Boatmen's Nat. Bank of St. Louis v. Bolles

Decision Date12 May 1947
Docket Number40065
Citation202 S.W.2d 53,356 Mo. 489
PartiesThe Boatmen's National Bank of St. Louis, a Corporation, Executor of the Estate of Hugh W. Thomasson, Deceased, Appellant, v. Ella F. Bolles and Elmira Townsend and Saint Paul Mercury Indemnity Company of St. Paul, a Corporation
CourtMissouri Supreme Court

Appeal from Circuit Court of St. Louis; Hon. Raymond E LaDriere, Judge.

Affirmed.

Chas Claflin Allen and Franklin E. Reagan for appellant; Lehmann & Allen, Sievers & Reagan, and Adolph K. Schwartz of counsel.

(1) The administratrices had no power or authority to make the contract with Grace Thomasson or to pay her $ 30,000. Woerner, American Law of Administration, Third Ed., pp. 972 1181, 1182; Yeakle v. Priest, 61 Mo.App. 47. (2) The real estate descended to the heirs subject only to the payment of debts of the estate, and the administratrices had no authority to use income from the real estate to buy off persons claiming to be heirs. R.S. 1939, sec. 309; Woerner, American Law of Administration, sec. 516; In re Soulard's Estate, 141 Mo. 642; Chambers, Adm., v. Wright's Heirs, 40 Mo. 482; McQuitty v. Wilhite, 218 Mo. 586. (3) An administrator's power over real estate is governed strictly by statute. Grant v. Hathway, 215 Mo. 141. (4) The contract between the administratrices and Grace Thomasson, void because it was not supported by any consideration, and the payment of $ 30,000 thereunder was also without consideration. Boatmen's Natl. Bank of St. Louis v. Fledderman. (5) The order of the probate court approving the contract between Grace Thomasson and respondents Bolles and Townsend is without authority and wholly void. Bonaparte's Adm. v. Lucas and Hunt, 21 Mo. 598; Shaw v. Nicholay, 30 Mo. 99; State v. Holtcamp, 322 Mo. 258, 14 S.W.2d 646. (6) The void order of the probate court approving the contract conferred no power on the administratrices to make the payment of $ 30,000, and conferred no authority on the probate court to approve the disbursement of the $ 30,000,000 in the final settlement to revocation. Sontag v. Stix, 191 S.W.2d 988; Woods v. Boots, 60 Mo. 546. (7) The approval of the settlement to revocation which referred on its face to the $ 30,000 payment having been made to Grace Thomasson pursuant to that void contract and void order of approval was void on its face as to the $ 30,000 payment. (8) A judgment void for want of jurisdiction is no bar and may be attacked at any time directly or collaterally. 1 Freeman, Judgments (5th Ed.), sec. 322; United Cemeteries Co. v. Strother, 342 Mo. 1115, 119 S.W.2d 762; State v. Hartman, 330 Mo. 386, 51 S.W.2d 22; In re Buckles, 331 Mo. 405, 53 S.W.2d 1055.

William R. Gilbert and Cullen Coil for respondent St. Paul Mercury Indemnity Company of St. Paul; Anderson, Gilbert, Wolfort, Allen & Bierman of counsel.

(1) The order of the probate court approving the settlement to revocation is a final judgment, entitled to the same credit and presumptions accorded judgments of courts of general jurisdiction and as such is not subject to collateral attack unless the judgment itself, or the record of the proceedings in the course of which it was rendered, discloses a lack of jurisdiction in the court to have rendered the judgment. Young v. Boatmen's Natl. Bank, 350 Mo. 1157, 171 S.W.2d 553; Griffin v. Priest, 137 S.W.2d 685; Blattel v. Stallings, 346 Mo. 450, 142 S.W.2d 9; State ex rel. Gray v. Carroll, 101 Mo.App. 110; Linville v. Ripley, 347 Mo. 95, 146 S.W.2d 581; Woodworth v. Woodworth, 70 Mo. 601. (2) The final judgment of the probate court in this case is regular on its face and the record of the proceedings in the course of which the judgment was rendered discloses no lack of jurisdiction in the court to have rendered said judgment, but on the contrary shows on the face thereof that the court was dealing with subject matter over which it had jurisdiction. Goodman v. Griffith, 155 Mo.App. 574; Eckerle v. Wood, 95 Mo.App. 378; Rivard v. Mo. Pac. Ry. Co., 257 Mo. 135, 165 S.W. 763; Mississippi & Fox River Drain. Dist. v. Ruddick, 228 Mo.App. 1143, 64 S.W.2d 306; Sheetz v. Kirtley, 62 Mo. 417; Covington v. Chamblin, 156 Mo. 574; Macey v. Stark, 116 Mo. 481; Camden v. Plain, 91 Mo. 117; Sec. 34, Art. VI, Const. of Mo. 1875, Sec. 16, Art. V, Const. Mo. 1945; Sec. 2046, R.S. 1929; Sec. 2437, R.S. 1939. (3) The $ 30,000 credit allowed the administratrices in said settlement was a reasonable expense or charge for the collection and preservation of the estate and was an allowance for a disbursement made by the order of the court, pursuant to the provisions of Sec. 221, R.S. 1929 (Sec. 220, R.S. 1939). Young v. Boatmen's Natl. Bank, 350 Mo. 1157, 171 S.W.2d 553; Sec. 221, R.S. 1929; Sec. 220, R.S. 1939; Hoffmeyer v. Mintert, 93 S.W.2d 894; In re Carlin's Estate, 226 Mo.App. 622, 47 S.W.2d 213. (4) The administratrices were authorized to enter into the memorandum of settlement as a compromise with a debtor of the estate of Hugh W. Thomasson, deceased, by the provisions of Sec. 234, R.S. 1929 (Sec. 233, R.S. 1939), and the administratrices had the inherent right to so compromise. State ex rel. Bovard v. Weill, 353 Mo. 337, 182 S.W. 521; Scott v. Crider, 217 Mo.App. 1, 272 S.W. 1010; Mosman v. Bender, 80 Mo. 579; Jeffries, Adm., v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 110 U.S. 305, 28 L.Ed. 156; Young v. Boatmen's Natl. Bank, 350 Mo. 1157, 171 S.W.2d 553; Jacobs v. Jacobs, 99 Mo. 427; Merritt v. Merritt, 62 Mo. 150; 23 C.J. 1198, sec. 451; 24 C.J. 448, sec. 1227; Note, 85 A.L.R. 176, 199; Sec. 234, R.S. 1929, Sec. 233, R.S. 1939. (5) This court has in effect held in prior litigation involving the sames parties that the Probate Court of the City of St. Louis had jurisdiction to approve the memorandum of settlement and to enter a final judgment approving the $ 30,000 disbursement in the settlement to revocation and the question of jurisdiction of the probate court is thereby res judicata. Young v. Boatmen's Natl. Bank, 350 Mo. 1157, 171 S.W.2d 553.

Clem F. Storckman and Taylor R. Young for respondents Ella F. Bolles and Elmira Townsend.

(1) The subject matter of the settlement with Grace Caroline Thomasson was within the power and authority of the administratrices because the rents which had accrued and were impounded during the lifetime of Thomasson were personal property which it was the duty of the administratrices to collect. Secs. 57, 94, R.S. 1939. (2) The administratrices had been ordered by the probate court to take charge of the real estate of the deceased for the purpose of collecting the rents to pay debts of the estate and were therefore empowered to "prosecute and maintain any action for the recovery of such real estate in the same manner and with like effect" as Thomasson might have done in his lifetime. Secs. 129, 130, R.S. 1939. (3) Numerous law suits were pending to which administratrices were parties or in which the estate had an interest and it was the duty of administratrices to prosecute, defend and dispose of these cases. Secs. 94, 97, 98, R.S. 1939; Young v Boatmen's Bank, 171 S.W.2d 553, 350 Mo. 1157; In re Carlin's Estate, 47 S.W.2d 213, 226 Mo.App. 622. (4) The estate had claims against Grace Caroline Thomasson arising out of her dealings with Thomasson and his property during his lifetime, and her possession of and adverse claims to all of the assets of his estate after his death. Secs. 57, 94, 98, 223, R.S. 1939. (5) Grace Caroline Thomasson had potential claims against the estate based on contracts for support and promissory notes. Secs. 94, 97, R.S. Mo. 1939. (6) The administrators of a decedent estate have the power and authority to enter into compromises of claims against debtors of an estate as well as claims of creditors of the estate and those adversely claiming rents and possession of decedent's real estate. Secs. 129, 233, R.S. 1939; Scott v. Crider, 272 S.W. 1010, 217 Mo.App. 1; State ex rel. v. Weill, 182 S.W.2d 521, 353 Mo. 337; Mossman v. Bender, 80 Mo. 579; Merritt v. Merritt, 62 Mo. 150; Jeffries v. Mutual Life Ins. Co., 110 U.S. 305, 28 L.Ed. 156; 23 C.J. 1198, Executors & Adms., sec. 451; 24 C.J. 448, Executors & Adms., sec. 1227; Ann., 85 A.L.R. 176; Ann., 85 A.L.R. 199; Wood v. Kansas City Tel. Co., 123 S.W. 6, 223 Mo. 537; 12 C.J. 329. (7) The probate court has general jurisdiction over all matters pertaining to probate business and leasing of lands by administrators and is specifically authorized to approve a compromise by the administrator of any claim against a debtor of the decedent and to allow disbursements made by order of the court and all reasonable charges for collecting and preserving the estate. Therefore, the approval by the probate court of the settlement agreement was proper and the inclusion of the expenditure of $ 30,000 in the settlement to revocation was lawfully authorized. Sec. 16, Art. V, Const. 1945; Sec. 34, Art. VI, Const. 1875; Secs. 105, 213, 220, 233, 2437, R.S. 1939; In re Carlin's Estate, 47 S.W.2d 213, 226 Mo.App. 622; Hoffmeyer v. Mintert, 93 S.W.2d 94. (8) The order of the probate court approving the settlement to revocation was a final judgment rendering the subject matter of appellant's present claim res judicata because a final judgment of a probate court has the same force and effect as a judgment of a court of general jurisdiction and is not subject to collateral attack especially since the face of the record shows that the probate court was dealing with a subject matter over which it had jurisdiction. Young v. Boatmen's Natl. Bank, 350 Mo. 1157, 171 S.W.2d 553; Griffin v. Priest, 137 S.W.2d 685; Blattel v. Stallings, 142 S.W.2d 9, 346 Mo. 450; State ex rel. v. Carroll, 101 Mo.App. 110; Linville v. Ripley, 146 S.W.2d 581, 347 Mo. 95; Woodworth v. Woodworth, 70 Mo. 601; Goodman v. Griffith, 155 Mo.App. 574, 134 S.W. 1051; Eckerle v. Wood...

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