Body v. McDonald
Citation | 334 P.2d 513,79 Wyo. 371 |
Decision Date | 20 January 1959 |
Docket Number | No. 2809,2809 |
Parties | Charles H. BODY and Ruth Henry, Plaintiffs and Respondents, v. Maggle McDONALD, individually and as the sole devisee of W. W. McDonald, Deceased, Deceased Defendant, Mabel I. McDonald Weaver and Anna M. Adams Wise, Substituted Defendants and Appellants. |
Court | United States State Supreme Court of Wyoming |
Brimmer & Brimmer, Clarence A. Brimmer, Rawlins, for appellants.
A. G. McClintock, Cheyenne, for respondents.
Before BLUME, C. J., and HARNSBERGER and PARKER, JJ. Mr. Chief Justice BLUME delivered the opinion of the court
This is an action in the nature of a declaratory judgment and to quiet title to a three-fourths mineral interest in the lands hereinafter described. The court substantially granted the prayer of the plaintiffs and appellees herein, and from the judgment so entered the defendants and appellants herein have appealed to this court. The facts as disclosed by the pleadings and the evidence herein are substantially as follows: On May 29, 1914, George Edwards and Lena B. Edwards, husband and wife, being then the owners of the property herein described, made and executed a warranty deed to W. W. McDonald in and to the following property: SW 1/4 NW 1/4, SW 1/4 Sec. 17; E 1/2 NE 1/4, NE 1/4 SE 1/4 Sec. 18; W 1/2 NE 1/4, NW 1/4, W 1/2 SW 1/4, N 1/2 SE 1/4, all of T. 29, R. 80 W., sixth principal meridian, Natrona County, Wyoming. The deed contained the following reservation:
Thereafter on June 11, 1914, the aforesaid W. W. McDonald joined by his wife, Maggie McDonald, executed and delivered to Albert G. Cheney and Charles H. Body a warranty deed to the aforesaid property. In that deed the grantors granted, bargained, sold and conveyed unto the grantees the aforesaid property, and it contained the following:
The deed also contained the statement that the grantors
At the same time the grantees in the last mentioned deed, namely, Body and Cheney, executed a mortgage in favor of William W. (W. W.) McDonald to secure the sum of $5,000. In that mortgage the mortgagors stated that they were well seized of the said premises, in and of a good and indefeasible estate, in fee simple. The mortgage further contained the following statement:
'* * * provided that this mortgage hereby expressly excepts and reserves unto George Edwards and unto Lena B. Edwards, his wife, their heirs and assigns, forever, an undivided one-fourth interest in and to all oil, petroleum and other oil products now located upon or in the said lands, or that may hereafter be taken therefrom, in the proportion of one half interest in the said exception and reservation hereby made, to each of said parties, to wit: George Edwards and Lena B. Edwards;'
The evidence of Charles H. Body herein shows that he knew of the reservation in the deed of the Edwardses to the McDonalds and that he, the said Charles H. Body, had been in possession of the premises since the time that he and his associate received a deed to the premises above mentioned. It further appears herein that one of the plaintiffs, Ruth Henry, is the successor in interest of Albert G. Cheney, and that Mabel I. McDonald Weaver and Anna M. Adams Wise are the successors in interest of W. W. McDonald and his wife, Maggie McDonald. Charles H. Body died on May 22, 1957, after the judgment was entered in the case below, and left his widow, Ruby Body, as his sole heir and devisee; and upon motion filed in this case, dated May 9, 1958, she was substituted as one of the plaintiffs and respondents herein.
The trial court entered judgment, stating in part as follows:
'The court concludes that either by estoppel or resulting trust the reservation contained in the said deed of June 11 and 12, 1914 is held by the Defendants for the use and benefit of George Edwards and Lena B. Edwards as such interest was set forth in the deed of May 29, 1914, if said interest is presently outstanding and claimed by the said George Edwards and Lena B. Edwards or their successors in interest.'
The court further quieted the title of three-fourths of the mineral interest in and to the lands in the plaintiffs Charles H. Body and Ruth Henry and enjoined and debarred defendants herein from setting up any claims of right, title or interest in and to three-fourths of the mineral interest in the lands above mentioned. As stated before, the defendants herein have appealed from this judgment.
The plaintiffs herein contend that as they are the owners of three-fourths of the minerals contained in the lands above described and since one-fourth of the mineral rights is outstanding in favor of Edwards and his wife (or their privies), the defendants herein have no mineral interest in the lands whatsoever.
The defendants, on the other hand, while not questioning the one-fourth mineral interest outstanding in favor of Edwards and his wife, claim that they are the owners of one-fourth of the minerals contained in the lands aforesaid according to the reservation in the deed by McDonald and his wife to Albert G. Cheney and Charles H. Body.
1. It may be conceded for the purposes of this case that the deed from the McDonalds, dated June 11, 1914, to Body and Cheney is plain and unambiguous and cannot be varied by parol evidence. By that deed the McDonalds conveyed to the grantees in that deed the whole of the lands above described excepting only a one-fourth mineral interest. In other words, the McDonalds conveyed under a warranty of title, aside from the surface of the land, three-fourths interest in and to the minerals contained therein. Having thus vested the title to three-fourths of the minerals in and to the grantees, the McDonalds and their successors in interest are estopped from claiming that the grantees and their successors in interest have less than three-fourths of the mineral rights in the land. In 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 10, it is said:
Again in 31 C.J.S. Estoppel § 13, it is stated:
* * *'
See also 19 Am.Jur., Estoppel §§ 5 to 10 inclusive.
A situation similar to that appearing in this case is discussed in a number of cases which sustain the judgment of the court rendered in the present action. Brown v. Kirk, 127 Colo. 453, 257 P.2d 1045; Merchants & Manufacturers Bank v. Dennis, Miss., 91 So.2d 254; Salmen Brick & Lumber Co., Limited v. Williams, 210 Miss. 560, 50 So.2d 130; Garraway v. Bryant, 224 Miss. 459, 80 So.2d 59, 61 A.L.R.2d 1387; Murphy v. Athans, Okl., 265 P.2d 461; Benge v. Scharbauer, 152 Tex. 447, 259 S.W.2d 166; Duhig v. Peavy-Moore Lumber Co., Inc., 135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878. Syllabus 3 in Salmen Brick & Lumber Co., Limited v. Williams, supra [210 Miss. 560, 50 So.2d 130], states as follows:
'Where grantor had property conveyed to it with one-half mineral exception and subsequently said grantor conveyed property by warranty deed conveying fee-simple title to property but containing exception clause almost identical to that used in original deed to grantor, exception clause in second deed merely described interest owned by grantor, and therefore effect of second deed was to convey to grantee exactly what grantor had received under its original deed and grantor retained for itself none of mineral interest by such deed.'
In the Duhig case [135 Tex. 503, 144 S.W.2d 878], syllabus 1 is similar to the foregoing and syllabus 2 states as follows:
'Where warranty deed, executed by grantor to whom realty had been conveyed with reservation of one-half undivided interest in mineral rights, expressly retained undivided one-half interest in mineral rights and purported to convey all other interest in the realty, covenant of general warranty in the deed operated as an 'estoppel' denying to the grantor and those claiming under him the right to set up a claim to one-half undivided interest in mineral rights.'
The court mentioned the fact that the grantor in the second deed should not be permitted to hold the mineral interest reserved by his deed and to require his grantee to seek redress in a suit for...
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