Boatman v. State

• Decision Date: 15 December 2011
• Docket Number: No. SC10–1630.,SC10–1630.
• Parties: Rayvon L. BOATMAN, Petitioner, v. STATE of Florida, Respondent.
• Court: Florida Supreme Court

77 So.3d 1242

Rayvon L. BOATMAN, Petitioner,

v.STATE of Florida, Respondent.

No. SC10–1630.

Supreme Court of Florida.

Dec. 15, 2011.

Nancy A. Daniels, Public Defender, and Gail E. Anderson, Assistant Public Defender, Second Judicial Circuit, Tallahassee, FL, for Petitioner.

Pamela Jo Bondi, Attorney General, Trisha Meggs Pate, Bureau Chief, and Thomas H. Duffy, Assistant Attorneys General, Tallahassee, FL, for Respondent.

PARIENTE, J.

The question presented in this case is whether an individual who has been tried and determined to be a sexually violent predator under the Jimmy Ryce Act ¹ is entitled to release and dismissal of the Jimmy Ryce proceedings on the grounds that he was not brought to trial within thirty days as required by the Act, where the individual objects in the trial court but waits until after trial to seek relief in the appellate courts. In Boatman v. State, 39 So.3d 391, 394 (Fla. 1st DCA 2010), the First District Court of Appeal determined that Boatman had waived the remedy of dismissal without prejudice, which would have been available if he had filed a petition for writ of habeas corpus before trial.

In this case, Boatman does not attack any aspect of his Jimmy Ryce trial pertaining to the fairness of the trial proceeding itself. Rather, Boatman asserts that because his pretrial detention was improper, he should be released and the petition dismissed, even though a trial has been held and he has been determined to be a sexually violent predator under the Act.

In its decision, the district court certified a question to be of great public importance,² which we rephrase as two separate certified questions. The first rephrased certified question is:

1. When a respondent who has served his or her prison sentence is not brought to trial within thirty days of the finding of probable cause under the Jimmy Ryce Act, and he or she has objected or filed a motion to dismiss in the trial court, must the respondent seek relief by habeas corpus prior to trial or else waive the claim?In order to resolve this case, our answer to the first rephrased certified question also requires us to answer the next question:

2. If the respondent waits to bring the claim on appeal after the trial, is the respondent entitled to the remedy of release and dismissal of the Jimmy Ryce proceedings, where the challenge is to the length of the pretrial detention and there is no demonstration of an impact on the fairness of the trial?

We have jurisdiction. See art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const.

For reasons more fully explained below, we answer both of the rephrased certified questions in the negative. With respect to the first rephrased certified question, we hold that a Jimmy Ryce respondent who has unsuccessfully objected to a continuance or filed a motion to dismiss in the trial court may challenge a violation of the thirty-day statutory time limit by way of filing a petition for writ of habeas corpus prior to trial or may choose to wait until the conclusion of trial to bring the challenge on direct appeal. With respect to the second rephrased certified question, we hold that should the respondent wait until after the trial to raise this challenge, he or she must demonstrate an impact on the fairness of the trial to be entitled to relief.

In this case, we hold that although Boatman did not waive his claim by waiting to bring it until after the trial, he is not entitled to release and dismissal of the Jimmy Ryce proceedings because he is challenging the length of his pretrial detention and not alleging that the improper continuance had any impact on the fairness of his trial. Thus, we approve the result reached by the First District but not its reasoning.

FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

In 1994, Rayvon L. Boatman pled guilty to one count of committing sexual battery with slight force. While serving a prison sentence for sexual battery, Boatman was referred to the multidisciplinary team of the Department of Children and Families (DCF) on November 16, 2007, for an assessment to determine whether he should be involuntarily committed as a sexually violent predator under the Jimmy Ryce Act.

On May 28, 2008, the multidisciplinary team determined that Boatman required a mental health evaluation in order to determine whether he met the criteria to be considered a sexually violent predator. Boatman was evaluated by two psychologists, both of whom concluded that Boatman suffered from a mental abnormality that made him likely to engage in acts of sexual violence if he was not confined in a secure facility for long-term control, care, and treatment. On July 9, 2008, the multidisciplinary team issued a written assessment finding that Boatman met the definition of a sexually violent predator and recommended that the state attorney file a petition seeking civil commitment.

Nearly three months later, on October 1, 2008, the state attorney filed a petition to involuntarily commit Boatman as a sexually violent predator. The petition alleged that Boatman was scheduled to be released on October 5, 2008. The same day that the petition was filed, the trial court entered an order finding probable cause to believe that Boatman met the criteria of a sexually violent predator under the Act, ordering Boatman's transfer to DCF at the completion of his sentence, and setting the case for trial on October 20, 2008. On October 8, 2008, the trial court held a pretrial hearing, appointed counsel for Boatman, and confirmed the trial date for October 20.

On October 10, 2008, the State filed a motion to continue the trial. While the Act requires that a trial must be conducted within thirty days of the determination of probable cause, it also provides for a continuance of not more than 120 days upon a showing of good cause, provided that the individual will not be substantially prejudiced. § 394.916(1)-(2), Fla. Stat. (2008). In support of its motion, the State asserted that one of the experts who had evaluated Boatman was “out of the country and unavailable for trial.” The State asserted that other reasons existed to support a showing of good cause to continue, including that the defense would not have time to engage in discovery and thus the defense expert who was to evaluate Boatman would have “virtually no information from which to testify effectively.” The State also noted that it would not have time to depose the expert. The State asserted: “The bottom line in this case is that neither side is prepared for trial at this time.”

At an October 13, 2008, hearing, Boatman opposed the motion. Boatman's counsel stated that the multidisciplinary team recommended on July 9, 2008, that the petition be filed, but the State failed to file the petition until the end of Boatman's sentence in October. Boatman's counsel argued that Boatman was being deprived of his liberty solely for this civil matter and that it was not the State's job to determine whether the defense was ready for trial.

The trial court granted the continuance, finding that the State had demonstrated good cause and that Boatman did not establish substantial prejudice. The court scheduled the trial for the week of February 2, 2009. The court also scheduled an adversarial probable cause hearing for the week of October 20, 2008.³ It appears from the record that an adversarial probable cause hearing was never held; however, the record does not contain any explanation for why the hearing was not held. The trial was later continued for one week by stipulation of the parties because the State's experts were unavailable the week that the trial was originally scheduled.

The trial was held on February 9 and 10, 2009. The morning of the first day of trial, just before jury selection, Boatman briefly renewed his objection to the trial proceeding because it did not take place within the thirty days contemplated by the statute and asked that the proceedings be dismissed. The trial judge denied the motion.

At the conclusion of the trial, the jury returned a verdict finding Boatman to be a sexually violent predator. That same day, the trial court entered a final judgment determining Boatman to be a sexually violent predator and committing him to the custody of DCF.

Boatman appealed to the First District Court of Appeal, contending that the trial court erred in granting the State's motion to continue and that he was entitled to immediate release because his civil commitment trial was not held within thirty days of the probable cause finding. Specifically, Boatman asserted that the State failed to show good cause for a continuance. Boatman also asserted that he was substantially prejudiced because at the time the State sought the continuance, Boatman would have been free but for being detained while awaiting trial.

The First District concluded that the thirty-day deadline was not validly extended, holding that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the continuance because Boatman was substantially prejudiced. Boatman, 39 So.3d at 394. The First District then addressed Boatman's argument that the proper remedy for an improper continuance was Boatman's release and dismissal of the State's petition without prejudice, stating that the

remedy contemplates that “the State may be entitled to continue the proceedings, but the respondent may be entitled to his freedom where the State has not scrupulously complied with the Act's provisions.” Thus, dismissal without prejudice would release appellant from custody without depriving the trial court of jurisdiction over the case.

Id. (quoting Mitchell v. State, 911 So.2d 1211, 1219 (Fla.2005)). The First District concluded, however, that any relief provided by a dismissal without prejudice would be moot because Boatman

already ha[d] been tried and committed under the Act. A dismissal without prejudice would only prolong the proceedings by allowing the state to refile the petition and requiring yet another trial. The purpose of the thirty-day deadline is to...