Board of Trustees of Police Pension Fund of Village of Park Forest v. Washburn

• Decision Date: 10 March 1987
• Docket Number: No. 86-890,86-890
• Citation: 106 Ill.Dec. 418,505 N.E.2d 1209,153 Ill.App.3d 482
• Parties: , 106 Ill.Dec. 418 BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the POLICE PENSION FUND OF the VILLAGE OF PARK FOREST, An Illinois Municipal Corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. John WASHBURN, Director, Department of Insurance, State of Illinois, Defendant-Appellant.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

Page 1209

505 N.E.2d 1209

153 Ill.App.3d 482, 106 Ill.Dec. 418

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the POLICE PENSION FUND OF the VILLAGE

OF PARK FOREST, An Illinois Municipal Corporation, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. John WASHBURN, Director, Department of Insurance, State of

Illinois, Defendant-Appellant.

No. 86-890.

Appellate Court of Illinois,

First District, Second Division.

March 10, 1987.

Atty. Gen. Neil F. Hartigan, Chicago (Roma Jones Stewart and Edward M. Kay, Asst. Attys. Gen., of counsel), for defendant-appellant.

Klein, Thorpe and Jenkins, Ltd., Chicago (Kathleen Field Orr, Michael J. Duggan, of counsel), for plaintiffs-appellees.

Justice STAMOS delivered the opinion of the court:

Plaintiff Board of Trustees ("Board") prevailed in an action for declaratory judgment against defendant Washburn, Director of the Illinois Department of Insurance, seeking a determination that defendant did not have authority to review individual Board decisions or to order the Board to comply with the provisions of the Illinois Pension Code. Defendant appeals.

The instant case stems from plaintiff's refusal to award a fund beneficiary, Milan Plavsic, benefits to which he alleges he was entitled, totaling $32,314.61. Plavsic, a member of the Park Forest police department for almost 12 years, was first granted a disability pension on February 28, 1963. The amount of such pension was based upon one-half of the salary of his rank for the preceding 12-month period. Plavsic elected to retire on December 26, 1971, at which time he was 50 years old and had accrued total service time of 20 years and 5 months. From that date until May 1980, Plavsic received a retirement pension, the amount of which was based on one-half the salary of his rank for the 12-month period preceding the disability pension award. On May 1, 1980, upon Plavsic's request that plaintiff review the amount of his retirement pension, such pension was increased to a sum one-half the salary of his rank for the 12-month period preceding his election to retire.

Thereafter, in September 1980, Plavsic's attorney requested that plaintiff make such increased benefits retroactive to the date Plavsic began his retirement. On November 13, 1980, plaintiff met to consider Plavsic's request for a recalculation of his retirement benefits and for retroactive benefits. Plaintiff voted to increase Plavsic's pension as of May 1980 to one-half the salary of his rank for the 12-month period preceding his election to retire but found that it had no statutory authority to make this increase in benefits retroactive to the date of Plavsic's retirement. Plavsic did not seek judicial review of plaintiff's decision.

On May 24, 1983, defendant conducted an examination of the Police Pension Fund of the Village of Park Forest; such examination covered a five-year period ending June 30, 1982. As a result of the examination, defendant discovered that plaintiff had violated section 3-132 and 3-133 of the Pension Code by failing to make retroactive payment of retirement benefits to Plavsic from the time he elected to retire on December 26, 1971, until the new pension was granted on May 1, 1980. Accordingly, defendant instructed plaintiff to remit to Plavsic these retroactive retirement benefits in the amount of $32,314.61. Plaintiff responded that it would not award retirement benefits to Plavsic because it believed it was without statutory authority to do so.

On August 9, 1984, defendant issued a notice of hearing for non-compliance due to plaintiff's failure to correct its violations. Plaintiff instituted the instant action by filing a complaint against defendant, seeking declaratory relief. Plaintiff alleged that defendant lacked statutory authority to review, reverse, modify or challenge its administrative decision regarding Plavsic's benefits. Plaintiff thereafter filed a motion for summary judgment in which it maintained that defendant lacked subject matter jurisdiction to review plaintiff's decision regarding Plavsic's retirement benefits as Plavsic did not seek judicial review of its decision. Defendant asserted in a cross-motion for summary judgment that he had express authority to order plaintiff to comply with provisions of the Pension Code. The circuit court thereafter entered summary judgment in favor of plaintiff, finding that defendant had no statutory authority or subject matter jurisdiction to review plaintiff's decisions.

Defendant's first contention on appeal is that the circuit court erred in granting judgment for plaintiff because defendant acted in accordance with the authority vested in him by the Pension Code in reviewing plaintiff's decision and in ordering plaintiff to comply with the provisions of the Pension Code. Plaintiff maintains in reply that defendant lacked subject matter jurisdiction to reverse plaintiff's administrative decisions.

An administrative agency has no inherent or common law powers, but is empowered to act only according to authority properly conferred upon the agency by law. (Fahey v. Cook County Police Department Merit Board (1974), 21 Ill.App.3d 579, 315 N.E.2d 573.) Administrative actions which extend beyond the authority delegated to the agency by law are void. Waupoose v. Kusper (1972), 8 Ill.App.3d 668, 290 N.E.2d 903.

Plaintiff maintains that the Administrative Review Law alone defines its powers. The Administrative Review Law states in relevant part:

"Administrative review. The provisions of the Administrative Review Law, and all amendments and modifications thereof and the rules adopted pursuant thereto shall apply to and govern all proceedings for the judicial review of final administrative decisions of the retirement board provided for under this Article. The term "administrative decisions" is as defined in Section 3-101 of the Code of Civil Procedure." Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 108 1/2, par. 3-148.

Where a statute provides that the administrative decisions of an agency are subject to the Administrative Review Law, the statute is the exclusive method of review of an administrative agency's final decision. The Administrative Review Law governs every action seeking a judicial review of a final decision of any administrative agency "where the Act creating or conferring power in such agency, by express reference * * * " adopts its provisions. (Mason v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University (1984), 125 Ill.App.3d 614, 80 Ill.Dec. 913, 466 N.E.2d 365; Ill.Rev.Stat.1985, ch. 110, par. 3-102.) Where it is adopted, the Administrative Review Law is the exclusive method of review. (Mason v. Board of Trustees of Southern Illinois University (1984), 125 Ill.App.3d 614, 80 Ill.Dec. 913, 466 N.E.2d 365; People ex rel. Chicago & North Western Railway Co. v. Hulman (1964), 31 Ill.2d 166, 201 N.E.2d 103.) In this case, section 3-148 of...