Board of Sup'rs of Leflore County v. Whittington
| Citation | 118 Miss. 799,80 So. 8 |
| Decision Date | 02 December 1918 |
| Docket Number | 20411 |
| Court | Mississippi Supreme Court |
| Parties | BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF LEFLORE COUNTY v. WHITTINGTON |
APPEAL from the circuit court of Leflora county, HON. H. H. ELMORE Judge.
Proceeding by W. M. Whittington against the Board of Supervisors of Leflora County, to review an assessment. From a judgment for plaintiff, defendant appeals.
The facts are fully stated in the opinion of the court.
Judgment reversed.
Gardner McBee & Gardner, for appellant.
The question involved in this case is the construction of section 4289 of the Mississippi Code of 1906, which provides as follows: "School Lands Taxable When Leased:--All school lands known as the sixteenth section, reserved for the use of school, or lands reserved or granted in lieu of or as substitute for the sixteenth sections, shall be liable, after the same shall have been leased, to be taxed as other lands are taxed during the continuance of the lease; but in case of sale thereof for taxes, only the title of the lessee or his assignee shall pass by the sale." It is the contention of the appellant that the language: "to be taxed as other lands are taxed during the continuance of the lease" means that sixteenth sections shall be taxed "as other lands are taxed."
Had it been the intention of the legislature to tax only the unexpired lease, then, we take it, the legislature would have so provided, or, in other words, the legislature instead of providing that sixteenth sections shall be taxed "as other lands," would have provided that the unexpired lease on said sixteenth sections should be taxed by a gradual rate of assessment to be lessened as each year expired on the lease.
We can well understand why the legislature would not undertake in taxing sixteenth sections, to tax the unexpired lease because the last few years of the lease would practically be of no value for the purpose of taxation, whereas the income from the sixteenth section would be just as great, in fact, possibly better, than in the beginning. The last year of the lease would practically amount to nothing for the purpose of taxation, if the theory of plaintiff is correct.
This court will notice that this section does not undertake to tax an "interest" in the land, which, of course, is the lease, but undertakes and does provide for the taxation of the land "as other lands are taxed."
We, therefore, say that this section of the Code, in dealing with the taxation of sixteenth sections does not undertake to tax any interest which the lessee may have in the land, but undertakes to tax the thing itself, which is the land, and which is taxed "as other lands are taxed."
It may be of some benefit to take the definition of the word "taxed."
By reference to Vol. 4, 2nd Edition, Words & Phrases, page 859, it is held: "The words 'assessed' and 'taxed' in Sess. Laws 1903, chapter 731, sec. 29, were used interchangeably by the legislature, and were intended to express the same meaning." State ex rel. Fleming, 97 N.W. 1063, 70 Neb. 529.
Evidently the legislature, in section 4289, intended to use the word "taxed" interchangeably with the word "assessed." In other words, the legislature, in providing for the taxation of sixteenth sections as other lands are taxed, intended to say that those lands should be assessed as other lands are assessed; that is to say, with reference to the value of the land, and not the interest of the owner of the land. We do not recall finding anywhere where any interest in the land is assessed under our law, but, the land itself is assessed for its actual value, according to its producing power, its potential wealth.
To the same effect--Adams v. Snow, 21 N.W. 765, 65 Iowa 435, where it is held: "If lands are listed and assessed to a person named, and the assessment is returned to the auditor, they are to be regarded as taxed," etc. In other words, to tax land is to assess land, and to assess land is: "To adjust or fix the proportion of a tax which each person, or several liable to it, has to pay; to proportion a tax among several; to distribute taxation in a proportion founded on the proportion of burden and benefit." 120 Cal. 322; Black's Law Dict., page 94.
We, therefore, say that the legislature provided in section 4289 that school lands, when leased, shall be taxed as other lands, meant exactly what it said, and used the language necessary to convey the idea that school lands are to be taxed just as other lands, without reference to any lease, or interest that the owner of the lands may have in them.
The argument will doubtless be made that when this school land is sold for non-payment of taxes, that under this section only the title of the lessee is passed by the sale. This does not militate against our position in the least, because the tax title, of course, could only convey the title of the owner of the lease; in other words, the purchaser would acquire the unexpired lease.
We also wish to submit that the owner of the lease does not have to pay future taxes, and that it is no hardship on him so far as future taxes are concerned to require the land to be assessed as other lands are assessed, as it may be that he will dispose of his unexpired lease which he has a perfect right to do, and which carries with it no obligation to see that future taxes are paid.
We respectfully submit that, under this section of the Code, appellee's unexpired lease on these school lands are liable to be taxed or assessed, just as other lands are taxed or assessed, without reference to when his lease may expire.
Whittington & Osborne, for appellee.
Learned counsel for the appellant have misconstrued the meaning of section 4289 of the Mississippi Code of 1906. This section provides that sixteenth sections school lands, after the same shall have been leased, shall be liable to be taxed as other lands are taxed during the continuance of the lease. It further provides that in case of a sale thereof for taxes, only the title of the lessee or his assigns shall pass by the same. This statute, when construed in the light of section 112 of the Constitution, means that the leasehold interest only is liable for assessment.
How are other lands assessed? Lands and property in this connection may be regarded as synonymous terms. All property must be assessed in proportion to its value and in accordance with its true value. What property does the appellee own on which the state can ask him to pay taxes? To ask the question is to answer it. If the appellee is called upon to pay on the full or fee simple value of his land, he would be paying taxes upon property which he did not own. It is a citizen's property that is assessed, and under our Constitution, it cannot be assessed at more than its true value.
Counsel for appellant admit that the value of the lease for the last few years would be practically nothing. This admission is a convincing argument in favor of the contention that only the leasehold interest of the appellee is liable to be taxed.
A citation of authorities, defining the meaning of the words "assessed" and "taxed" is wholly unnecessary, for undoubtedly in the statute involved, they are used interchangeably. When property is sold for taxes, the title to that property is ordinarily vested in the purchaser. There is one exception to this rule. Learned counsel for the appellant have pointed out this exception, for they realize that this exception destroys their theory and their argument utterly. The statute provides that only the interest of the lessee can pass under the tax sale. Yet if the theory of the appellant is correct, the full value of the section would be liable to taxation, while only the leasehold interest could be sold. In other words, the appellant argues that the property could be assessed for taxes, but in default of payment could not be sold.
We submit that the argument of the learned counsel for the appellant is as far wide of the mark as was their argument in the court below, that this case came within the case of Cudahy Pkg. Co. v. Stovall, 112 Miss. 106, 72 So 870. In the court below the learned counsel for the appellant called attention to that provision of section 112 of the Constitution, which provides for a special mode of valuation and assessment for railroads, or for particular species of property of persons, corporations, or associations not situated wholly in one county. They actually argued that sixteenth sections were not situated wholly in one county. Their reasoning, evidently, is that inasmuch as there are sixteenth sections in every county, therefore school lands are within the provisions just referred to. The same might be said of other lands or other species of property. Taxation on all property except that within the exceptions and except banks as provided by another section of the...
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