Board of Trustees of Calaveras Unified School Dist. v. Leach

• Decision Date: 25 January 1968
• Citation: 258 Cal.App.2d 281,65 Cal.Rptr. 588
• Court: California Court of Appeals Court of Appeals
• Parties: BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF CALAVERAS UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. Russell W. LEACH, Sheriff of Calaveras County, Respondent; Charles H. EVANS, Sr., Calaveras County Grand Jury, and the Superior Court of the State of California, In and For the County of Calaveras, Real Parties in Interest. Civ. 11645.

Page 588

65 Cal.Rptr. 588

258 Cal.App.2d 281

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF CALAVERAS UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT, Petitioner, v. Russell W. LEACH, Sheriff of Calaveras County, Respondent Charles H. EVANS, Sr., Calaveras County Grand Jury, and the Superior Court of the State of California, In and For the County of Calaveras, Real Parties in Interest.

Civ. 11645.

Court of Appeal, Third District, California.

Jan 25, 1968.

Rehearing Denied Feb. 23, 1968.

Hearing Denied March 20, 1968.

[258 Cal.App.2d 283] George A. Huberty, County Counsel, San Andreas, for petitioner.

Irving G. Breyer, Gen. Counsel, San Francisco, amicus curiae, for petitioner.

Orrin K. Airola, Dist. Atty., San Andreas, for respondent.

Joseph W. Kiley, San Andreas, for respondent, Grand Jury.

JANES, Associate Justice pro tem.

Petitioner, Board of Trustees of Calaveras Unified School District, seeks a writ of mandate to compel respondent Russell W. Leach, Sheriff of Calaveras County, to return certain personnel records of the Calaveras Unified School District. The real parties in interest, Calaveras County Grand Jury and Charles H. Evans, Sr., its foreman, have filed their return and answer to the petition, and a motion to quash the alternative writ.

FACTS

At its regular meeting in March 1967, petitioner Board of Trustees of Calaveras Unified School District reassigned James Tarbat from the position of principal of the Calaveras High School to vice principal thereof, and Richard Butler from the position of vice principal to a teaching position therein.

Thereafter the Calaveras County Grand Jury subpoenaed the superintendent of said district to appear at a session of the grand jury with the personnel records of Tarbat and Butler. The superintendent appeared at the grand jury meeting, but without the records, the board of trustees having taken the position and advised their superintendent that the records were not in his custody or control but in that of the board.

On May 5, 1967, upon the written petition of the foreman of the grand jury, the Judge of the Calaveras County Superior Court ordered the sheriff of said county to remove the personnel records of Tarbat and Butler from the custody of petitioner board and to deliver them to the foreman of the grand jury.

Said order reads as follows: 'On reading and filing the petition of CHARLES H. EVANS, Sr., Foreman, Calaveras County Grand Jury, setting forth under penalty of perjury that the Calaveras Unified School District Board having custody and control of the personnel records of James Tarbat and Richard Butler refused and still refuses to permit the Calaveras County Grand Jury to routinely examine the said records,

'IT IS ORDERED that the sheriff of Calaveras County be and he is hereby commanded to remove the personnel records of James Tarbat and Richard Butler from the custody of the Calaveras Unified School District Board and to deliver said records to CHARLES H. EVANS, Sr., as foreman of the Calaveras County Grand Jury.'

There was not pending before the grand jury the investigation of any crime or of the wilful or corrupt misconduct in office of any public officer at the time of the grand jury's application and the making of said order by the court.

On May 8, 1967, the sheriff seized said personnel records, sealed them and declared that he would deliver them to the grand jury at its meeting to be held on May 9, 1967.

On May 9, 1967, the petition for a writ of mandate was filed herein, and this court issued an alternative writ of mandate staying the execution of the superior court order and directing the sheriff to return the personnel files to the board until final determination of the petition.

CONTENTIONS

Petitioner contends that the grand jury is not entitled to said personnel records when no public offense or misconduct in office of a shool official is being investigated.

The grand jury answers that it has the right 'to routinely examine the personnel records in question' by virtue of section 933.5 of the Penal Code, ¹ and that mandate is not an appropriate remedy for petitioner in the circumstances here shown.

Section 933.5 provides: 'A grand jury may at any time examine the books and records of any special purpose assessing or taxing district located wholly or partly in the county.'

The question to be decided by this court is whether or not, on the facts, the grand jury is entitled to inspect the personnel records of any special purpose assessing not pending before the grand jury the investigation of any public offense or of the wilful or corrupt misconduct in office of any public officer.

POWERS AND DUTIES OF THE GRAND JURY

The grand jury is 'an instrumentality of the courts of this state.' (In re Shuler, 210 Cal. 377, 405, 292 P. 481, 493.) Although its powers are broad, they are carefully defined and limited by statute, and the grand jury has no inherent investigatory powers beyond those granted by the Legislature. (Allen v. Payne, 1 Cal.2d 607, 36 P.2d 614.)

The grand jury may inquire into all public offenses committed or triable within the county (§ 917) and into the wilful or corrupt misconduct in office of public officers of every description within the county (§ 919). These sections are of no aid to the grand jury in its present proceeding, however, as it is admitted that the grand jury is not investigating any public offense or any misconduct upon the part of the officers of the shool district.

The grand jury is entitled to examine, without charge, all public records within the county. (§ 921.) This section was enacted to avoid the rule in some jurisdictions that the authority to investigate crimes or misconduct by public officers did not also permit the grand jury to examine public records. In re Charge to Grand Jury, 30 Fed.Cas. pp. 992, 994 (No. 18,255) (C.C.D.Cal.1872).)

The remaining statutory authorization under which it may be contended that the grand jury may investigate the conduct of school district officers which is neither criminal nor corrupt is section 933.5, above quoted, and it is that provision upon which the grand jury purported to act and upon which it relies. Basing its argument thereon, it is the position of the grand jury that its power of examination therein defined extends beyond mere examination into the records of assessment, taxation and the finances of the shool district to include inspection of the subject personnel records. ²

There are several reasons why the grand jury's position cannot be supported.

It appears from an analysis of the legislative history of section 933.5 and related code sections that section 933.5 was enacted merely to aid the grand jury in the exercise of its already existing powers to inquire into public offenses and official misconduct. Section 933.5 was added to revised title 4 of part 2 of the Penal Code in 1961 by a statute which also added section 26910 to the chapter of the Government Code defining the duties of the county auditor. (Stats.1961, ch. 1461, p. 3313.) Section 26910 of the Government Code provides: 'The auditor may at any reasonable time and place examine the books and records of any special purpose assessing or taxing district located wholly in the county.'

Enactment of section 933.5 and of section 26910 of the Government Code followed closely upon the completion of a study of special district problems in California by the Assembly Interim Committee on Municipal and County Government, and it is clear from the report of that study (Assembly Interim Committee Reports, 1959--1961, vol. 6, no. 15, pp. 26--34, Special District Problems in the State of California, Final Report of the Assembly Interim Committee on Municipal and County Government) that the Legislature was concerned with the widespread lack of knowledge concerning the existence and operations of many single purpose special districts and of their place and impact in municipal and county tax structures. The legislation which followed may reasonably be construed as an effort by the Legislature to broaden the field of public knowledge and information in relation to such districts. The legislative intent may not be reasonably construed, however, to broaden the scope of grand jury investigations into matters which the grand jury is not otherwise authorized to investigate. ³

That section 933.5 is not broad enough to include an investigation of the evaluation of principals and other certificated employees (teachers) of a school district absent cause by the grand jury to believe that these officials are guilty of any criminal activities or other misconduct in office is demonstrated also by the fact that as to County officers, where criminal activities or other misconduct are not involved, the Legislature has specifically set forth the grand jury's investigative powers. Thus, section 925 empowers the grand jury to examine the accounts and records of all county officers; section 929 extends this examination to county officers acting ex officio as officers of certain other districts; section 927 authorizes the grand jury to investigate and report upon the needs for increase or decrease in the salaries of county supervisors, the district attorney and the auditor; section 928 provides that every grand jury shall investigate and report upon the needs of all county officers, including the abolition or creation of offices and the equipment for, and the method or system of performing the duties of the county offices. The application of sections 925--926 is limited to County officials.

Since school district officials are not county officers, sections 925--929 do not apply to them. 'School districts are agencies of the state for the local operation of the state school system.' (Hall v. City of Taft, supra, 47 Cal.2d at p. 181, 302 P.2d at p. 577.) 'The school district is a state agency and its board members are state officers.' (...