Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Sylvester, 7050

• Decision Date: 28 November 1994
• Docket Number: No. 7050,Docket No. ARO-94-290,7050
• Parties: BOARD OF OVERSEERS OF THE BAR v. Torrey A. SYLVESTER. DecisionLaw
• Court: Maine Supreme Court

Page 702

650 A.2d 702

BOARD OF OVERSEERS OF THE BAR v. Torrey A. SYLVESTER.

Decision No. 7050.

Law Docket No. ARO-94-290.

Supreme Judicial Court of Maine.

Argued Oct. 5, 1994.

Decided Nov. 28, 1994.

Kevin Cuddy (orally), Doris Harnett, Cuddy & Lanham, Bangor, for appellant.

J. Scott Davis (orally), Bd. of Overseers of the Bar, Augusta, for appellee.

Before ROBERTS, GLASSMAN, CLIFFORD, RUDMAN, DANA and LIPEZ, JJ.

ROBERTS, Justice.

Torrey A. Sylvester appeals from the judgment of a single justice of the Supreme Judicial Court (Wathen, C.J.) denying his petition for reinstatement as a member of the bar. Sylvester contends that he was denied procedural due process, that the Court applied an erroneous legal standard, and that the Court's findings of fact were insufficient. We affirm.

After a hearing in May 1992 on an information filed by the Board of Overseers of the Bar, the Supreme Judicial Court (Wathen, C.J.) disbarred Sylvester and granted him leave to petition for reinstatement after one year. The Court found that Sylvester had attempted to collect additional fees from two clients without any agreement for such fees and that he had falsely altered two promissory notes to support his claim that there was an agreement for additional fees. Sylvester admitted that he withheld funds from his clients and that he added three words to the notes after they were signed, but insisted that he made these additions during a meeting with his clients. A qualified document examiner testified that five words, "Criminal only. Collection separate fee." were added by Sylvester with a different pen. The Court concluded that Sylvester made these additions after the meeting with his clients and without their knowledge.

In hearings on his reinstatement petition before the Grievance Commission and before the Court, Sylvester acknowledged the wrongfulness of his conduct, stated that he accepted the factual findings of the disbarment court, but nevertheless insisted that any additions to the promissory notes were added in the presence of his clients. The Grievance Commission recommended to the Board that Sylvester be reinstated. The Board, after hearing the argument of counsel, was unable to agree on a recommendation. The Court, after a hearing in which Sylvester testified, denied the petition. Sylvester appeals.

Sylvester's initial challenge on appeal is directed at M.Bar R. 7.3(j). He asserts that the vagueness and lack of direction of the rule operates to deprive him of procedural due process. His challenge is without merit for the primary reason that the only result of the proceedings before the Board is a recommendation that is not binding on the Court. Although the rule may be unclear, our case law is not. The proceedings before the Court must be de novo simply because the ultimate decision whether to admit or reinstate an individual to the bar cannot be delegated to another agency. See Board of Overseers of the Bar v. Lee, 422 A.2d 998, 1002 (Me.1980). Although Sylvester argues that the implication in Rule 7.3(j)(6) that a petition...