Board of Sup'rs of Worth County v. District Court of Scott County

• Decision Date: 11 March 1930
• Docket Number: 40174
• Citation: 229 N.W. 711,209 Iowa 1030
• Parties: BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF WORTH COUNTY, Petitioners, v. DISTRICT COURT OF SCOTT COUNTY, Respondent
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

229 N.W. 711

209 Iowa 1030

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF WORTH COUNTY, Petitioners, v. DISTRICT COURT OF SCOTT COUNTY, Respondent

No. 40174

Supreme Court of Iowa, Des Moines

March 11, 1930

Certiorari to Scott District Court.--WILLIAM W. SCOTT, Judge.

Original action in certiorari in this court, to review the ruling of the district court of Scott County in refusing to grant a motion for a change of venue in a certain action pending in said court.--Writ sustained and order reversed.

Writ sustained; order reversed.

Paul G Thonn and Thomas & Loth, for petitioners.

Lane & Waterman, for respondent.

FAVILLE J. MORLING, C. J., and EVANS, KINDIG, and GRIMM, JJ., concur.

OPINION

FAVILLE, J.

One Huebotter brought an action in the district court of Scott County against the board of supervisors of Worth County and Drainage District No. 46 of said Worth County. Said action was brought to recover on certain drainage district bonds held by the plaintiff in said action. The defendants in said action moved for a change of venue of said cause from Scott County to Worth County. Said motion was overruled, and to review said ruling, this action was brought in certiorari. For convenience, we shall refer to the said Huebotter as plaintiff, and to the board of supervisors of Worth County and Drainage District No. 46 as defendants.

Drainage District No. 46 was duly organized, as provided by law, and certain bonds were issued by the board of supervisors of Worth County to pay for an improvement in said drainage district. Plaintiff's action is brought upon a number of said bonds. Plaintiff's petition alleges the establishment of said drainage district and the issuance of said bonds, and the plaintiff prays judgment against the defendants for the amount due on said bonds together with interest, and as a part of the prayer of said petition, plaintiff alleges:

"Plaintiff further states that he is advised and avers the fact to be that the levy of assessments in Drainage District No. 46 has not produced sufficient revenue to meet the aforesaid interest and principal now due, and that the treasurer of Worth County has not sufficient funds in his hands to pay the aforesaid bonds and interest and the judgment to which plaintiff is entitled thereon; that the owners of some of the lands assessed have defaulted in their payments, and said treasurer was not able to sell said lands at tax sale; that the members of the defendant board of supervisors, in disregard of their duty in the premises, have failed and refused, and still refuse, to levy additional assessments on the lands in said Drainage District No. 46 to produce sufficient funds to meet interest and principal of outstanding bonds now due, as required by law. As auxiliary relief in this action, plaintiff further prays that a writ of mandamus of this court issue, to be directed to said defendant board of supervisors, commanding said board forthwith to levy and collect sufficient assessments on the lands included in said Drainage District No. 46, on the basis of the classification heretofore made by the appraisers appointed in the drainage proceedings and confirmed by said board, to pay such portion of the judgment prayed for herein remaining unpaid after the application of all funds available for that purpose in the hands of the county treasurer of Worth County, together with interest and costs, and to pay the same to the plaintiff."

The bonds sued upon provide that the interest and principal are made payable at a certain banking house in the city of Davenport, which is in Scott County. Said bonds further recite:

"This bond is one of a series of bonds issued by said county for the purpose of paying the cost of a system of drainage known as Drainage District No. 46, within said county, and in anticipation of the collection of the installment of a special assessment duly levied upon the lands benefited, pursuant to an order made by the board of supervisors of said county, duly entered, and in strict compliance with Chapter 68 of the Laws of the Thirtieth General Assembly of Iowa, as amended. This bond is based upon and constituted a lien upon and is payable solely out of the proceeds of the special assessments for benefits heretofore legally levied on the lands to be benefited, and the said special assessments are hereby irrevocably pledged therefor."

The motion for change of trial to Worth County is predicated upon several grounds, which may be summed up in the general contention that the action is maintainable only in Worth County.

I. Plaintiff's action is brought at law. The relief sought in the first instance is a judgment at law against the defendants for the aggregate amount due on plaintiff's bonds, with interest and costs.

Our first inquiry is whether or not plaintiff is entitled to a judgment at law against the defendants as prayed. Clearly, the plaintiff has no cause of action against Worth County. Said county has incurred no liability to the plaintiff. Sisson v. Board of Supervisors, 128 Iowa 442, 462, 104 N.W. 454.

Nor is the plaintiff entitled to a judgment against said Drainage District No. 46. A drainage district is sui generis. It is not a corporation. It cannot sue or be sued. It is merely a segregated area of land, which has been set out by legal proceedings, and is subject to assessment for the construction of certain drainage improvements within said territory. It can incur no corporate liability. Under the statute, its affairs are managed by the board of supervisors of the county in a representative capacity. The powers of such board, however, are limited and defined by statute. Clary v. Woodbury County, 135 Iowa 488, 113 N.W. 330; First Nat. Bank v. Webster County, 204 Iowa 720, 216 N.W. 8. There can be no judgment at law rendered against a drainage district in any case. The only method by which the obligations growing out of the establishment of a drainage district and the construction of a public improvement thereunder can be paid, is by the process of levy and collection of a special assessment upon the lands embraced within the drainage district. It therefore follows that the plaintiff was not entitled to a judgment at law against said Drainage District No. 46.

Nor is the plaintiff entitled to any judgment at law against the board of supervisors. They act wholly in an official or representative capacity, under the express provisions of the drainage statutes.

At this point it is contended, however, that the plaintiff is entitled to have the validity of his obligation established, and the amount due thereon fixed in an action at law. The ordinary method by which a court of law establishes legal rights and enforces obligations is by the rendition of a judgment. The instant case is brought as an ordinary action for a judgment against the defendants for the amount alleged to be due to the plaintiff. This the plaintiff was not entitled to on the face of the pleadings, for the reason that it affirmatively appears that there is no liability on the part of the defendants for which any judgment at law could be entered against them. Under what circumstances and in what court the plaintiff might be entitled to have the amount of his claim established is a question not before us in the instant case, and upon it we make no pronouncement. We hold that, in the action at law now under review in this case, the plaintiff was not entitled to a judgment at law for the amount...