Board of Sup'rs of Harrison County v. Gulf Coast Military Academy

• Decision Date: 24 October 1921
• Docket Number: 21764
• Citation: 126 Miss. 729,89 So. 617
• Parties: BOARD OF SUP'RS OF HARRISON COUNTY v. GULF COAST MILITARY ACADEMY
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court

89 So. 617

126 Miss. 729

BOARD OF SUP'RS OF HARRISON COUNTY v. GULF COAST MILITARY ACADEMY

No. 21764

Supreme Court of Mississippi

October 24, 1921

TAXATION. Statute exempts property of incorporated college from taxation, although operated for private profit, and does not conflict with constitutional provisions relating to uniform and equal taxation, taxation of private corporations, and that the right to tax them shall not be surrendered.

Under paragraph D, section 4251, Code of 1906 (section 6878 Hemingway's Code), the property of any incorporated college or institution for the education of youth used directly and exclusively for such purpose is exempt from taxation; and this is true, regardless of whether or not the institution is operated for private profit. Such exemption is not in conflict with sections 112, 181, and 182 of the Constitution of 1890.

HON. D M. GRAHAM, Judge.

APPEAL from circuit court of Harrison county, HON. D. M. GRAHAM Judge.

Tax proceeding in which the Board of Supervisors of Harrison County appeals from a judgment exempting from taxation property owned by the Gulf Coast Military Academy. Affirmed.

Judgment affirmed.

M. D. Brown, for appellant.

The general rule as to exemptions is that persons or corporation seeking exemption from taxation must bring themselves strictly within the letter of the statute. All reasonable doubts are resolved against the exemption, and under the above statute the rule applies. Adams County v. Catholic Diocese of Natchez, 71 So. 19; Ridgeley Lodge v. Redus, 78 Miss. 352.

It is true that in the case of Adams County v. Catholic Diocese of Natchez, that the court held that this property was exempt from taxation, because all of the rents and profits derived from the institution went back to charitable purposes. Adams County v. Catholic Diocese, 71 So., at page 19, in further discussing this case, as to the intention of the legislature, Judge HOLDEN uses the following language: "In this we disagree with the learned counsel of the appellant, as it is clear that section 4252, Code of 1906, does not conflict with, nor curtail the exemption given in 4251, but simply extends the exemption so as to apply to property owned by religious societies when not used exclusively for the purposes of the society but producing revenue, provided the revenue is used for benevolent purposes and not for profit. We concede that statutes exempting persons and property from taxation must be strictly construed, but it is also true that there is a relaxation of the rule in the case of statutes of exemption applicable to religious and educational institutions, and that the supreme test is in the intent of the legislature." In State v. Fisk University, 87 Tenn. 241, 10 S.W. 286, the court holds: "The intention of the legislature must govern in ascertaining the extent of tax exemptions, and when the exemption is to religious, scientific, literary, and educational institutions the same strict construction will not be indulged in that would be to corporations created for private gain or profit. Adams Co. v. Catholic Diocese of Natchez, 71 So. 19.

This case stresses and emphasizes the fact that the institutions which are exempt from taxation apply to religious and educational institutions operating not for profit, and it cannot be contended, with any consistency, that appellee is such an institution, that is, one operating not for profit.

Counsel no doubt will lay great stress on the case of Preston v. The City of Jackson, as controlling in the instant case. In the case of Preston v. The City of Jackson, 93 Miss. 356, 47 So. 547, it was held that Belhaven was exempt from taxation. In this case the declaration alleges that during the entire year of 1907 and some years prior thereto Preston was the sole owner of Belhaven College, an educational institution, and that the property in question was used during the entire year directly and exclusively for educational purposes and therefore was not subject to ad valorem tax, being exempt under paragraph "D," section 4251, Code of 1906, and which institution as stated by the declaration, was used directly and exclusively for educational purposes within the meaning of the statute, Sec. 4251, Code 1906.

The Preston case is not controlling nor of any great weight in this case, because the question involved in that case was whether the exemption applied to corporations and individuals alike, being the only point that was properly before the court, and the court held that the same rule applied to an individual as to a corporation.

In reaching the conclusion in the Preston case the history of legislation with reference to liberality of legislation toward educational institutions of Mississipppi was dwelt on at great length. However, in all of this discussion and reference to authorities there was not a school or educational institution of the kind and character of appellee referred to, to-wit (Quoting for the charter): "To carry on and operate a high class military school, during the fall, winter and spring; and if it is desirable to operate a summer Naval School." In connection with the school it will operate a dormitory and boarding department, a dormitory, a place, a room, a building, to sleep in; and a boarding department, a department for boarders--in other words, to operate a hotel. Under this charter, if desirable, this appellee can operate a commodious and elaborate hotel in the summer season, when the hotel season is best on the coast in full competition with all other hotels on the coast and be exempt from taxation. A mere statement of the case carries with it a refutation of the claim of the appellee; that is, that it has this privilege under its charter, but notwithstanding it is exempt from taxation.

As shown by the record, all of this property is located in the rural separate school district of Harrison county, Mississippi, with special assessments, to-wit, twelve thousand dollars for public school buildings, a bonded indebtedness, and a special ten mill levy for carrying on the public schools. Even should the court hold that this property is exempt from the ad valorem tax, we contend that it would not be exempt from paying its part of this bonded indebtedness and the special ten mill levy for operating the school, and we cite in support of this contention under the head of exemptions from taxations, 12 A. & E. Ency. of Law, page 316, paragraph (b), in discussing the question of exemptions of public property as follows:

(b) Express exemption from assessments; a power to grant; it is not to be implied from the rule laid down above that the legislature has not power to exempt from local assessment as well as from general taxation, for in the absence of any constitutional restrictions, such a power doubtless exists. It has been held, however, that a constitutional provision that certain property may be exempted from taxation by the general assembly impliedly forbids any exemption from special assessments. 12 A. & E. Ency. of Law, page 316.

We respectfully submit that this institution is not such an institution as intended by the legislature to be exempt from taxation.

W. H. Watkins, Hanun, Gardner & Chas. Scott Brown for appellee.

The operation of a dormitory, as well as each other feature of which counsel for appellant complains so strongly is a necessary ingredient of, and incidental to, the operation of a military school. The students must sleep, for which purpose dormitories are necessary; they must eat, hence mess halls. To study, they must have books; and to embody the intended military character, cadets must perforce be supplied with uniforms. Dormitories occupied by students, buildings used as dining halls, observatory buildings, houses furnished by a college for officers of its observatory, adjoining land necessary for the proper use of same, and land used as a college yard, are non-taxable." Yale University v. Town of New Haven, 42 A. 87, 43 L. R. A. 490.

In People ex rel, Mt. Pleasant Academy v. Metzger, 98 A.D. 237 (affirmed in 181 N.Y. 511, 73 N.E. 1130) buildings occupied by the principal as a residence, as well as the sleeping rooms for students, drill rooms, armories, stables, etc., all connected with a military school, were held to be used exclusively for educational purposes. In Wylie v. Montreal, 12 Can. S. C. 384, a private boarding school for girls was declared to fall within the exemption.

In Blackburn v. Houston, 39 La. Ann. 592, 2 So. 193, POCHE, J., said: "It stands to reason that a college with some two or three hundred scholars, who would also be boarders, would not loose its character as being used exclusively for school purposes, because, forsooth, it would contain rooms for the accommodation of necessary teachers, as well as for the servants required for the preparation of the food for teachers as well as for scholars. It is too plain in our minds for argument that all these incidents are necessary adjuncts to property used exclusively for school purposes."

These authorities could be multiplied indefinitely but we have already considered the subject of usage of school property with more attention than it deserves. However, the learned counsel for appellant, evidently through a misconception of the case, has advanced a line of argument that is wholly foreign to the issue involved, and not at all relevant or pertinent to the subject now before the court. To say that appellee is operating a summer boarding house in connection with the school, or that under this charter, if desirable this appellee can operate a commodious and elaborate hotel in the summer season, when the hotel season is best on the coast, in full competition with all other hotels on the coast, and be exempt from taxation goes...