Board of Education v. Round Valley Teachers Assn.

• Citation: 52 Cal.Rptr.2d 115,13 Cal.4th 269,914 P.2d 193
• Decision Date: 29 April 1996
• Docket Number: No. S047491,S047491
• Court: United States State Supreme Court (California)
• Parties: , 914 P.2d 193, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2085, 108 Ed. Law Rep. 947, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2997, 96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4930 BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the ROUND VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. ROUND VALLEY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, Defendant and Appellant.

Page 115

52 Cal.Rptr.2d 115

13 Cal.4th 269, 914 P.2d 193, 152 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2085,

108 Ed. Law Rep. 947, 96 Cal. Daily Op. Serv. 2997,

96 Daily Journal D.A.R. 4930

BOARD OF EDUCATION OF the ROUND VALLEY UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, et al., Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. ROUND VALLEY TEACHERS ASSOCIATION, Defendant and Appellant.

No. S047491.

Supreme Court of California.

April 29, 1996.

Diane Ross, Beverly Tucker, Ramon Romero and A. Eugene Huguenin, Jr., Burlingame, for Defendant and Appellant.

Robert J. Henry, Joseph C. Kinkade, Santa Rosa, Patrick K. Rafferty, Los Angeles, Lozano, Smith, Smith, Woliver & Behrens, Diana K. Smith and Loren A. Carjulia, San Rafael, for Plaintiffs and Respondents.

John Bukey, Corona, Fekete, Carton, Hartsel, Grass, Ronch, Peters & Inman and Frank J. Fekete, Bakersfield, as Amici Curiae on behalf of Plaintiffs and Respondents.

LUCAS, Chief Justice.

We granted review to determine whether a school board may, through collective bargaining, agree to give greater procedural protections to probationary employees than those set forth in Education Code section 44929.21, subdivision (b) (section 44929.21(b); all statutory references are to the Education Code unless otherwise noted). Section 44929.21(b) provides procedures that a school district must follow when notifying a probationary employee of its "decision to reelect or not reelect the employee for the next succeeding school year to the position," but otherwise allows districts to decline to reelect a probationary employee without cause. (See Fontana Teachers Assn. v. Fontana Unified School Dist. (1988) 201 Cal.App.3d 1517, 247 Cal.Rptr. 761 (Fontana ); Grimsley v. Board of Trustees (1987) 189 Cal.App.3d 1440, 235 Cal.Rptr. 85 (Grimsley ).) For the reasons discussed below, we conclude section 44929.21 preempts the procedural protections contained in the collective bargaining agreement, and that the arbitrator exceeded his powers in this case by purporting to give effect to those preempted provisions. Because the arbitrator exceeded his powers by enforcing provisions of the preempted agreement, we vacate his award pursuant to Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2, and Moncharsh v. Heily & Blase (1992) 3 Cal.4th 1, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 183, 832 P.2d 899 (Moncharsh ). Accordingly, we reverse the Court of Appeal judgment.

FACTS

The Round Valley Teachers Association (Association) and the Round Valley Unified School District (District) entered into a collective bargaining agreement effective from July 1, 1987, to June 30, 1990. Article 19, section B(1) of the agreement set forth procedures for the dismissal or decision not to reelect probationary teachers for the following school year. The agreement provided: "Prior to any notice of dismissal/[decision not to reelect] any probationary teacher, the Superintendent shall give notice to the employee no less than thirty (30) days prior to the final notice of dismissal/[decision not to reelect]. Such notice shall include: [p] ... [p] b. Notice that the employee has fifteen (15) days to appeal the dismissal/[decision not to reelect]. [p] c. The proposed specific reasons for the dismissal/[decision not to reelect] as they relate to the teacher's alleged incompetency to teach (including copies of summary evaluations upon which the decision was based)." In section B(2) of article 19, "just cause" is required for dismissal or decision not to reelect probationary teachers.

In 1990, District's superintendent notified Kurt Gritts, a probationary teacher, that District would not renew his teaching contract for the 1990-1991 school year. District's notice did not comply with article 19, section B(1) of the collective bargaining agreement because it failed to provide reasons for not reelecting Gritts or allow for an appeal of District's decision.

Gritts thereafter filed with District a grievance alleging that the school district had violated article 19, section B(1) of the agreement. Although District insisted the grievance was not arbitrable, the superior court granted Association's motion to compel arbitration. The arbitrator found District had violated the agreement and ordered it to comply with the procedures set forth in article 19, section B(1). The arbitrator also ordered District to reconsider its decision not to renew Gritts's teaching contract. Although District challenged the validity of the contractual provisions, the arbitrator left that issue to judicial determination.

District thereafter filed a petition to vacate the arbitration award. District asserted the arbitrator exceeded his powers in ordering District to comply with the agreement because section 44929.21(b), which governs exclusively the procedures for the reelection of probationary teachers, preempted the reelection provisions of article 19, section B(1). Section 44929.21(b) provides that in school districts with "an average daily attendance of 250 or more" (like District here), probationary employees who have served two consecutive years in a position requiring certification, and are reelected for a third year, become permanent employees of the district. Section 44929.21(b) further provides in part: "[t]he governing board shall notify the employee, on or before March 15 of the employee's second complete consecutive school year of employment by the district in a position or positions requiring certification qualifications, of the decision to reelect or not reelect the employee for the next succeeding school year to the position. In the event that the governing board does not give notice pursuant to this section on or before March 15, the employee shall be deemed reelected for the next succeeding school year." Unlike article 19, section B(1), discussed above, section 44929.21(b) does not provide for a hearing or statement of reasons in the event a probationary employee is not reelected in his or her third year.

The trial court granted District's petition, and vacated the award. It concluded the arbitrator exceeded his powers by giving effect to provisions of the collective bargaining agreement which were in conflict with, and superseded by, section 44929.21(b), and Government Code sections 3540 through 3549.3. The Government Code provisions establish a system of collective bargaining for school district employees, and limit negotiations between a school district and an employee organization to matters relating to wages, hours "and other terms and conditions of employment." (Gov.Code, § 3543.2, subd. (a).) The Government Code specifically states that "[t]his Chapter shall not supersede other provisions of the Education Code." (Gov.Code, § 3540.) The trial court reasoned that District had no power to agree to provisions in a collective bargaining agreement The Court of Appeal reversed the trial court judgment. It held that the procedural protections provided by article 19, section B(1) did not conflict with the directives in section 44929.21(b), and were thus valid and enforceable. Accordingly, the Court of Appeal concluded, the arbitrator did not exceed his authority in giving effect to the collective bargaining agreement. We granted District's petition for review.

[914 P.2d 196] that conflicted with specific provisions of the Education Code.

DISCUSSION

1. Judicial Review of Arbitration Award

In granting his award, the arbitrator made the following findings:

"1. The grievance is arbitrable.

"2. The District violated Article 19, Section B(1)(a-f) with regard to [District's decision not to reelect Gritt].

"3. As a remedy, the District is directed to comply with the procedural requirements of Article 19, Section (B)(1)(a-f), except that the District is not required to reinstate [Gritt] prior to providing the notice required therein. The District is further directed, within 30 days after written notice of the matters described in subsections (c) and (d), to reconsider the decision declining renewal of [Gritts's] teaching contract and to grant a request by [Gritts] and/or the Association to address the Board of Education with respect to the renewal or nonrenewal of [Gritts's] contract."

Our first inquiry is whether the arbitrator's award enforcing specific procedural provisions of the collective bargaining agreement is a proper subject of judicial review. Code of Civil Procedure section 1286.2 sets forth limited grounds for vacating an arbitrator's award and the only one that may apply here is contained in subdivision (d). Pursuant to that subdivision, a court shall vacate the award if the arbitrator exceeded his or her powers in making the award and "the award cannot be corrected without affecting the merits of the decision upon the controversy submitted." (Code Civ. Proc., § 1286.2, subd. (d).)

As the Court of Appeal observed, we have made it clear that in light of the strong public policy in favor of private arbitration, judicial review of an arbitrator's award is quite limited. In Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at pages 8 through 13, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 183, 832 P.2d 899, we articulated the general rule that the merits of an arbitration award, either on questions of fact or of law, are not subject to judicial review. Moncharsh limited judicial review to the statutory grounds set forth in Code of Civil Procedure sections 1286.2 or 1286.6 (correction of award). (Moncharsh, supra, 3 Cal.4th at p. 13, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 183, 832 P.2d 899.) We further explained, "We recognize that there may be some limited and exceptional circumstances justifying judicial review of an arbitrator's decision when a party claims illegality affects only a portion of the underlying contract. Such cases would include those in which granting finality to an arbitrator's decision would be inconsistent with the protection of a party's statutory rights." (Id., at p. 32, 10 Cal.Rptr.2d 183, 832 P.2d 899, italics added.)

We further delineated "the standard for measuring the scope of the arbitrators' authority" in Advanced Micro Devices, Inc. v. Intel Corp. (...