If it be objected that, under the general law, an independent district is created by the action of the qualified electors therein, but that this is established by the legislature, the answer is that it surely can make no difference under the constitution whether the limits within which the public education is to be carried on under the management of a "board of education" are prescribed by one power derived from the people or another, provided the education of the people is to be conducted upon the same principles.

It is not perceived in what our system of public schools would be less general, uniform, thorough, and efficient, if for example, the limits of half the school-districts in the state were directly prescribed by the legislature.

In this district the public schools are managed by a body elected in the same way and with the same powers as the boards of education provided for by the general law in all essentials. The only difference seems to be in some details of execution.

As to the objection that it violates article 10, § 2, viz., that no corporations shall be formed under special acts, except for municipal purposes, it is sufficient to say that the definition of the term "corporations," as used in that article, given in section 1, viz., "all associations and joint-stock companies having any of the powers and privileges not possessed by individuals or partnerships, except such as embrace banking privileges," will not include the "body politic and corporate" constituted by this act. The six directors who compose it, and for whose election (section 2) the act provides, are no more an association or a joint-stock company than the legislature itself.

The management of the public schools is one branch of the state government, for which, within the limits of this district, they are incorporated; and, as in the case of the inhabitants of a school district, who for the same purpose are by the general law declared a body corporate, they are a quasi corporation, invested with corporate powers sub modo, and for a few specified purposes only, — 11 Minn. 41, (Gil. 12,) — and it may also be observed that those purposes are as correctly to be called "municipal" as in the case of such school-district; and the constitutionality of this corporate body, and that of the independent school-district provided for by the General Statutes, may be as well defended on that ground as that of such school-district. In each case the object is the control and management of the public schools within a certain territory.

The first objection urged under the head of error in law occurring at the trial is that the district court erred in overruling the motion made for judgment on the pleadings. It is said that it appears on the face of the complaint that the bonds are nullities, not having been issued in pursuance of a two-thirds vote. Chapter 26, § 1, Laws 1866, as amended by chapter 3, § 1, Laws 1867, does not apply here.

The bonds authorized thereby must be payable at times and in a manner to which this special law does not restrict this district. Section 14. Moreover, those authorized by the general law may be issued for the purchase of site, and erection, completion, and furnishing of school-houses; whereas, those authorized by this charter can be issued to provide for purchase of site, rent, or purchase, or erection of school-houses. Section 14. There can be no pretense for saying that provisions regulating the issue of a bond of one character and for one purpose can apply to a bond of a different character and for a different purpose.

The provision in the special law that the board may issue such bonds "in pursuance of a vote of the electors" is not, as the defendant supposes, silent as to the character of the vote. The ordinary and established meaning of this is the expressed will of a majority of such electors voting upon the question. Webst. Dict. "Vote," subd. 4. That a majority vote is spoken of in another part of the section does not prove that this is not intended to mean what it usually means.

The complaint further states that by said majority vote the said bonds and their proceeds were to be used in the discretion of the board in the erection of a school-house for said district, and giving it authority to negotiate them to the best advantage. Whereupon it is objected that the electors could not confer any such discretion on the board. The act however authorizes it. The board may issue bonds for any of the purposes specified in said section, when authorized by the electors to do so. One purpose is the erection of school-houses.

This allegation, in our judgment, means that the board was authorized to issue bonds to the amount of $6,000, sell them for as much as possible, and use the proceeds, or so much thereof as the board think fit, in erecting a school-house.

This is all within the act. To issue bonds for the purpose of building a school-house implies their sale, and the use of the proceeds therefor by the board, which is by law to expend all moneys coming into the treasury, (sections 4, 14,) and has the entire control and management of the schools and school property in the district. Section 6.

The defendant would construe the resolution alleged as if it left it discretionary with the board to build a school-house or not.

The resolution, which is correctly set out in the complaint, is certainly a little obscure, but that the construction that we have put upon it is intended by the complaint, sufficiently appears from the allegation which follows, that afterwards the board sold these bonds to defendant for lumber and brick, to be used in the erection of said school building, and that this is what the electors meant is very apparent from the evidence.

Among the purposes for which the meeting was called was that of voting on the question of erecting a school-house and the purchase of a site therefor. The meeting first voted that certain lots be purchased for such site by the board, and then, in the language above mentioned, provided for the issue of the bonds; the vote also providing that these shall be in such denominations as will insure their sale to the best advantage; and the case shows that the board proceeded to procure plans and make contracts for the material for a building, and that the only question raised was as to size and style. We think the complaint sufficiently alleges that the question of the erection of a school-house was passed upon by the electors, not left to the board; and we think that in point of fact it was so passed upon.

It is further objected that it does not appear that the meeting at which these bonds were voted was called in the mode provided by the special act, or by any authority whatever; or that any notice was given that the question of issuing the bonds would be submitted to a vote of the electors. The complaint states that "at a special meeting of the legal voters"...