Board of Supervisors of Winston County v. Adams

• Decision Date: 21 November 1932
• Docket Number: 30407
• Citation: 144 So. 476,164 Miss. 162
• Court: Mississippi Supreme Court
• Parties: BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF WINSTON COUNTY v. ADAMS, CHANCERY CLERK

144 So. 476

164 Miss. 162

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS OF WINSTON COUNTY v. ADAMS, CHANCERY CLERK

No. 30407

Supreme Court of Mississippi

November 21, 1932

Division B

1 COUNTIES.

Attempted borrowing of money from county sinking fund on county's unsecured note, to procure money for paying school salaries held unauthorized (Code 1930, section 5988).

2 MANDAMUS.

Mandamus held not available against chancery clerk to compel action on order of county supervisors which on its face was unauthorized.

HON JNO. F. ALLEN, Judge.

APPEAL from circuit court of Winston County, HON. JNO. F. ALLEN, Judge.

Action by the Board of Supervisors of Winston County for mandamus against Mrs. L. W. Adams, Chancery Clerk. From a judgment denying relief, petitioner appeals. Affirmed.

Affirmed.

Rodgers & Prisock, of Louisville, for appellant.

The Board of Supervisors of Winston County, Mississippi, met at its regular October meeting on the first Monday in October as shown by Exhibit two in the petition filed in the Circuit Court of Winston County, Mississippi, and after having been called to order entered an order under Sections 6615 and 6616 of the Code of 1930, which permits the Board of Supervisors or trustee of separate school districts to borrow money for the purpose of paying school teachers and school carrier's salaries.

Winston County had at that time funds in the Common County Sinking Fund which were not in use and were held by the County Depository to await the contingency for which said funds were accumulated, to-wit: for the payment of bonds and interest.

We are unable to see how the jurisdictional facts could be set out in plainer terms than to follow the words of the statute authorizing the lending of the sinking funds to said county of its obligations under Section 5988, Code of 1930; and Sections 6615 and 6616, Code of 1930, where the school fund is depleted the board is permitted to borrow money for the purpose of paying school carriers.

The order sets out the fact that there is no school fund with which to pay school carriers, thereby giving it the jurisdiction to borrow the money; and sets out the fact that there are sinking funds which will not be needed before the due date of its obligation. We, therefore, say that it is very evident that the jursidiction giving the board the right to borrow the sinking funds for the school, and the right to lend the sinking funds have been plainly set out in the order of the Board of Supervisors.

Board of Supervisors Noxubee County v. Long, 106 So. 83; Hinton v. Board of Supervisors, Perry County, 36 So. 565.

Appellee has set out many reasons under which she refuses to act in this case, none of which were seriously argued by her attorney, except the jurisdictional question, in the court below, and the ninth assignment which, of course, is answered by Section. 5988, Code of 1930, quote: "The Board of Supervisors are also authorized to invest the sinking funds of any county in the bonds or other obligations issued by said county." And there is really no contention on that assignment.

E. M. Livingston, of Louisville, for appellee.

It is necessary for the board to pass an order that is full and complete showing the authority for a loan before a loan can be legally made from any fund belonging to the county or the districts thereof. The authority of law is jurisdictional and should appear in the order giving the Clerk notice and showing authority for the transfer or transposition of funds belonging to the county or its various taxing districts.

We admit that the county had sufficient funds in the interest and sinking fund to make the loan, and it is not contended that the board cannot borrow money under the provision of Sections 6615 and 6616 of the Code, but we do seriously contend that the board has no authority of law to borrow money from any other fund of the county under the provision of these sections. They could borrow money from an individual or a bank, but cannot transpose funds from one fund to another, and what the board did in this instance was to undertake to transpose funds from Common County Bond and Interest Sinking Fund to the Common School Fund, and the effort was made without authority so to do.

Sections 6615 and 6616, Code of 1930, nowhere give the Board of Supervisors the authority to loan the funds to another fund of the county, but simply give them the authority to borrow money.

Counsel for appellant cites Section 5987, Code of 1930, in support of their contention and quote part of the section only. They do not quote that part of the section that places them squarely under the provisions of section 247 above quoted. We submit that Section 5987 simply reiterates and makes the restriction on the board more rigid than does Section 247, Code of 1930.

In neither section has the Legislature made provisions for such loan as contemplated by appellant in this proceeding.

Section 5988, Code of 1930, is of no assistance to appellant in this case because they are not undertaking to make an investment in bonds or other obligations of the county, or at least the order under which they are traveling does not even hint at such procedure.

This court has held in numerous cases that boards of supervisors are creatures of statute and can do only such things as are expressly authorized by statute. They cannot enlarge upon the statute, nor can they make an investment in securities when the order they pass provides for a loan.

The powers of a county board of supervisors will be strictly limited to those conferred by statute.

Adams v. First National Bank, 103 Miss. 744; Green County v. Snellgrove, 103 Miss. 898.

Boards of supervisors have no implied powers, and can act only through their minutes spread upon the records of their office.

Tallahatchie Drainage District v. Yocono-Tallahatchie Drainage District, 148 Miss. 182.

A warrant issued under an order which does not specify the statute which it is allowed is void.

Beck v. Allen, 58 Miss. 143.

And the clerk will act right to refuse to...