Mak v. RUSH-PRESBYTERIAN-ST. LUKE'S
Citation | 198 Ill.2d 249,261 Ill.Dec. 710,764 N.E.2d 1 |
Decision Date | 20 December 2001 |
Docket Number | No. 90527.,90527. |
Parties | M.A.K., Appellee, v. RUSH-PRESBYTERIAN-ST.-LUKE'S MEDICAL CENTER, d/b/a Rush Behavioral Health Center—Du Page, Appellant. |
Court | Illinois Supreme Court |
George F. Galland, Jr., Jeffrey I. Cummings, of Miner, Barnhill & Galland, Chicago, for appellant.
Herbolsheimer, Lannon, Henson, Duncan & Reagan, P.C., La Salle (T. Donld Henson, Lawrence M. Kaschak, of counsel), for appellee.
Thaddeus J. Nodzenski and Mark D. Deaton, Naperville, for amicus curiae Illinois Hospital & Healthsystems Association.
Plaintiff, M.A.K., filed a complaint in the circuit court of Will County against defendants, Rush-Presbyterian-St. Luke's Medical Center (Rush) and Royal Maccabees Life Insurance Company (Royal), alleging that Rush had improperly released certain medical records to Royal, pursuant to a written consent signed by plaintiff. The circuit court granted judgment on the pleadings to Rush. Thereafter, plaintiff voluntarily dismissed his action as to Royal and appealed the circuit court's order. The appellate court reversed and remanded (316 Ill.App.3d 156, 249 Ill.Dec. 287, 736 N.E.2d 129). We granted Rush's petition for leave to appeal (177 Ill.2d R. 315) and we now reverse the judgment of the appellate court.
In count I of his second amended complaint, plaintiff alleged that Rush had breached the physician-patient relationship by releasing his records without first advising plaintiff of its intention to do so and obtaining his approval. In count II, for invasion of privacy, plaintiff alleged that Rush had wrongfully released his medical records without his prior authorization or consultation. Count III alleged negligent infliction of emotional distress.
The allegations of the complaint show that on January 13, 1995, plaintiff was admitted to Rush's Behavioral Health Center-Du Page (Behavioral Health Center) for alcohol dependence. He was discharged on March 2, 1995. In October 1994, plaintiff had applied to Royal for a disability income insurance policy. Royal issued the policy. While receiving treatment at Rush, plaintiff contacted his insurance agent about filing a claim for benefits under the policy. After receiving a claim form from Royal, plaintiff notified Royal in February 1995 that he would not be filing a claim. In April 1995, Rush received from Royal a written consent signed by plaintiff, dated October 12, 1994, to release plaintiff's medical and nonmedical information to Royal. The records that Rush released to Royal included plaintiff's records of alcohol-dependence treatment. After receiving plaintiff's medical records from Rush, Royal cancelled plaintiff's disability policy.
The written consent signed by plaintiff was entitled "AUTHORIZATION AND ACKNOWLEDGEMENT" (hereafter authorization) and stated in pertinent part as follows:
* * *
* * * I AGREE this Authorization shall be valid for two and one half years from [October 12, 1994]."
In the circuit court, Rush filed a motion for judgment on the pleadings (735 ILCS 5/2-615(e) (West 1998)), arguing that plaintiff's executed authorization expressly permitted Rush to release his medical and nonmedical records to Royal and was therefore facially valid. Plaintiff argued that the authorization was not a valid waiver of his right to confidentiality of his medical records that were not in existence at the time he signed the authorization and that Rush should have notified plaintiff that Royal had submitted a request for his medical records. Plaintiff also filed a reply to Rush's reply brief in support of its motion for judgment on the pleadings in which plaintiff included an affidavit of his attorney, who stated that, during a meeting with Paul Feldman, the medical director of the Behavioral Health Center, Feldman admitted that plaintiff's records should not have been released to Royal. On December 11, 1997, the circuit court granted Rush's motion.
The issue addressed by the appellate court was whether the authorization complied with the requirement of section 2.31(a)(1) of the Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient Records regulations (hereafter regulation). Confidentiality of Alcohol and Drug Abuse Patient Records, 42 C.F.R. § 2.31(a)(1) (2000). The regulation requires that a written consent for release of alcohol and drug treatment records give the "specific name or general designation" of the person or program authorized to make the disclosure of such records. In reversing the circuit court, the appellate court relied upon the "plain language" of the authorization and concluded that the term "general designation" required something more specific than the phrase "any physician, medical practitioner, hospital, clinic, health care facility or other medical or medically related facility." The court described the language of the authorization as "at best imprecise and far too generic to be considered a general designation as that term is commonly understood and as is required by the regulations." 316 Ill.App.3d at 160, 249 Ill.Dec. 287, 736 N.E.2d 129.
Judgment on the pleadings is proper only where no genuine issue of material fact exists and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Chicago Title & Trust Co. v. Steinitz, 288 Ill.App.3d 926, 934, 224 Ill.Dec. 354, 681 N.E.2d 669 (1997). In ruling on a motion for judgment on the pleadings, only those facts apparent from the face of the pleadings, matters subject to judicial notice, and judicial admissions in the record may be considered. All well-pleaded facts and all reasonable inferences from those facts are taken as true. Mt. Zion State Bank & Trust v. Consolidated Communications, Inc., 169 Ill.2d 110, 115, 214 Ill.Dec. 156, 660 N.E.2d 863 (1995). Our review is de novo. Board of Trustees of the University of Illinois v. City of Chicago, 317 Ill. App.3d 569, 571, 251 Ill.Dec. 434, 740 N.E.2d 515 (2000)
.
The regulation implements section 543 of the Public Health Service Act (Public Health Act) (42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2 (1994)). That section mandates the confidentiality of alcohol and drug abuse patient records and prescribes the conditions and manner of release of such records. It states in pertinent part as follows:
Subsection (g) grants authority to the Department of Health and Human Services (Department) to promulgate regulations to implement the purposes of the law. 42 U.S.C. § 290dd-2(g) (1994). The regulation sets forth the requirements of a written consent authorizing disclosure of a patient's alcohol or drug abuse treatment records. That section provides in pertinent part:
Familiar principles of statutory construction apply to the interpretation of regulations of an administrative agency. See Tivoli Enterprises, Inc. v. Zehnder, 297 Ill.App.3d 125, 132, 231 Ill.Dec. 631, 696 N.E.2d 1202 (1998). The primary rule of statutory construction is to give effect to the intent of the legislature. Paris v. Feder, 179 Ill.2d 173, 177, ...
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