Boedigheimer v. Taylor
| Decision Date | 19 June 1970 |
| Docket Number | No. 41645,41645 |
| Citation | 287 Minn. 323,178 N.W.2d 610 |
| Parties | Norbert H. BOEDIGHEIMER, Appellant, v. Clarion George TAYLOR, Defendant, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company, garnishee, Respondent. |
| Court | Minnesota Supreme Court |
Syllabus by the Court
In a garnishment action brought by a judgment creditor against the automobile liability insurer of the individual judgment debtor, judgment in favor of the garnisheeinsurer is affirmed on the following grounds:
1. A special interrogatory inquiring, in the language of the insurance policy, whether a certain automobile was 'furnished to or available for the regular or frequent use' of the named insured, with instructions that such terms be given their common and ordinary meaning, was properly submitted to the jury in order to determine the factual question of whether the requirements of the policy were satisfied, and the verdict must be sustained on appeal.
2. The trial court correctly instructed the jury that the burden of proof rested upon plaintiff to establish compliance with the requirements of the non-owned automobile provision of the insurance policy.
Robins, Meshbesher, Singer & Spence, and Morley Friedman, Minneapolis, for appellant.
Meagher, Geer, Markham & Anderson, James W. Torke and O. C. Adamson, II, Minneapolis, for respondent.
Heard before KNUTSON, C.J., and ROGOSHESKE, SHERAN, PETERSON, and FRANK T. GALLAGHER, JJ.
Appeal from a judgment and from an order of the district court denying plaintiff's motion for a new trial.
Plaintiff brought an action against defendant, Clarion Taylor, to recover damages for personal injuries sustained as a result of an accident which occurred on June 16, 1965, when a 1960 Studebaker Lark automobile driven by Taylor collided with the rear end of an automobile driven by plaintiff. Taylor did not contest liability and stipulated to be bound by the trial court's determination of damages. Pursuant to the trial court's findings of fact, judgment was entered for plaintiff in the sum of $10,000, plus costs. Plaintiff then served garnishment process upon State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance Company (hereinafter State Farm), Taylor's insurer, requiring State Farm to disclose its indebtedness to Taylor. State Farm responded that it was not indebted to Taylor. Upon leave of the trial court, plaintiff then served a supplemental complaint upon State Farm, alleging that State Farm was liable for the judgment under the terms of its automobile liability insurance policy issued to Taylor. State Farm again denied liability, asserting that the accident was excluded from coverage under the policy because the automobile driven by Taylor was owned by another person and failed to satisfy the following definition of the 'non-owned automobile' insurance provision:
'* * * (A)n automobile * * * not
'(i) owned by
'(ii) registered in the name of, or
'(iii) furnished or available for the frequent or regular use of the named insured, his spouse, or any relative of either residing in the same household, other than a temporary substitute automobile.'
The garnishment action proceeded to trial on the factual question of whether the Studebaker Lark was 'furnished or available for the frequent or regular use' of Taylor. The evidence indicated that the only automobile owned by Taylor was a 1955 Chevrolet with automatic transmission, the car described in the State Farm policy. The Lark was owned by William Knoll, Taylor's father-in-law. Because Knoll was hospitalized during the period involved, the Lark was parked at the Knoll residence. Mrs. Knoll did not drive. Taylor's wife, Nancy, was unable to drive the Lark because it had a standard transmission. Taylor testified to an understanding with Mr. Knoll that Taylor would be allowed to use the Lark whenever he needed or wanted it, but that he would have to ask permission of Mrs. Knoll on the occasion of each use and obtain the key from her. He stated that Mr. Knoll approved of Taylor's use of the Lark because Knoll desired to have the car started occasionally.
Taylor testified to approximately eight occasions when he used the Lark prior to the accident. On four of these occasions, he used it as a temporary substitute for his Chevrolet, which was then being repaired. Twice he used it to bring his mother-in-law to the hospital to see Mr. Knoll, and once to take her shopping. On the occasion of the accident, Taylor had obtained the Lark for his personal use because his wife needed the Chevrolet.
In an effort to impeach the foregoing testimony, State Farm cross-examined to show prior statements by Taylor in which it was acknowledged that on the occasion of the accident Taylor had had possession of the Lark for 2 days, that the Lark 'was available for me when I wanted to use it,' and that 'Mr. Knoll had told his wife that if I wished to use his car, I could, as he wanted to keep it in running condition.' Mrs. Taylor testified that the Lark had been kept overnight at the Taylor residence on four or five occasions prior to the accident.
At the close of evidence in the garnishment action, the following special interrogatory was submitted to the jury:
'Was the Studebaker Lark automobile of William Knoll furnished to or available for the regular or frequent use of Clarion Taylor or his wife Nancy, having in mind all the evidence and law given you in these instructions?'
The trial court instructed:
'* * * (T)he terms or the words 'furnished and available' are words of such common usage that they are self-explanatory, and you should interpret them in the ordinary and usual use of such words. The words or terms 'frequent and regular,' as referring to the use of the car, these words also are mostly self-explanatory, but should be considered by you as a Jury as those words might be commonly applied to the use of an automobile as far as this case and your answering the interrogatory here is concerned.
'* * * In determining whether or not the Studebaker Lark car of Mr. Knoll was furnished or made available for the frequent or regular use of Clarion Taylor or his wife, Nancy Taylor, you should not consider those times when the Studebaker Lark car of Mr. Knoll was used as a temporary substitute automobile for the Taylor-owned 1955 Chevrolet automobile because of the breakdown, repair or servicing of the Taylor-owned 1955 Chevrolet automobile. Also in considering this question, the question for you to answer is not whether the Taylors, Mr. or Mrs. Taylor, actually used the Studebaker Lark car of Mr. Knoll frequently, but whether it was available for them to use frequently and regularly when Mr. and Mrs. Taylor so chose to use it.
The jury answered the special interrogatory in the affirmative, judgment was entered, and this appeal resulted.
1. Plaintiff's primary contention on appeal is that he is entitled to judgment notwithstanding the verdict because as a matter of law the Lark automobile was not 'furnished or available' for Taylor's 'regular or frequent use.' Plaintiff recognizes that the terms of an insurance policy are to be given their ordinary meaning, as well as the interpretations adopted in prior cases, but he contends that the facts concerning Taylor's use of the Lark could not reasonably be held to satisfy those meanings. Alternatively, plaintiff contends that if the issue of 'regular or frequent use' was correctly submitted to the jury, the trial court erred in failing to define these terms for the jury as 'principal or habitual use rather than occasional or incidental use,' or using other proposed definitions, and in failing to instruct that any ambiguity in the words of an insurance policy is to be construed against the insurer. 1 Combined, these theories contest the propriety of submitting to the jury as a special interrogatory a factual question containing terms taken directly from the policy.
While it is true that the construction of terms in an insurance policy is a question of law...
To continue reading
Request your trial
-
Moss v. Mid-American Fire and Marine Ins. Co.
...Nevertheless, even those courts treat the issue as a question of fact to be decided by the trier of fact. In Boedigheimer v. Taylor, 287 Minn. 323, 178 N.W.2d 610 (1970), the court required such a case to go to the jury with the instruction that the terms are to be given their common and or......
-
In re RFC & Rescap Liquidating Trust Action
...adopted in prior cases." Ritrama, Inc. v. HDI-Gerling Am. Ins. Co. , 796 F.3d 962, 969 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Boedigheimer v. Taylor , 287 Minn. 323, 178 N.W.2d 610, 613 (1970) ).E. Cross Motions for Summary JudgmentRespectively, the parties move for summary judgment on several identical ......
-
ResCap Liquidating Trust v. Primary Residential Mortg., Inc. (In re ResCap Liquidating Trust Litig.)
...adopted in prior cases." Ritrama, Inc. v. HDI-Gerling Am. Ins. Co. , 796 F.3d 962, 969 (8th Cir. 2015) (quoting Boedigheimer v. Taylor , 287 Minn. 323, 178 N.W.2d 610, 613 (1970) ).C. Summary Judgment Summary judgment is appropriate if "the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as t......
-
Winterwerp v. Allstate Ins. Co.
...is in accord with the interpretation of this provision by Judge Chesnut . . .,' which he then quoted.); and Boedigheimer v. Taylor, 287 Minn. 323, 328, 718 N.W.2d 610 (1970). In Rodenkirk v. State Farm Mut. Automobile Ins. Co., 325 Ill.App. 421, 60 N.E.2d 269 (1st D., 3d Div. 1945), quoted ......
-
Was The Wallace & Gale Holding Rejected In The API Case?
...definition is part of the policy limits and not an exclusion, this conclusion is very questionable. See, e.g., Boedigheimer v. Taylor, 178 N.W.2d 610, 614 (Minn. 1970) ["the burden of proof rests upon the party claiming coverage under an insurance policy"]; Fibreboard Corp. v. Hartford, 16 ......