Bockelman v. State, Dept. of Transp.

• Decision Date: 17 April 1985
• Docket Number: No. 84-378,84-378
• Parties: Cheryl A. BOCKELMAN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Iowa, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee.
• Court: Iowa Supreme Court

Page 550

366 N.W.2d 550

Cheryl A. BOCKELMAN, Appellant, v. The STATE of Iowa, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION, Appellee.

No. 84-378.

Supreme Court of Iowa.

April 17, 1985.

John C. Louis of Louis, Moore, Kohorst, Louis, Murtaugh & Kohorst, Harlan, for appellant.

Thomas J. Miller, Atty. Gen., Brent Appel, Deputy Atty. Gen., and Craig Gregersen, Asst. Atty. Gen., for appellee.

Considered by HARRIS, P.J., and McGIVERIN, SCHULTZ, CARTER and WOLLE, JJ.

SCHULTZ, Justice.

The deciding issue in this appeal is whether a party injured by a negligent motorist may recover from the State for its negligence in failing to seek the suspension of such motorist's driving privileges because he was an habitual offender. The trial court decided this case on a factual basis, holding that plaintiff had failed to meet her burden of proving proximate cause. We hold plaintiff did not state a claim for which relief can be granted and affirm.

On January 7, 1980, plaintiff Cheryl A. Bockelman was a passenger in a vehicle driven by Daniel Loren Richards. Richards negligently operated his vehicle; consequently, it left the highway and crashed, causing plaintiff's injury.

There is substantial evidence in the record to sustain the trial court's finding that the State of Iowa was negligent because the Department of Transportation failed to take action seeking a revocation of Richards' driver's license pursuant to Iowa Code sections 321.555-.556. Within a two-year period between 1977 and 1979 Richards accumulated six or more reportable driving offenses, and the Department did not certify the records to the proper county attorney for the filing of a petition requesting that Richards be adjudicated an habitual offender and ordered not to operate a motor vehicle for a period of one year as specified in sections 321.559-.560. A Department official admitted that computer problems between 1976 and 1980 and other types of inefficiencies prevented the Department from identifying all drivers whose licenses could have been suspended. Thus, Richards possessed a driver's license on the date of the accident.

Plaintiff brought an action against Richards and obtained a default judgment of $300,000. In a separate action plaintiff sued the State under the State Tort Claims Act, Iowa Code ch. 25A, alleging the Department was negligent in failing to take action against Richards under the habitual offender statutes. The trial court found that the State was negligent in failing to act, but this negligence was not the proximate cause of plaintiff's injuries. The court further found that plaintiff did not establish by a preponderance of the evidence that suspension of Richards' license would have prevented him from driving at the time and place of the accident. Citing Davis v. Jenness, 253 N.W.2d 610, 615 (Iowa 1977), which states that a demonstrated disregard for the law negates any presumption that a citizen will obey the law, the court held that, as a matter of law, proximate cause was not established.

On appeal, plaintiff initially attacks the trial court's fact-finding on the issue of proximate cause. Plaintiff then urges that the court incorrectly applied a theory which shields the state from tort claims based on negligent failure to act under the habitual offender provisions. The State urges that there was substantial evidence to support the court's finding, but also claims that failure to properly discharge a duty under the habitual offender statutes does not give rise to redress by a private party in a tort action.

We agree that substantial evidence in the record supports the trial court's finding that plaintiff did not prove proximate cause. Richards' driving record showed intentional driving violations. When his license was suspended following the accident, he was arrested for driving without a license. Opinion evidence was given that intentional violators do not quit driving after suspension. The trial court could properly find that the accident was not caused by the Department's failure to act.

Both parties also devoted substantial portions of their appellate briefs to the issue of whether the trial court's ruling deprived plaintiff of her cause of action. Some problems exist concerning preservation of error on this issue. However, both parties have addressed the problem on appeal, and the issue directly arises from the trial court's determination that proximate cause was lacking as a matter of law--effectively precluding this action. Since the issue is likely to recur, we will address the validity of this cause of action.

Authority for tort actions against the State is provided by the State Tort Claims Act, but it does not supply the answer we seek. It does not create a new cause of action, but merely gives recognition to and provides a remedy for a cause of action already existing by reason of a wrong committed by a state agent for which redress could not be had because of the common-law doctrine of governmental immunity. Graham v. Worthington, 259 Iowa 845, 861, 146 N.W.2d 626, 637 (1966). The State does not claim that the present action falls within any of the exceptions of the Act. Section 25A.2(5)(a) defines "claim" as follows:

Any claim against the state of Iowa for money only, on account of damage to or loss of property or on account of personal injury or death, caused by the negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee of the state while acting within the scope of his office or employment, under circumstances where the state, if a private person, would be liable to the claimant for such damage, loss, injury, or death.

Although a "claim" is defined to include damage "caused by negligent or wrongful act or omission of any employee," such negligence will not state a cause of action when no tort action would otherwise exist under our law. Smith v. State, 324 N.W.2d 299, 300 (Iowa 1982). Liability is strictly limited to situations when "a private person, would be liable to the claimant for such damage." § 25A.2(5)(a). Whether the present action properly states a cause of action is ascertained under common-law tort principles.

The essential elements of a tort claim for negligence generally include: (1) the existence of a duty on the part of the defendant to protect plaintiff from injury; (2) a failure to perform that duty; (3) a reasonably close causal connection, i.e., legal cause or proximate cause; and (4) damages. W. Prosser, Handbook of the Law of Torts § 30, at 143 (4th ed. 1971).

Plaintiff maintains the State's duty is created by statute. The legislature has defined habitual offenders and provided a course of action which allows the district court to bar them from operating motor vehicles and order surrender of their driver's licenses for a period of two to six years; criminal penalties are provided for violation of suspension. Iowa Code §§ 321.555-.562 (1983). In the present case Richards met the definition, accumulating convictions for more than six separate and distinct offenses within a two-year period. § 321.555(2). When a person appears to be an habitual offender, section 321.556 states that the Director of Transportation "shall certify certain abstracts to the appropriate county attorney in order that he may file a petition and obtain a court order for the surrender of such driver's license pursuant to sections 321.558-.559. We have indicated that the purpose of this statutory scheme is to protect the public that uses the highways from the habitual offender. State v. Thomas, 275 N.W.2d 422, 423 (Iowa 1979). The habitual offender statutes, however, are silent concerning the responsibility of the Department for failure to carry out its duties.

We are faced with a situation involving a statutory violation, but we are provided no express remedy. Plaintiff, by her pleadings and in this appellate argument, maintains that the State was negligent because of a breach of its duty under the habitual offender statutes which continued to exist up to the time of the accident and was a concurrent cause of the accident. Should we construe the statute to provide an implied remedy by providing a cause of action?

Neither part...