Board of Trustees of University of Illinois v. City of Chicago

• Decision Date: 20 November 2000
• Docket Number: No. 1-98-4153.,1-98-4153.
• Citation: 251 Ill.Dec. 434,317 Ill. App.3d 569,740 N.E.2d 515
• Parties: BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. The CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal corporation, Code Enforcement Bureau of the Chicago Building Commission, and Compliance Board of the Chicago Bureau of Fire Prevention, Defendants and Counterplaintiffs-Appellants.
• Court: United States Appellate Court of Illinois

740 N.E.2d 515

317 Ill. App.3d 569

251 Ill.Dec. 434

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF the UNIVERSITY OF ILLINOIS, Plaintiff and Counterdefendant-Appellee, v. The CITY OF CHICAGO, a municipal corporation, Code Enforcement Bureau of the Chicago Building Commission, and Compliance Board of the Chicago Bureau of Fire Prevention, Defendants and Counterplaintiffs-Appellants.

No. 1-98-4153.

Appellate Court of Illinois, First District, First Division.

November 20, 2000.

Mara S. Georges, Corporation Counsel, Chicago (Lawrence Rosenthal, Benna Ruth Solomon and Julian N. Henriques, Jr., of counsel), for Appellant.

Quinlan & Crisham, Ltd., Chicago (William R. Quinlan, Michael I. Rothstein, James A. Niewiara and Jasmine de la Torre, of counsel), for Appellee.

Presiding Justice McNULTY delivered the opinion of the court:

The City of Chicago (City) appeals an order of the circuit court finding that the Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois (the Board) is not subject to the City's ordinances. The City argues on appeal that the home rule provision of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art. VII, § 6) grants the City the power to impose its health and safety ordinances on the Board and that the doctrine of sovereign immunity does not bar the City's proceedings to enforce these ordinances against the Board. For the reasons set forth below, we affirm.

On November 29, 1994, the Board filed a complaint against the City, which alleged that the City, through its department of buildings, had repeatedly attempted to impose its building code on the Board. The complaint stated that the department of buildings inspected various buildings at University of Illinois at Chicago (UIC), cited the Board with building code violations for UIC buildings and ordered the Board to appear at hearings regarding these violations. The complaint also averred that the City's bureau of fire prevention and department of health tried to enforce the City's ordinances against the Board and that the City's department of revenue attempted to force the Board to purchase City permits and licenses and to pay fees to the City. Claiming that the City was exceeding its authority through these acts and that the City's attempts to adjudicate the Board's violations of the ordinances violated the State Lawsuit Immunity Act (Immunity Act) (745 ILCS 5/1 (West 1996)), the complaint sought: (1) a declaration that the Board was not subject to the City's local ordinances; (2) a writ of prohibition barring the City from attempting to assert jurisdiction over the Board; and (3) a permanent injunction barring the City from enforcing its ordinances against the Board.

The City filed a counterclaim against the Board for declaratory relief on June 18, 1997, seeking a declaration that the City has the authority to impose its ordinances relating to public health and safety against the Board and that the Immunity Act does not bar the City's enforcement proceedings against the Board regarding the City's public health and safety ordinances. Through its counterclaim, the City also sought a declaration that the Board is subject to and is acting in violation of certain provisions of the City's building code, fire code, and health code.

On September 10, 1997, the Board filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to section 2-615(e) of the Illinois Code of Civil Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615(e) (West 1996)). While the Board argued in the motion that the City lacked the authority to regulate the Board, it did not assert sovereign immunity as a basis for judgment on the pleadings.

On October 23, 1998, the court granted the Board's motion for judgment on the pleadings, holding that the City lacked the home rule authority to implement its building, safety, and health ordinances on the Board. The City now appeals that order.

"A motion for judgment on the pleadings tests the sufficiency of the pleadings by determining whether the plaintiff is entitled to the relief sought by his complaint or, alternatively, whether the defendant by his answer has set up a defense which would entitle him to a hearing on the merits." Village of Worth v. Hahn, 206 Ill.App.3d 987, 990, 151 Ill.Dec. 895, 565 N.E.2d 166 (1990). The motion requires the trial court to examine the pleadings and determine whether there is an issue of fact or whether the controversy can be resolved as a matter of law. Village of Worth, 206 Ill.App.3d at 990, 151 Ill.Dec. 895, 565 N.E.2d 166. On appeal, the reviewing court must ascertain whether the trial court correctly determined that the pleadings presented no issue of material fact and, if there were no such issue, whether the court correctly entered the judgment. TDC Development Corp. v. First Federal Savings & Loan Ass'n, 204 Ill.App.3d 170, 174, 149 Ill.Dec. 446, 561 N.E.2d 1142 (1990). The appropriate standard of review is de novo. Massachusetts Bay Insurance Co. v. Unique Presort Services, Inc., 287 Ill.App.3d 741, 744, 223 Ill.Dec. 291, 679 N.E.2d 476 (1997)

.

The City first argues on appeal that the enforcement of its building, fire, and health ordinances against the Board is a valid exercise of the City's home rule authority, which the City possesses under section 6(a) of article VII of the 1970 Illinois Constitution. Section 6(a), which pertains to municipalities with populations greater than 25,000, provides in pertinent part:

"[A] home rule unit may exercise any power and perform any function pertaining to its government and affairs including, but not

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