Board of Regents State Universities, State of Wis. v. Davis
| Decision Date | 16 April 1974 |
| Citation | 38 Cal.App.3d 650,113 Cal.Rptr. 628 |
| Court | California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals |
| Parties | BOARD OF REGENTS STATE UNIVERSITIES, STATE OF WISCONSIN, Plaintiff and Appellant, v. Ralph E. DAVIS, Jr., Executor of the Estate of Ralph E. Davis, Deceased, Defendant and Respondent. Civ. 41949. |
Archbald, Zelezny & Spray, and Kenneth L. Moes, Santa Barbara, for plaintiff and appellant.
Robert R. Stone, Santa Barbara, for defendant and respondent.
Plaintiff, the Board of Regents State Universities, State of Wisconsin, appeals from a judgment of the pleadings, entered in favor of defendant in an action to collect, from the estate of a former conservatee, now deceased, a claim for $150,000.
The principal issue raised by this appeal is whether the mere fact of the existence of a conservatorship of an estate deprives the conservatee of capacity to contract, and therefore renders void a contract entered into by him. We conclude that absent a specific showing and adjudication of incompetence, contracts entered into by a conservatee are not void, though they may be subject to avoidance upon any of the grounds applicable to other persons, and the enforcement of a conservatee's contract against the conservatorship estate is limited by the provisions of Probate Code section 1858.
Before reaching this issue it is necessary to consider another: was the complaint in this matter filed within the time established by the three month statute of limitations found in Probate Code section 714? We conclude that it was.
It is convenient to set out the facts relating to both question before discussing either. We do so in chronological order.
On August 25, 1967, Ralph E. Davis, Jr. (now the defendant herein in his capacity as executor of the estate of Ralph E. Davis, deceased) filed a petition for appointment of himself or some other fit person as temporary conservator of the senior Davis. We will refer to the latter as Mr. Davis or the conservatee, and to the former as defendant. The petition alleged that Mr. Davis was over the age of eighty years and was unable to properly care for his property and that it was for his best interest that a conservator of his estate be appointed. It was alleged that Mr. Davis' estimated personal assets were $4,198,018.65, that his estimated liabilities were $2,327,452.90 and that his estimated net worth was $1,870,565.75. On the same day the court appointed defendant as the temporary conservator of the estate of Mr. Davis. Defendant on that day filed his oath and letters of temporary conservatorship issued. Also on August 25, 1967, defendant filed a petition seeking appointment of himself as conservator of the estate of Mr. Davis. This petition alleged that Mr. Davis was unable to properly care for himself or for his property and that it was for his best interest that a conservator be appointed of his estate.
Thereafter a memorandum was filed which referred to a conference held in chambers (the conference is not part of the record) and which suggested that if the court decided that there should be a conservatorship of Mr. Davis' estate a five member committee should be appointed as co-conservators. The memorandum was signed by both defendant and Mr. Davis, and by their respective counsel. The committee was suggested to be composed of four named persons, including defendant; the fifth member was to be either Mr Davis himself or another individual named in the memorandum. On October 25, 1967, the court ordered that the five individuals, not including Mr. Davis, be appointed as co-conservators. The order contained a finding that the facts alleged in the petition were true. There was neither an allegation in the petition nor a finding by the court that Mr. Davis was either insane or incompetent.
On January 6, 1968, the conservatee signed a writing 1 agreeing to give the sum of $150,000 on a matching basis for a stadium to be built at Wisconsin State University-Platteville. 2
On January 15, 1968, letters of conservatorship were issued to the five individuals who had been appointed by the court the preceding October, and they apparently took their oaths and qualified as conservators on that day. (Prob.Code, § 1801.)
On September 10, 1968, the conservators filed in the probate court a petition for an order to show cause why the conservators should not be instructed to rescind Mr. Davis' 'pledge' but Mr. Davis died on September 21, 1968, before the petition could be heard.
Defendant became the executor of Mr. Davis' estate. Plaintiff filed a claim in the probate proceedings, based upon the agreement to match funds. On December 13, 1968, defendant rejected the claim. On December 16, 1968, notice of the rejection was mailed to plaintiff. 3
During the last part of February or the beginning of March, 1969, the clerk's office of the superior court received by mail from the office of the Attorney General of Wisconsin the complaint herein, together with the necessary filing fees. The complaint seeks to recover on the facts set out in the rejected claim. The complaint did not meet the requirements of form prescribed by Rule 201, California Rules of Court. It was signed and verified by the executive director of plaintiff and was also signed by the Wisconsin Attorney General. No member of the State Bar of California signed the document. The clerk's office was not certain whether the complaint was 'acceptable.' Within twenty-four hours it was submitted by the clerk to the presiding judge of the court below for his review as to form and for advice as to whether out of state counsel could file pleadings in the court. The judge immediately determined that the complaint was acceptable for filing so far as its form was concerned. He did not so advise the clerk's office, but instead kept the document until he could decide whether the question concerning counsel affected the right to file the document. The judge kept the complaint in his office until he determined that out-of-state attorneys could file pleadings in the court. He then returned the document to the clerk's office on or about May 2, 1969. A filing stamp bearing that date was put onto the complaint.
Defendant generally demurred to the complaint, urging the two points to be decided in this appeal, and requesting that judicial notice be taken of the facts set forth in the conservatorship proceeding (some of which we have recited above). The demurrer was overruled and defendant answered. Thereafter, on November 1, 1971, defendant moved for judgment on the pleadings on the ground the complaint failed to state a cause of action for the reasons set forth in the demurrer. 4 On January 3, 1972, the motion was denied. On September 13, 1972, defendant renewed his motion for judgment on the pleadings, alleging the Court of Appeal's decision in Place v. Trent, 27 Cal.App.3d 526, 103 Cal.Rptr. 841 () required granting of the motion. The renewed motion was granted, and judgment on the pleadings was entered in favor of defendant. Plaintiff appeals.
The Complaint is not Barred by Probate Code section 714
Probate Code section 714 requires that actions on rejected claims be commenced within three months after the date of service of the notice of rejection if the claim is then due; if the claim is not due the action must be brought within two months after it becomes due. 5
An action is commenced when the complaint is filed with the court (Code Civ.Proc., §§ 350 and 411.10). (Tregambo v. Comanche M. & M. Co., 57 Cal. 501, 506; Andrews v. Metzner, 83 Cal.App. 764, 769-770, 257 P. 203; Estate of Carroll, 190 Cal. 105, 111, 210 P. 817; Hoyt v. Stark, 134 Cal. 178, 180, 66 P. 223.)
Since the complaint which was tendered to him by plaintiff here was not in the form prescribed by Rule 201, subparagraphs (a) through (c) of the California Rules of Court, the clerk did not violate his duties when he turned the papers over to the presiding judge. Rule 201, subdivision (g) provides: 'The clerk of the court shall not accept for filing or file any papers which do not comply with this rule; provided, however, that for good cause shown, the court may permit the filing of papers which do not comply herewith.' Thus, it was perfectly proper for the clerk to inquire of the judge whether to accept the complaint for filing.
Within a day after the complaint had been received and, therefore, well within the time which the complaint had to be filed, the judge determined that insofar as the form of the papers was concerned the complaint was acceptable for filing. At that time the full requirements of Rule 201(g) were met.
It is the duty of the clerk to file properly tendered papers upon delivery, and his failure to do so does not forfeit any right of the party delivering the papers for filing. (Tregambo, supra, 57 Cal. at 506; Beck v. Pasadena Etc. Water Co., 130 Cal. 50, 58, 62 P. 219; W. H. Marston Co. v. Kochritz, 80 Cal.App. 352, 357, 251 P. 959; but cf. City of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 264 Cal.App.2d 766, 771, 70 Cal.Rptr. 826, where the papers never were put into the custody of the clerk.)
Similarly, the fact that the judge neglected to advise the clerk in this connection because the judge had not yet determined the right of out-of-state counsel to present the complaint should not be considered to have worked a forfeiture of any rights of plaintiff. The judge did in fact determine subsequently that counsel's out-of-state status did not...
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