Boggess v. City of Charleston
| Decision Date | 30 October 2014 |
| Docket Number | No. 13–1261.,13–1261. |
| Citation | 765 S.E.2d 255,234 W.Va. 366 |
| Court | West Virginia Supreme Court |
| Parties | Myron BOGGESS and William Gill, et al., Plaintiffs Below, Petitioners v. CITY OF CHARLESTON, A West Virginia Municipal Corporation; Matthew P. Jackson, Eric E. Kinder, and Victor E. Sigmon, in their Capacity as Commissioners of the Firemen's Civil Service Commission of the City of Charleston, Defendants Below, Respondents. |
Thomas P. Maroney, Esq., Patrick K. Maroney, Esq., Maroney, Williams, Weaver & Pancake, PLLC, Charleston, WV, for Petitioners.
Thomas V. Flaherty, Esq., Caleb P. Knight, Esq., Flaherty Sensabaugh Bonasso, PLLC, Charleston, WV, for Respondent City.
Arden J. Curry, II, Esq., David K. Schwirian, Pauley Curry, PLLC Charleston, WV, for Respondent Commission and Commissioners, individually.
This matter is before the Court upon an appeal by Myron Boggess and William Gill, individually and in their capacities as representatives of 162 firefighters (hereinafter “the petitioners”) from an October 7, 2013, order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County granting summary judgment to the City of Charleston (hereinafter “the City”) and a July 9, 2013, order of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County dismissing the Fireman's Civil Service Commission for the City of Charleston (hereinafter “the Commission”). The petitioners challenge the City's method of calculating overtime wages and contend that the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment to the City and dismissing the Commission. Upon thorough review of the arguments, record, and applicable precedent, this Court affirms the orders of the Circuit Court of Kanawha County.
The petitioners are individuals employed by the City as firefighters. The City establishes an annual salary for its firefighters, paid in twenty-six equal installments per year. Overtime compensation is determined by dividing the annual salary by a certain number of hours worked to establish a baseline regular hourly rate of pay.1 Overtime is then paid at one and one-half times the regular hourly rate after the firefighters work beyond the regular hours. “Kelly days” were also established in 1991.2 In 1994 and 1997, the City reduced the number of hours per week that the firefighters would work before overtime was required to be paid.3
The divisor used in the baseline hourly rate calculation is the primary matter of controversy in this case. From 1991 until 2011, the City calculated its firefighters' baseline hourly rates in a manner consistent with a formula utilized in Aaron v. City of Wichita, 797 F.Supp. 898 (D.Kan.1992) (hereinafter “Aaron I ”), subtracting Kelly days and vacation days from the total number of hours worked annually. In 2011, however, Charleston City Manager David D. Molgaard reviewed the City's methodology for calculating the baseline hourly rate and determined that it was incorrect and had actually been compensating the firefighters at a higher overtime rate than required. Mr. Molgaard further determined that the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit had rejected the formula being utilized in Aaron I through its decision in Aaron v. City of Witchita, 54 F.3d 652 (10th Cir.1995) (hereinafter “Aaron II ”). The Tenth Circuit held in Aaron II that the proper hourly rate is determined by dividing the salary by the total number of hours the annual salary was intended to compensate, without deducting vacation days and Kelly days. 54 F.3d at 656.
Concluding that its previous formula had inappropriately inflated the calculation of the baseline regular hourly rate and had resulted in overpayment of approximately $1.4 million in wages not required under the federal Fair Labor Standards Act (hereinafter “FLSA”), 29 United States Code §§ 201 to 219 (2006), the City amended its mathematical formula by resolution dated November 7, 2011. The City provided the firefighters with notice of the alteration. The resolution modifies the method of calculating overtime compensation and indicates that the City “adopted the Section 207(k) exemption under the [FLSA] and provided that the City would henceforth pay its firefighters premium compensation for any unscheduled time worked in excess of 212 hours within a 28 day period.” See 29 U.S.C. § 207(k).
Under the modified formula, the baseline regular hourly rate is calculated by dividing the annual salary by 2548, the number of hours each firefighter is to work under the FLSA guidelines prior to what is considered overtime, with anything over forty-nine hours per week deemed as overtime. This modified method of calculation has not reduced the firefighters' annual salaries; it has only altered the mathematical calculation by which the baseline regular hourly rate of pay is determined.4 Due to the effect upon overtime calculation, the petitioners initiated legal action on November 23, 2011, by filing a petition with the Commission seeking to reinstate the prior baseline regular hourly rate calculation. In that action, the petitioners alleged that the City's November 7, 2011, resolution constituted an improper unilateral change to the method of calculation and that such change resulted in a reduction of overtime pay.
On January 26, 2012, the Commission addressed the issue of whether it had jurisdiction to hear the petitioners' claims, pursuant to West Virginia Code §§ 8–15–11, –25 (2012), dealing with civil service for paid fire departments. According to those provisions, the Commission's jurisdiction is limited to certain defined areas, and it is authorized to hear and rule upon allegations involving the removal, discharge, suspension, or reduction in rank or pay of a firefighter. Because the petitioners had not been the subject of disciplinary action, the Commission found that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitioners' claims.
On February 2, 2012, the City filed a Request for Declaratory Judgment and Relief in the United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia. The City asserted that an actual controversy had arisen under the FLSA regarding the proper methodology for calculating hourly and overtime wages for the petitioners. The City requested declaratory judgment and relief regarding the legality of its methodology under the FLSA.
On May 3, 2012, the petitioners filed a motion to dismiss. The federal court determined that there was no controversy under the FLSA and therefore dismissed the declaratory judgment action, by order dated September 7, 2012. The court reasoned as follows:
[I]f the firefighters believed that the new methodology adopted by the City that took effect in 2012 violated the FLSA, they could have brought a claim in federal court. They did not do so; rather, they brought a claim in State court, alleging only violations of State law and [Firemen's Civil Service] Commission rules, and nowhere have the firefighters even suggested that the new methodology violates the FLSA. Thus, there is no controversy as to whether the new methodology satisfies the requirements of the FLSA.
On February 24, 2012, the petitioners filed a Complaint and Petition for Writ of Mandamus in the Circuit Court of Kanawha County. The petitioners alleged that the City should not be permitted to unilaterally alter its method of calculating overtime pay and asserted that the Commission should be compelled to assume jurisdiction in this matter and hold a full evidentiary hearing.5
In response, the Commission filed a motion to dismiss, and the circuit court heard arguments regarding that motion on April 22, 2013. The court found that this Court's decision in Darlington v. Mangum, 192 W.Va. 112, 450 S.E.2d 809 (1994), compelled the conclusion that the Commission lacked jurisdiction.6 Thus, the circuit court held, by order dated July 9, 2013, that the Commission properly concluded that it lacked jurisdiction to hear the petitioners' claims.
The petitioners filed a motion for summary judgment on May 28, 2013, alleging that the City violated its contractual obligations and the FLSA by unilaterally altering the method of calculating overtime pay. The City agreed that this matter was suitable for summary judgment and, on June 14, 2013, converted its previously-filed motion to dismiss to a motion for summary judgment. On June 26, 2013, the parties argued their respective motions for summary judgment before the circuit court. The petitioners asked the circuit court to take judicial notice of certain FLSA statutes that were supportive of their motion. The City objected on the grounds that the petitioners were estopped from litigating alleged violations of the FLSA because they had sought and obtained dismissal of the City's declaratory judgment action in federal court on the basis that no FLSA violations had occurred.7
On October 7, 2013, the circuit court granted the City's motion for summary judgment. The petitioners now appeal both the July 9, 2013, dismissal order and the October 7, 2013, summary judgment order to this Court.
This Court has consistently explained that “[a] circuit court's entry of summary judgment is reviewed de novo. ” Syl. Pt. 1, Painter v. Peavy, 192 W.Va. 189, 451 S.E.2d 755 (1994). Summary judgment is mandated when the record demonstrates that no genuine issues of material fact exist and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. See Powderidge Unit Owners Ass'n v. Highland Props. Ltd., 196 W.Va. 692, 474 S.E.2d 872 (1996).
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Marshall v. City of Huntington
...of policy does not retroactively impair previously earned and vested rights, such as pension benefits.Syl. Pt. 4, Boggess v. City of Charleston, 234 W. Va. 366, 765 S.E.2d 255 (2014). As the circuit court noted, "[a]t the time the CBA was executed and at the time [petitioner] retired, the C......