Board of Trustees of School Dist. No. 4, Big Horn County v. Colwell, 5215

• Decision Date: 12 May 1980
• Docket Number: No. 5215,5215
• Parties: BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 4, BIG HORN COUNTY, Wyoming, Appellant (Defendant), v. John R. COLWELL, Appellee (Plaintiff).
• Court: Wyoming Supreme Court

Page 427

611 P.2d 427

BOARD OF TRUSTEES OF SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 4, BIG HORN COUNTY, Wyoming, Appellant (Defendant), v. John R. COLWELL, Appellee (Plaintiff).

No. 5215.

Supreme Court of Wyoming.

May 12, 1980.

Gary P. Hartman, Greybull, signed the brief and appeared in oral argument on behalf of appellant.

Patrick E. Hacker, of Patrick E. Hacker & Associates, Cheyenne, signed the brief and appeared in oral argument on behalf of appellee.

Ross D. Copenhaver, of Ross D. Copenhaver, P. C., Powell, filed amicus curiae briefs on behalf of Wyoming School Boards Association.

Before RAPER, C. J., and McCLINTOCK, THOMAS, ROSE and ROONEY, JJ.

ROONEY, Justice.

This is an appeal from an order of the district court which reversed the dismissal of appellee from his teaching position by appellant-Board of Trustees for insubordination.

We reverse the district court order.

PREAMBLE

At the outset, we express disappointment at the failure of those involved in this matter to have acted in a more considered and deliberate fashion. A recognition on their part that their principal purpose in respect to the matter here involved was the education of the children of the district would have resolved such matter without a school board hearing (which lasted into the early morning hours), a district court proceeding

and, finally, this appeal a great expenditure of money and time. Appellee could have been more understanding of the needs of the students at Basin for the instruction which he could furnish; he could have wholeheartedly entered into efforts to secure allocation of books, desks, et cetera toward this purpose; he could have attempted to work out a scheduling of his proposed team-teaching class in Manderson at other than the first period; and certainly he could have attempted to work out his problems by seeking advice and help from his superintendent. The principals of the two schools could have been more prompt in giving positive directions to appellee. They could have more carefully explored the available options and communicated them to appellee. All of those involved could have been less intractable, less perverse and more cooperative. Their failure in these respects brings this matter to us in a context in which we can only apply cold legal propositions. These comments are made in hope that they will engender a better cooperative spirit between school administrators and teachers in future matters such as this.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

For the purpose of reviewing the propriety of the district court's action, we will review the agency action as though the appeal were directly to this court from the agency. We are governed by the same rules of review as was the district court. Federal Trade Commission v. Sun Oil Company, 371 U.S. 505, 83 S.Ct. 358, 9 L.Ed.2d 466 (1963); Kansas State Board of Healing Arts v. Foote, 200 Kan. 447, 436 P.2d 828 (1968); Alabama Public Service Commission v. Nunis, 252 Ala. 30, 39 So.2d 409 (1949); Diamond Ring Ranch, Inc. v. Morton, 10th Cir. 1976, 531 F.2d 1397.

Therefore, we will not substitute our judgment for that of the agency. Shenefield v. Sheridan County School District No. 1, Wyo., 544 P.2d 870 (1976); Sweetwater County Planning Committee for Organization of School District v. Hinkle, Wyo., 493 P.2d 1050 (1972). Appellee has the burden of establishing the insufficiency of the evidence to sustain the Board's decision. Board of Trustees, Laramie County School District No. 1 v. Spiegel, Wyo., 549 P.2d 1161 (1976). In making the determination as to whether or not the agency findings and conclusions are supported by substantial evidence as required by § 9-4-114(c)(ii)(E), W.S.1977, 1979 Cum.Supp., we set forth the following standard in Howard v. Lindmier, 67 Wyo. 78, 214 P.2d 737, 739, 740 (1950), as quoted in Board of Trustees, Laramie County School District No. 1 v. Spiegel, supra, 549 P.2d at 1177, 1178:

" '. . . Even if the court comes to a different conclusion than that of the Land Board, considering the evidence as a whole, that . . . is in no sense conclusive. The court must go further. It must be able to determine that the Land Board might not reasonably, under the same state of facts, have come to a different conclusion; . . . yet the rule adopted and followed by appellate courts here and elsewhere of deferring their opinions as to the weight and credibility of the evidence to that of the trier of the facts in the first instance should be adhered to in land lease cases.' (Emphasis in original text)

" '. . . the term "substantial evidence" does not include the idea of weight of evidence, although it is more than a mere scintilla and means such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion . . .' "

See Laramie River Conservation Council v. Industrial Siting Council, Wyo., 588 P.2d 1241 (1978); Barger v. Board of Trustees of School District No. 3, Goshen County, Wyo., 494 P.2d 544 (1972).

Prior to 1979, the "substantial evidence" standard was definitely mandated in the Wyoming Administrative Procedure Act:

"(c) The court's review pursuant to the provisions of this section shall be limited to a determination that:

"(iv) The findings of facts in issue in a contested case are supported by substantial evidence * * *." Former § 9-4-114(c), W.S.1977.

This subsection was amended, effective May 25, 1979, to require agency action, findings and conclusions to be supported by substantial evidence, but also to provide for a review of the "whole record." ¹ Under this standard, we do not examine the record only to determine if there is substantial evidence to support the Board's decision, but we must also examine the conflicting evidence to determine if the Board could reasonably have made its findings and order upon all of the evidence before it. After reviewing the history and rationale in changing the "substantial evidence" rule in the Wagner Act to the "whole record" provision of the Federal Administrative Procedure Act (similar to present provisions of § 9-4-114(c)), the consideration is stated in Universal Camera Corp. v. National Labor Relations Board, 340 U.S. 474, 488, 71 S.Ct. 456, 465, 95 L.Ed. 456 (1951), and quoted in National Labor Relations Board v. Walton Manufacturing Company, 369 U.S. 404, 405, 82 S.Ct. 853, 854, 7 L.Ed.2d 829 (1962):

" * * * the 'reviewing court is not barred from setting aside a Board decision when it cannot conscientiously find that the evidence supporting that decision is substantial, when viewed in the light that the record in its entirety furnishes, including the body of evidence opposed to the Board's view,' it may not 'displace the Board's choice between two fairly conflicting views, even though the court would justifiably have made a different choice had the matter been before it de novo.' * * * "

The petition for judicial review by the district court was filed in this case on November 27, 1978. The findings and order of the district court were dated September 10, 1979. Without making a determination as to whether the standard of review pursuant to the 1979 amendment is applicable to this case, we note that such standard is far more favorable to appellee's position than is the former "substantial evidence" standard, and that the action, findings and order of the Board must be sustained under either standard (the findings and order of the district court must be reversed). Therefore, we will review the whole record and consider conflicting evidence and not only the presence of substantial evidence to support the Board's findings, thus giving appellee the benefit of the standard most favorable to him.

SUMMARY OF EVIDENCE

To apply the foregoing standard, we must carefully examine the evidence presented by this case, particularly as such applied to the elements of insubordination. To do so, we set forth a summary of the evidence in far more detail than usual.

William Diercks, principal of the Manderson school since 1951, testified that included among his other duties were those of scheduling and assigning teachers to classrooms; that the Manderson school was small with Terry Roice, principal of the Basin school for two years, testified that among his other duties he schedules classes, makes teacher assignments and performs other responsibilities delegated by the superintendent; Dr. John McLaren, Superintendent of Schools for Big Horn County School District No. 4 for four years, testified that he delegates to principals the duties and responsibilities of scheduling classes and assigning teachers; that in mid-July, Roice conferred with him concerning the problem of having 28 or 29 students registered for Industrial Arts and suggested that the use of the Manderson teacher might solve the problem; that he (McLaren) told Roice to check with Diercks and see what could be worked out; that later he was advised that the schedule had been worked out, and, still later, at the principals' meeting preceding the start of school, he asked if the arrangement was finalized and was advised that it was and that appellee was so notified; that he approved such schedule; that on September 1, 1978 he was advised that appellee had a number of "excuses" for not teaching the class and that a meeting was scheduled for the principals and appellee to discuss the problems and possible solution; that Roice later advised him concerning appellee's concerns and the solutions expressed to appellee and his feelings that the problem was solved; that he received a call from Roice on September 7, 1978 to the effect that Diercks had reported that appellee was refusing to go to Basin; that he directed Roice to meet with Diercks and appellee and see if appellee "was going to stay with Appellee was called as a witness by the appellant. He testified that he had taught general shop and crafts and basic welding at Manderson for the two previous years; that he had picked up his welding knowledge on his own; that Diercks had said on August 19, 1978 that...