Board of Supervisors v. Superior Court

• Decision Date: 22 March 1994
• Docket Number: No. E013090,E013090
• Citation: 28 Cal.Rptr.2d 560,23 Cal.App.4th 830
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: BOARD OF SUPERVISORS of Riverside County, et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Riverside County, Respondent. Temecula RANCHOS, Real Party in Interest.

Page 560

28 Cal.Rptr.2d 560

23 Cal.App.4th 830

BOARD OF SUPERVISORS of Riverside County, et al., Petitioners, v. The SUPERIOR COURT of Riverside County, Respondent Temecula RANCHOS, Real Party in Interest.

No. E013090.

Court of Appeal, Fourth District, Division 2, California.

March 22, 1994.

Certified for Publication

[23 Cal.App.4th 833] Lorenz, Alhadeff, Cannon & Rose and Steven W. Winton, San Diego, and William C. Katzenstein, Riverside County Counsel, for petitioners.

No appearance for respondent.

Best, Best & Krieger, Michelle Ouellette and Meredith Jury, Riverside, for real party in interest.

OPINION

TIMLIN, Acting Presiding Justice.

The underlying action to which this writ petition relates is a mandamus and a declaratory and injunctive relief proceeding brought by Temecula Ranchos against the County of Riverside (County), in which Temecula Ranchos challenges County's approval of a residential housing project on the basis that the County improperly determined that the project will not have a significant effect on the environment and issued a negative declaration to that effect as to the project. The question presented by the petition filed in this court is whether Temecula Ranchos complied with the statutory requirements for service of its petition for administrative mandamus under Public Resources Code section 21167 ("petition") contained in Public Resources Code section 21167.6, subdivision (a). ¹ We conclude that the latter section of the Public Resources Code does establish the procedure for obtaining jurisdiction over the County in the underlying action, but that the failure to personally serve the petition on County within the specified period was not fatal to Temecula Ranchos' action.

I PROCEDURAL HISTORY OF THE UNDERLYING ACTION

The procedural history of the underlying action is not subject to dispute. County filed the negative declaration on January 28, 1993, and posted notice on January 29. On February 25, 1993, Temecula Ranchos gave written notice to County of its intent to commence the action, and then filed its petition on February 26, 1993. On March 3, 1993, Temecula Ranchos served County with conformed copies of the summons ² and petition, the "Notice of Commencement," and a "Request for Preparation of Record of Proceedings." This service was made by mail and there is no contention that it complied with any of the substituted service provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure. ³

Temecula Ranchos then filed an amended petition on March 23. This petition was personally served on County on March 29, and there is no contention that this service did not comply with the personal service requirements of the Code of Civil Procedure. On April 29, County moved to quash service of "summons," which motion was directed to the purported service of the petition on March 3, 1993. It also moved to dismiss the action. ⁴ (Code Civ.Proc., § 418.10.) It argued that as to CEQA actions commenced under Public Resources Code section 21167, subdivision (b), Public Resources Code section 21167.6(a) sets a ten business day time limit for personal service of the petition, which time limit is jurisdictional. As Temecula Ranchos had not accomplished proper service on County within this period, County claimed that it was entitled to a dismissal. Presumably County intended that the court should also quash the second service made on March 29 as untimely, although the motion was not entirely clear on the requested relief.

In response, Temecula Ranchos argued that section 21167.6(a) is a statute governing notice, not jurisdiction, and that under the service provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure its personal service of the amended petition on March 29 was both timely and effective for jurisdictional purposes.

The trial court found that the service requirement of section 21167.6(a) was not jurisdictional, thus agreeing with Temecula Ranchos. Accordingly, it denied County's motion and this petition followed.

II DISCUSSION

A. General Principles Applicable in Interpreting CEQA Statutes

The specific issue before us is whether Public Resources Code section 21167.6(a) provides the exclusive service procedure by which a petitioner under section 21167 acquires jurisdiction over a public agency, or whether it serves only a notice function and does not supersede the general provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure with respect to service and the time limits within which it must be accomplished.

It is axiomatic that if statutory "language is ... clear and unambiguous there is no need for construction." (In re Lance W. (1985) 37 Cal.3d 873, 886, 210 Cal.Rptr. 631, 694 P.2d 744.) In our view, the statute under consideration is not unequivocal as to service of the petition and the method thereof on the public agency so as to have caused the trial court to have jurisdiction over the agency. Thus, we attempt to "ascertain the intent of the Legislature so as to effectuate the purpose of the law." (In re Estate of MacDonald (1990) 51 Cal.3d 262, 268, 272 Cal.Rptr. 153, 794 P.2d 911.) In so doing, we strive to reach a reasonable result and to avoid absurdities. (In re Eric J. (1979) 25 Cal.3d 522, 537, 159 Cal.Rptr. 317, 601 P.2d 549.) In this case, neither of the proposed interpretations by the parties is absurd or unreasonable, and the intent of the Legislature cuts both ways.

We begin our analysis with observations concerning the overall purpose and structure of the California Environmental Quality Act (CEQA or Act), Public Resources Code sections 21000 et seq. Temecula Ranchos points out that CEQA was obviously designed and enacted with the intent to protect the environment, and that it has often been interpreted to provide as wide a protection as possible. The Supreme Court has repeatedly confirmed that CEQA is " 'to be interpreted in such manner as to afford the fullest possible protection to the environment within the reasonable scope of the statutory language.' " (Laurel Heights Improvement Assn. v. Regents of the University of California (1988) 47 Cal.3d 376, 390, 253 Cal.Rptr. 426, 764 P.2d 278, quoting Friends of Mammoth v. Board of Supervisors (1972) 8 Cal.3d 247, 259, 104 Cal.Rptr. 761, 502 P.2d 1049.)

However, while these precepts are validly applied to the substantive merits of challenges brought under CEQA, in which it is asserted that certain projects will or may have a significant effect on the environment, that does not mean that the same standard of liberality should necessarily be applied in interpreting the procedural requirements of the Act. The Act contains a number of provisions evidencing the clear "legislative determination that the public interest is not served unless challenges under CEQA are filed promptly" (Oceanside Marina Towers Assn. v. Oceanside Community Development Com. (1987) 187 Cal.App.3d 735, 741, 231 Cal.Rptr. 910), and the same policy must certainly be said for similar provisions which require that a CEQA action, once filed, be diligently prosecuted and heard as soon as reasonably possible.

Thus, Public Resources Code section 21167 establishes statutes of limitations governing various CEQA challenges; these statutes run from 30 to 180 days--periods of far shorter duration than the typical civil statute of limitations controlling common civil actions. (Cf. Code Civ.Proc., §§ 337, subd. 1--four years on written contract, 338, subd. 2--three years for trespass or injury to real property, 340--one year for personal injuries.) Public Resources Code section 21167.8(a) requires that a settlement conference be scheduled within 20 days after the petition is served, and held within 45 days of service. Public Resources Code section 21167.4 requires the petitioner in a CEQA proceeding to request a hearing on the petition within 90 days of its filing, or be subject to dismissal, while section 21167.1 gives a general trial preference to CEQA actions over all other civil actions. Patently, there is legislative concern that CEQA challenges, with their obvious potential for financial prejudice and disruption, must not be permitted to drag on to the potential serious injury of the real party in interest. Recognizing this potential for abuse, in Citizens of Goleta Valley v. Board of Supervisors (1990) 52 Cal.3d 553, 276 Cal.Rptr. 410, 801 P.2d 1161, the court, while repeating the language from Laurel Heights quoted above, also cautioned that CEQA was not to be "subverted into an instrument for the oppression and delay of social, economic, or recreational development and advancement." (At pp. 563-564, 576, 276 Cal.Rptr. 410, 801 P.2d 1161.)

Inevitably, however, the policy of encouraging environmental protection through the statutory mechanisms for challenging allegedly improper actions sometimes conflicts with the short times limits of CEQA and the policies served by such limits.

Where the law is clear, these strict requirements of CEQA are applied as written; in Lee v. Lost Hills Water District (1978) 78 Cal.App.3d 630, 633-634, 144 Cal.Rptr. 510, for example, the court held a petition untimely even though the petitioner landowners asserted that they had never received notice of the action they wished to challenge. ⁵ In Oceanside Marina Towers, supra, the petitioners argued that the short period of section 21167, subdivision (b) did not bar their apparently tardy petition because the notice of negative declaration had been posted by the respondent city, rather than the redevelopment agency which was actually the "lead agency" in the project (see Pub.Res.Code, § 21067); the court found that as the city and the agency were essentially the same, the statute had begun to run at the time of posting, and the action was barred.

Nevertheless, it appears that, under certain circumstances, the courts have construed the unique procedural requirements of CEQA so as to permit the maintenance of a challenge for noncompliance with CEQA despite some arguable failure by the petitioner to fulfill the...