Boddie v. Bond

• Decision Date: 22 March 1911
• Citation: 70 S.E. 824,154 N.C. 359
• Parties: BODDIE v. BOND.
• Court: North Carolina Supreme Court

70 S.E. 824

154 N.C. 359

BODDIE v. BOND.

Supreme Court of North Carolina

March 22, 1911

Appeal from Superior Court, Warren County; Ferguson, Judge.

Action by Viola Boddie against V. N. Bond. From a judgment of nonsuit, plaintiff appeals. Reversed and remanded.

Action for the recovery of land. Defendant denied the plaintiff's ownership and set up an equitable estoppel by which he says that, if he had not title to the land in dispute, he acquired it by the conduct of the plaintiff with reference to the location of a line between the said land which is claimed by him, and that sold by plaintiff to Mrs Mamie E. Miles. The defendant contended that the line between the disputed lot and the property sold was curved, extending from the southeast corner of the Presbyterian Church lot (at A on the map) to the northeast corner of the old peach orchard (A, B, C, on the map), and that, when plaintiff sold to Mrs. Miles, the husband of the latter, T. J. Miles, acting for his wife, agreed with him that the line of division between the two lots should be straightened, so that the line would extend in a straight course from D to C. The deed from plaintiff to Mrs. Miles was made accordingly. Plaintiff was not present when T. J. Miles and defendant agreed upon the line, but she testified that T. J. Miles told her before she signed the deed "that he had traded with defendant and agreed on a line between the lots and that such new line was inserted in the deed," which contains the following clause: "Said northern line beginning at the northeast corner of the orchard and running north 78 1/4 west 308 feet 4 inches to the Presbyterian Church lot is an agreed line by all parties interested in the presents of." Plaintiff in her own behalf, testified: "My aunt, Mrs Heptinstall, died December 12, 1909. Miss Person died in February following. I made sale to Mr. Miles about a month after her death. I paid Miss Blow the $1,000 provided in my aunt's will. I had no communication, written or oral with defendant, and did not authorize Mr. Miles to represent me in any transactions with him. When I went to Littleton to attend the sale of personal property of my aunt's estate, I had already bargained with Mr. Miles, but the papers had not been executed. There had been no controversy between defendant and myself respecting the ownership of property, and at the time I executed the deed to Mrs. Miles I had not learned that the property I am now suing for was embraced in the will, and was mine. I understood from Mr. Miles when I signed the deed that at an interview between him and defendant, at which I was not present, he had made a trade with the defendant, letting him have a few feet of land at the rear of the lot I sold him for a given number of feet claimed by the defendant at the front. I was leaving Littleton on the night train, and signed the deed that night without reading it, but supposed it was all the same. I did not understand that I was signing away any rights except to the land I was selling Mr. Miles. I did not know that I had any more land than I was selling Mr. Miles. Mr. Miles sent me a bill for surveying the land, and I paid it. I have not sold the lot I am now suing for. I was asked by Mr. Miles to go out there that morning. I went and stayed a little while, and left for the house where the sale was going on. I did not send for the surveyor. I did not understand that I had anything to do with the running or fixing any line. My trade was made with Mr. Miles before that time. Mr. Miles afterwards sent me the surveyor's bill, and I paid it. I had heard in my aunt's lifetime that she had been defrauded out of the lot now in suit. She was easy to influence, and would not contend for her rights. Mr. Miles told me before I signed the deed that he had traded with the defendant, and agreed on a line between the lots, and that such agreed line was inserted in the deed, as now shown to the court."

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T. J. Miles, witness for the plaintiff, testified: "I traded with Miss Boddie, plaintiff, by letter before any lines were established. She was in Littleton soon after Mrs. Heptinstall's death, at a sale of the personal property of the estate. I think I took the deed from her before she left. I arranged to run line of the lot I was buying. Defendant was in possession, claiming the lot now in dispute, and I told him I was going there next morning to run the line, and wanted him to come, and he did so. Mr. Picot and Mr. Newsom came with the defendant and talked for him. I was acting entirely for myself in the matter, and did not represent Miss Boddie. We found that a straight line continuing the Presbyterian Church line would strike the building already spoken of, and, as the will called for the buildings with the house lot, we ran a diagonal line from the Presbyterian Church corner so as to strike the fence line north of the house. I agreed with the defendant that I would give him certain allowance of land at another point on the line if he would give me so many feet, 17 feet 4 inches, along the Presbyterian Church lot, running north, so as to make the line a square one, instead of diagonal across the now disputed lot. The plaintiff was present when we were running the line a little while, and left. I do not think she spoke to the defendant at all. She had nothing to do with my arrangement with the defendant. I was acting entirely on my own account with him without any authority from plaintiff and without her knowledge. I did not undertake to act for her. I had the deed from her to my wife prepared and she executed it." Defendant here introduced the deed from plaintiff to Mrs. Miles referred to by the witness, and read from description: "N. 78 1/4 308 feet 4 inches to corner of Presbyterian Church lot *** is an agreed line by all parties interested." Plaintiff objected to the introduction of the deed during the taking of her testimony, and excepted to the admission of it by the court. "That clause in the deed was inserted by my direction. Defendant and I agreed on line, and plaintiff had nothing to do with it. I had already bargained to buy the property I got. Plaintiff had nothing to do with the negotiation, and did not authorize me to make any agreed line. She lived in Greensboro, and I don't know that she made any claim to the land now in controversy. She was not present when the survey was made. There was some controversy between plaintiff and Mr. Newsom. Halifax street was not established until after Mr. Heptinstall's death. There was a path or driveway along there across his field in his lifetime." There was evidence that John W. Heptinstall at one time owned all the land and devised it by his will to his widow, Cornelia B. Heptinstall, who devised it to Mrs. Person for life, with remainder to the plaintiff. The life tenant died in February, 1910, and plaintiff shortly thereafter contracted to sell that part of the land designated on the map as the "Heptinstall lot" to Mrs. Miles, and the deed to her was executed on March 24, 1910. At the close of the testimony introduced by the plaintiff, the defendant not having offered any except the deed, the court ruled "that the plaintiff was estopped to maintain her action by the recital in her deed to Mrs. Miles, to wit, 'that N. 78 1/4 west 308 feet 4 inches to corner of Presbyterian Church lot is an agreed line by all parties interested in the presents of,' and entered judgment of nonsuit." The plaintiff excepted and appealed.

During the taking of plaintiff's evidence, evidence offered by the defendant cannot be received.

J. H. Kerr, S. G. Daniel, and T. M. Pittman, for appellant.

J. M. Picot and T. T. Hicks, for appellee.

WALKER, J. (after stating the facts as above).

There is no sufficient evidence in the case to show that the defendant owned any part of the land, and, unless the alleged equitable estoppel can be established, the plaintiff is entitled to recover the premises in dispute, provided the jury find that John W. Heptinstall was seised of them at the time of his death, as by his will and that of his widow and devisee they have been vested in the plaintiff. There was evidence tending to prove that he was the owner, which it is not necessary to set out. The material facts will be found in our statement of the case.

The doctrine of equitable estoppel has been thoroughly discussed and settled by the courts. What seems to be the best thought upon the subject may be thus expressed. Estoppel by misrepresentation or equitable estoppel (which is estoppel in pais) grows out of such conduct of a party as absolutely precludes him, both at law and in equity, from asserting rights which might perhaps have otherwise existed, either of property, of contract, or of remedy, as against another person who in good faith relied upon such conduct, and has been led thereby to change his position for the worse, and who on his part acquires some corresponding right, either of contract or of remedy. This estoppel arises when any one by his acts, representations, or admissions, or by his silence when he ought to speak out, intentionally or through culpable negligence induces another to believe certain facts to exist and such other rightfully relies and acts on such belief, so that he will be prejudiced if the former is permitted to deny the existence of such facts. It consists in holding for truth a representation acted upon, when the person who made it, or his privies, seek to deny its truth, and to deprive the party who has acted upon it of the benefit obtained. 16 Cyc. 722. It is called equitable estoppel because it arises upon facts which render its application in the...