Boggs v. Crenshaw
| Decision Date | 30 June 1928 |
| Citation | 7 S.W.2d 994 |
| Parties | BOGGS v. CRENSHAW. |
| Court | Tennessee Supreme Court |
L. D. Bejach and Marion S. Boyd, both of Memphis, for appellant.
Sivley, Evans & McCadden, of Memphis, for appellee.
This suit was brought by John E. Boggs to recover of E. B. Crenshaw, county court clerk of Shelby county, a privilege tax paid under duress and protest.
The chancellor overruled a demurrer interposed by the clerk, and, upon notice that no further pleading would be filed, rendered a decree in favor of complainant, from which the defendant has appealed.
The privilege tax in question is levied by the Revenue Act of 1927, chapter 89, under the heading "Futures." The privilege for which the tax is exacted is defined in the statute (page 311 of the Public Acts of 1927) as follows:
"* * * The soliciting or accepting orders, or contracts, or consummating deals for either the purchase or sale of any stock, bonds, cotton produce, or merchandise through any organized Exchange or through any member of such Exchange in this or any other state where any margin or partial payment is required of such purchaser or seller, and when the delivery of any such commodity aforesaid may be made in the future, and for which any such person, firm, or corporation, and any agent or employee of such firm or corporation as above set out and provided are compensated for such soliciting, accepting, contracting or consummating such deals, either by brokerage, commission or salary."
The tax is required of one who makes a business of soliciting or accepting orders or contracts of the designated character. First, the order or contract must be for the purchase or sale of stocks, bonds, etc., through an organized exchange or through a member of such an exchange in this state or some other state; second, the order or contract must be one "where any margin or partial payment is required of such purchaser or seller"; third, the order or contract must be one on which the delivery of the commodity purchased or sold may be made in the future; and, fourth, the order or contract must be one for the soliciting or accepting of which the person or firm of whom the tax is required is compensated by brokerage, commission, or salary.
Complainant is a member of the Memphis Cotton Exchange, which is maintained for the information and convenience of cotton dealers in and near Memphis, but orders for the purchase or sale of cotton for future delivery are not executed at the Memphis exchange. Complainant is engaged in the business of soliciting orders from Memphis cotton dealers, for the purchase and sale of cotton for future delivery, to be executed by and through the firm of Mason, Smith & Co. on the floor of the New Orleans Cotton Exchange, of which exchange the firm of Mason, Smith & Company is a member.
The fair inference of the agreed statement of facts, which is incorporated in the original bill, is that the connection of complainant with the orders so solicited is terminated when such orders are transmitted by wire to the New Orleans firm. The facts were so construed by the chancellor.
The complainant is described as one thoroughly familiar with the financial standing of cotton firms in Memphis, and in the Memphis territory. Accordingly, it is his duty to furnish Mason, Smith & Co. with a statement of the financial rating and responsibility of such firms. Orders solicited by complainant from such firms are executed by Mason, Smith & Co., without the deposit of a margin, to the extent that their financial responsibility justifies the extension of credit to them. After the acceptance and execution of an order solicited by complainant, Mason, Smith & Co. asserts and exercises the right to require the Memphis customer to make a deposit protecting its contract, whenever the credit of such customer with Mason, Smith & Co. is exhausted by the...
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Saturn Corp. v. Johnson
...extend by implication the right to collect a tax "beyond the clear import of the statute by which it is levied." Boggs v. Crenshaw, 157 Tenn. 261, 7 S.W.2d 994, 995 (1928). By the same token, courts must give effect to the "plain import of the language of the act" and must not use the stric......
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Qualcomm Incorporated v. Chumley, No. M2006-01398-COA-R3-CV (Tenn. App. 9/26/2007)
...by which it is levied.'" American Airlines, Inc. v. Johnson, 56 S.W.3d 502, 504 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2000) (quoting Boggs v. Crenshaw, 157 Tenn. 261, 7 S.W.2d 994, 995 (1928)). Thus, "[w]here there is doubt as to the meaning of a taxing statute, the doubt must be resolved in favor of the taxpaye......
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Equifax Check Serv. v. Johnson
...not extend by implication the right to collect a tax "beyond the clear import of the statute by which it is levied." Boggs v. Crenshaw, 7 S.W.2d 994, 995 (Tenn. 1928). By the same token, courts must give effect to the "plain import of the language of the act" and must not use the strict con......
- Boggs v. Crenshaw