Board of Regents of University of Nebraska on Behalf of University of Nebraska-Lincoln v. Pinzon

• Decision Date: 06 March 1998
• Docket Number: NEBRASKA-LINCOL,A,No. S-96-806,S-96-806
• Citation: 575 N.W.2d 365,254 Neb. 145
• Parties: , 124 Ed. Law Rep. 716 BOARD OF REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA, on behalf of the UNIVERSITY OFppellee, v. Charles M. PINZON, Appellant, and Dan Dolan, Commissioner of Labor, State of Nebraska, Appellee.
• Court: Nebraska Supreme Court

Page 365

575 N.W.2d 365

254 Neb. 145, 124 Ed. Law Rep. 716

BOARD OF REGENTS OF the UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA, on behalf of the UNIVERSITY OF NEBRASKA-LINCOLN, Appellee, v. Charles M. PINZON, Appellant and Dan Dolan, Commissioner of Labor, State of Nebraska, Appellee.

No. S-96-806.

Supreme Court of Nebraska.

March 6, 1998.

Syllabus by the Court

1. Employment Security: Appeal and Error. In an appeal from the Nebraska Appeal Tribunal to the district court regarding unemployment benefits, the district court conducts the review de novo on the record; but on review by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, the judgment of the district court may be reversed, vacated, or modified for errors appearing on the record.

2. Judgments: Appeal and Error. When reviewing a question of law, an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of the district court's ruling.

3. Statutes: Appeal and Error. Statutory interpretation is a matter of law in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent, correct conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the court below.

4. Statutes: Appeal and Error. In the absence of anything to the contrary, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning; an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous.

5. Statutes. Reading a meaning into a statute that is not there or reading anything direct and plain out of a statute is beyond the court's province.

Carole McMahon-Boies, of Pepperl & McMahon-Boies Law Offices, Lincoln, for appellant.

John C. Wiltse, Lincoln, for appellee Bd. of Regents.

CAPORALE, WRIGHT, CONNOLLY, GERRARD, STEPHAN, and McCORMACK, JJ.

PER CURIAM.

This is an action for unemployment benefits brought by Charles M. Pinzon against the Board of Regents of the University of Nebraska (University) and the Commissioner of Labor. Based on the district court's denial of Pinzon's request for unemployment benefits, Pinzon appeals. We determine that Pinzon was "unemployed" pursuant to Neb.Rev.Stat. § 48-602(22) (Cum.Supp.1994). We reverse, and remand.

Pinzon began working for the University in 1993 as a nontenured assistant professor, teaching undergraduate courses in advertising and public relations. After Pinzon's first year of teaching, the University renewed his contract for the 1994-95 academic year. At the end of the 1994-95 year, the University elected not to renew Pinzon's contract for the next academic year. Because the University did not offer Pinzon a subsequent contract, Pinzon was no longer obligated to perform services for the University when the 1995 spring semester examinations were graded.

After the 1995 spring semester examinations were graded, Pinzon was unable to find employment. On July 21, 1995, Pinzon applied for unemployment benefits for the period of July 16 through September 2. During this time, the University was paying Pinzon $740.38 per week in wages. The final monthly payment on Pinzon's contract was paid on August 31. Even though Pinzon contracted with the University to draw his wages on a 12-month basis, Pinzon was obligated to perform services for the University on only a 9-month basis or, in other words, during the academic year. Therefore, Pinzon received remuneration over a 12-month period but was being paid for only 9 months of service.

A Department of Labor claims deputy initially denied Pinzon's application for unemployment benefits because Pinzon was still being paid by the University. Pinzon appealed to the Nebraska Appeal Tribunal, which determined he was entitled to unemployment benefits. The University appealed to the Lancaster County District Court, and the court determined that Pinzon was not entitled to unemployment compensation benefits for the period he was receiving pay from the University. Pinzon appealed to the Nebraska Court of Appeals, and we removed the case pursuant to our power to regulate the Court of Appeals' caseload. Neb.Rev.Stat. § 24-1106 (Reissue 1995).

In an appeal from the Nebraska Appeal Tribunal to the district court regarding unemployment benefits, the district court conducts the review de novo on the record; but on review by the Court of Appeals or the Supreme Court, the judgment of the district court may be reversed, vacated, or modified for errors appearing on the record. Law Offices of Ronald J. Palagi v. Dolan, 251 Neb. 457, 558 N.W.2d 303 (1997). When reviewing an order for errors appearing on the record, the inquiry is whether the decision conforms to the law, is supported by competent evidence, and is neither arbitrary, capricious, nor unreasonable. Id. When reviewing a question of law, an appellate court reaches a conclusion independent of the district court's ruling. Continental Western Ins. Co. v. Swartzendruber, 253 Neb. 365, 570 N.W.2d 708 (1997).

Pinzon contends the district court erred when the court (1) determined wages are paid "with respect to" the months the wages are received instead of the months the wages are earned, (2) determined a teacher with a 9-month contract who receives pay for that 9-month period subsequent to the termination of his position is disqualified from the receipt of unemployment compensation benefits, (3) failed to give deference to the Nebraska Appeal Tribunal's interpretation of the tribunal's own rules and regulations, and (4) failed to uphold the decision of the Nebraska Appeal Tribunal. Because Pinzon's first assignment of error is dispositive, we will not address the remaining arguments. See Tyler v. Tyler, 253 Neb. 209, 570 N.W.2d 317 (1997).

Pinzon initially contends the district court erred in determining he was not entitled to unemployment compensation pursuant to § 48-602(22), which provides: "Unemployed shall mean an individual during any week in which the individual performs no service and with respect to which no wages are payable...." The district court found that Pinzon was unable to satisfy § 48-602(22) because he was still receiving compensation from the University. However, Pinzon urges this court to construe the phrase "with respect to" as meaning that wages are paid with respect to the months that remuneration is earned, not the months that remuneration is received.

Statutory interpretation is a matter of law in connection with which an appellate court has an obligation to reach an independent, correct conclusion irrespective of the determination made by the court below. Bank of Papillion v. Nguyen, 252 Neb. 926, 567 N.W.2d 166 (1997). In the absence of anything to the contrary, statutory language is to be given its plain and ordinary meaning; an appellate court will not resort to interpretation to ascertain the meaning of statutory words which are plain, direct, and unambiguous. State ex rel. City of Elkhorn v. Haney, 252 Neb. 788, 566 N.W.2d 771 (1997). Reading a meaning into a statute that is not there or reading anything direct and plain out of a statute is beyond the court's province. See id.

We find that § 48-602(22) is unambiguous. Affording § 48-602(22) a plain, ordinary meaning, we find that two elements must be satisfied to demonstrate unemployment. First, the individual must not perform any services for the weeks in question; and second, no wages may be payable with respect to the time period the individual performed no services. Several jurisdictions support this finding. See, Meyer v. Employment Appeal Bd., 441 N.W.2d 766 (Iowa 1989); Tracy v. Employment...