Bogart v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec., 2:19-cv-0584-KJN

Decision Date14 September 2020
Docket NumberNo. 2:19-cv-0584-KJN,2:19-cv-0584-KJN
PartiesCAROL LYNN BOGART, Plaintiff, v. COMMISSIONER OF SOCIAL SECURITY, Defendant.
CourtU.S. District Court — Eastern District of California

ORDER ON PARTIES' CROSS MOTIONS FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

Plaintiff seeks judicial review of a final decision by the Commissioner of Social Security denying her application for Title II disability insurance benefits.1 In her summary judgment motion, plaintiff primarily contends the Administrative Law Judge ("ALJ") erred by failing to properly weigh the medical evidence and by failing to assess her subjective testimony. The Commissioner opposes and has filed a cross-motion for summary judgment.

As set forth below, the court DENIES plaintiff's motion for summary judgment, GRANTS the Commissioner's motion, and AFFIRMS the final decision of the Commissioner.

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I. BACKGROUND AND ALJ'S FIVE-STEP ANALYSIS2

Plaintiff applied for benefits on April 21, 2015, alleging an onset date of November 30, 2014. (Administrative Transcript ("AT") 143.) Plaintiff claimed the following medical conditions: diabetes, fibromyalgia, abnormal mammogram and liver imaging, degenerative osteoarthritis, compression fracture in the back, herniated disc in her neck, osteoporosis, scoliosis, spondylosis, high blood pressure, thyroid condition, cataract surgery, possible glaucoma, and high cholesterol. (AT 63-64.) Plaintiff's application was denied initially and again upon reconsideration. (AT 80-84, 88-92.) Plaintiff, aided by an attorney, sought review of these denials with an ALJ. (AT 93-94.)

At a March 6, 2017 hearing, plaintiff testified about her conditions, and the ALJ heard testimony from a vocational expert regarding plaintiff's ability to work. (AT 39-62.) On May 31, 2017, the ALJ issued a decision determining that plaintiff was not disabled during the relevant period. (AT 21-38.) At step one, the ALJ concluded plaintiff had not engaged in substantial gainful activity during the period of her alleged onset date of November 30, 2014, through her last date insured, December 31, 2014. (AT 26.) At step two, the ALJ found plaintiff had the following severe impairments: "cervical degenerative disc disease, status post T8 compressionfracture, and hip osteoarthritis." (Id.) The ALJ found plaintiff's other impairments did not cause "more than minimal limitation in the claimant's ability to perform basic work activities and therefore were not severe." (Id.) At step three, the ALJ determined the severe impairments did not meet or medically equal a listed impairment. (AT 27.)

The ALJ then found plaintiff had the residual functional capacity ("RFC") to perform the full range of medium work through her last date insured. (AT 27.) In reaching this conclusion, the ALJ stated he considered plaintiff's expressed symptoms, the objective medical evidence in the record, and the opinion evidence in the record. (Id.) The ALJ found the severity of plaintiff's expressed symptoms to be inconsistent with the medical evidence and other evidence in the record. (AT 28.) Specifically, the ALJ found that although plaintiff sought extensive treatment for her conditions after December 31, 2014, she required minimal treatment during the relevant period. (AT 28-29.) The ALJ concluded at step four that plaintiff was capable of performing her past relevant work as a reporter. (AT 31.) In the alternative, the ALJ found that there were a significant number of jobs in the national economy that plaintiff could perform. (AT 32.)

Plaintiff appealed to the Appeals Council and submitted additional medical records. (See AT 2, 141.) On January 24, 2018, the Council denied plaintiff's appeal. (AT 10-14.) Plaintiff then timely filed this action requesting judicial review of the Commissioner's final decision, and the parties filed cross-motions for summary judgment. (ECF Nos. 1, 14, 17.)

II. LEGAL STANDARD

The court reviews the Commissioner's decision de novo and should reverse "only if the ALJ's decision was not supported by substantial evidence in the record as a whole or if the ALJ applied the wrong legal standard." Buck v. Berryhill, 869 F. 3d 1040, 1048 (9th Cir. 2017). Substantial evidence is more than a mere scintilla, but less than a preponderance; i.e. "such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion." Edlund v. Massanari, 253 F. 3d 1152, 1156 (9th Cir. 2001). "The ALJ is responsible for determining credibility, resolving conflicts in medical testimony, and resolving ambiguities." Id. The court will uphold the ALJ's conclusion where "the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation." Tommasetti v. Astrue, 533 F. 3d 1035, 1038 (9th Cir. 2008). Further, thecourt may not reverse the ALJ's decision on account of harmless error. Buck, 869 F. 3d at 1048.

III. ISSUES PRESENTED

Plaintiff alleges three errors on the ALJ's part: (A) that the ALJ failed to sufficiently discuss relevant opinion evidence; (B) that the ALJ rejected her subjective complaints without providing clear and convincing reasons; and (C) that the ALJ's RFC and hypothetical questions were legally inadequate. Plaintiff requests that this court remand for the payment of benefits. (ECF No. 14.) The Commissioner counters each of plaintiff's arguments and maintains the ALJ's opinion should be affirmed. (ECF No. 17.)

IV DISCUSSION

As an initial matter, and generally pertinent to all of plaintiff's points, plaintiff must establish that she was disabled within a relatively short timeframe: between her alleged onset date, November 30, 2014, and her date last insured, December 31, 2014. See Lair-Del Rio v. Astrue, 380 F. App'x 694, 695 (9th Cir. 2010) (explaining the relevant time period for Title II actions). Accordingly, generally speaking, records from within the relevant timeframe will have the most value, and as time passes these records will lose their probative weight.

A. Substantial evidence supports the ALJ's evaluation of medical opinions.

The weight given to medical opinions depends in part on whether they are proffered by treating, examining, or non-examining professionals. Holohan v. Massanari, 246 F.3d 1195, 1201-02 (9th Cir. 2001); Lester v. Chater, 81 F.3d 821, 830 (9th Cir. 1995). Generally speaking, a treating physician's opinion carries more weight than an examining physician's opinion, and an examining physician's opinion carries more weight than a non-examining physician's opinion. Holohan, 246 F.3d at 1202.

To evaluate whether an ALJ properly rejected a medical opinion, in addition to considering its source, the court considers whether (1) contradictory opinions are in the record; and (2) clinical findings support the opinions. An ALJ may reject an uncontradicted opinion of a treating or examining medical professional only for "clear and convincing" reasons. Lester, 81 F.3d at 830-31. In contrast, a contradicted opinion of a treating or examining professional may be rejected for "specific and legitimate" reasons. Id. at 830. While a treating professional's opiniongenerally is accorded superior weight, if it is contradicted by a supported examining professional's opinion (supported by different independent clinical findings), the ALJ may resolve the conflict. Andrews v. Shalala, 53 F.3d 1035, 1041 (9th Cir. 1995) (citing Magallanes v. Bowen, 881 F.2d 747, 751 (9th Cir. 1989)). The regulations require the ALJ to weigh the contradicted treating physician opinion, Edlund, 253 F.3d at 1157,3 except that the ALJ in any event need not give it any weight if it is conclusory and supported by minimal clinical findings. Meanel v. Apfel, 172 F.3d 1111, 1114 (9th Cir. 1999) (treating physician's conclusory, minimally supported opinion rejected); see also Magallanes, 881 F.2d at 751. The opinion of a non-examining professional, by itself, is insufficient to reject the opinion of a treating or examining professional. Lester, 81 F.3d at 831. Importantly, when "interpreting the evidence and developing the record, the ALJ does not need to 'discuss every piece of evidence.'" Howard ex rel. Wolff v. Barnhart, 341 F.3d 1006, 1012 (9th Cir. 2003) (citations omitted). "[T]he ALJ is not required to discuss evidence that is neither significant nor probative." Id.

Dr. Carey

Plaintiff first contends that the ALJ erred by failing to discuss a letter from Dr. Carey dated July 16, 2003. An ALJ is only required to discuss significant, probative evidence. Vincent on Behalf of Vincent v. Heckler, 739 F.2d 1393, 1395 (9th Cir. 1984) (holding that evidence that is not significant or probative need not be explicitly discussed by the ALJ); accord Barreras v. Saul, 803 F. App'x 70, 73 (9th Cir. 2020).

Here, the evidence proffered by plaintiff is neither significant nor probative. Dr. Carey's one-page letter from 2003 states that plaintiff "continues to have problems with fibromyalgia." (AT 429.) To the extent that this letter arguably constitutes medical opinion evidence, the statement that plaintiff has "problems with fibromyalgia" is not probative as to plaintiff's alleged limitations more than ten years later. See Vincent, 739 F.2d at 1395 (ALJ did not need to discuss opinion of doctor who had treated claimant several years before the alleged onset date and hadnot examined him in several years); Gunderson v. Astrue, 371 F. App'x 807, 809 (9th Cir. 2010) (ALJ did not err by discounting medical opinion of doctor who conducted examination "nearly two years before the alleged onset date of [claimant]'s disabilities"). Additionally, the ALJ specifically mentions plaintiff's fibromyalgia, but found the symptoms non-severe. (See AT 26-27.) Thus, the ALJ's failure to mention this particular report was not in error.

Dr. Saini

Plaintiff asserts that the ALJ failed to consider two "to whom it may concern" letters from Dr. Saini dated September 25, 2015, and November 4, 2015, and also improperly dismissed a form that checked "disabled" prepared by Dr. Saini on February 7, 2013.

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