Bogren v. State of Minnesota

• Decision Date: 16 June 2000
• Docket Number: No. 99-3516,99-3516
• Citation: 236 F.3d 399
• Parties: (8th Cir. 2000) ANN BOGREN, APPELLANT, v. STATE OF MINNESOTA; MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY; DONALD DAVIS, COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; MINNESOTA STATE PATROL; ANN BEERS, CHIEF OF THE STATE PATROL, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY; LIEUTENANT THOMAS FRASER OF THE STATE PATROL, PERSONALLY AND INDIVIDUALLY; LIEUTENANT LORI HODAPP OF THE STATE PATROL, PERSONALLY AND INDIVIDUALLY; LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEPHEN MENGELKOCH OF THE STATE PATROL, PERSONALLY AND INDIVIDUALLY,APPELLEES. Submitted:
• Court: U.S. Court of Appeals — Eighth Circuit

Page 399

236 F.3d 399 (8th Cir. 2000)

ANN BOGREN, APPELLANT, v. STATE OF MINNESOTA; MINNESOTA DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY; DONALD DAVIS, COMMISSIONER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF PUBLIC SAFETY, IN HIS OFFICIAL CAPACITY; MINNESOTA STATE PATROL; ANN BEERS, CHIEF OF THE STATE PATROL, IN HER OFFICIAL CAPACITY; LIEUTENANT THOMAS FRASER OF THE STATE PATROL, PERSONALLY AND INDIVIDUALLY; LIEUTENANT LORI HODAPP OF THE STATE PATROL, PERSONALLY AND INDIVIDUALLY; LIEUTENANT COLONEL STEPHEN MENGELKOCH OF THE STATE PATROL, PERSONALLY AND INDIVIDUALLY,APPELLEES.

No. 99-3516

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE EIGHTH CIRCUIT

Submitted: June 16, 2000

Filed: December 22, 2000

Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of Minnesota. [Copyrighted Material Omitted]

Before Loken, Ross, and Hansen, Circuit Judges.

Hansen, Circuit Judge.

Ann Bogren, a former probationary trooper with the Minnesota State Patrol, brings this action against the state alleging she was discriminated against on account of her race and gender and retaliated against in violation of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. 2000e to 2000e-17 (1994). She also alleges claims pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1981, 1983 and 1985 against three state patrol employees in their individual capacities. Upon motions by the defendants, the district court ¹ granted summary judgment on Bogren's federal law claims, and she appeals. We affirm. ²

I.

Bogren was accepted into the Minnesota State Patrol Academy in November 1994 through a program designed to recruit women and minority applicants into the patrol. Bogren graduated from the academy in February 1995, the first black female to do so. Around the same time, the Minnesota Department of Public Safety launched an investigation into the training environment at the academy. The investigation was spawned by complaints from two former female cadets that academy instructors engaged in sexually harassing and discriminatory conduct. Bogren was interviewed during the investigation but did not identify any incidents where she was harassed or discriminated against.

Following her graduation from the academy, Bogren began the patrol's phased field training program. In general, her field training officers (FTOs) provided favorable reports on her performance, but more than one identified her driving skills as an area requiring improvement. Her FTOs commented on her ability to comprehend material quickly and to get along with others, although by the end of her field training period Bogren had developed an antagonistic relationship with her primary FTO, Trooper Brian Polansky. According to Polansky, Bogren's driving performance regressed during the final phase of her field training period. He reported that Bogren committed traffic violations on an almost daily basis, despite his instruction on the necessity of avoiding such violations.

Despite Polansky's concerns over her driving skills, Bogren advanced in May 1995 beyond the field training program, was assigned a patrol car and began solo patrol. As a solo probationary patrol officer, Bogren generally received above average or satisfactory marks from her initial supervising lieutenant, Lieutenant Al Kutz, yet her driving problems continued to be a concern. On May 24, 1995, Bogren struck a metering light with her patrol car, knocking the light over. Another trooper, who happened upon Bogren and the downed metering light, asked Bogren how the light was knocked over. Bogren admitted that she struck the light, but when the officer informed Bogren that she needed to file an accident report with the patrol, Bogren was hesitant and had to be coaxed to make the report. Although Bogren filed the report the same day, the trooper reported to Kutz that she had to convince Bogren to make the report and that Bogren was not happy about it. Kutz later questioned Bogren about the light and specifically asked whether any damage occurred to her patrol car. Bogren denied damage but upon Kutz's inspection he noted that there was some. Bogren was also involved in an incident in August 1995 in which she made a U-turn on an interstate entrance, causing two other vehicles to crash.

On the evening of October 22, 1995, Bogren, while off-duty, went to the home of her former boyfriend, Steve Johnson, to retrieve a set of keys. While in Johnson's home, Bogren attempted to take a set of oriental tea cups she had previously given Johnson, and an argument ensued. During the argument, according to Bogren, Johnson's dog jumped up on her, causing her to drop the cups. She then left, and Johnson called the local police department to report the cup-breaking incident. He also called the patrol office and left a message complaining about Bogren's conduct.

A local police officer responded to Johnson's call. Johnson told the officer that Bogren threw the cups at his feet. The same officer later called Bogren to ask her about the incident. Bogren admitted to the officer that she was at Johnson's home, that an argument occurred, and that cups were broken. The officer informed Bogren that he would be issuing and sending her a citation. In the officer's report of the incident, he noted that Bogren informed him that she threw down the cups, although Bogren denies ever making such an admission. Bogren received a citation for criminal damage to property.

Lieutenant Thomas Fraser, the patrol supervisor on duty the night of the incident, returned Johnson's call around midnight to discuss the complaint against Bogren. He also contacted the local police officer who responded to Johnson's call. The next morning, Fraser relayed Johnson's complaint to his supervisor, Captain Stephen Mengelkoch, who in turn filed a complaint with the patrol's internal affairs division, reporting a charge that Bogren allegedly engaged in conduct unbecoming an officer. The task of investigating the complaint was ultimately assigned to Fraser. Fraser conducted taped interviews with Bogren, Johnson and a female companion of Johnson's who was at Johnson's home on the night of the incident. In his report, Fraser concluded that the charge of conduct unbecoming an officer was sustained. He further reported that Bogren was "untruthful and evasive" during her taped interview with him and that his investigation revealed Bogren had trouble controlling her anger.

Following his investigation of the incident at Johnson's home, Fraser recommended to Captain Mengelkoch that Bogren's employment with the patrol be terminated. Captain Mengelkoch agreed and assigned Lieutenant Lori Hodapp the responsibility of preparing a supervisors' report documenting the reasons for Bogren's termination. The final decision to terminate Bogren was made by Michael Chabries, Chief of the Patrol. Chabries stated in an affidavit that he made the termination decision based on conversations with and reports by Hodapp, Fraser and Mengelkoch. Bogren was notified of the termination decision on November 8, 1995, and was ultimately terminated on November 14, 1995. Shortly thereafter, Bogren pleaded guilty to the reduced charge of petty misdemeanor criminal damage to property.

II.

We review a district court's issuance of summary judgment de novo, applying the same standards as those employed by the district court. See Callas Enters., Inc. v. Travelers Indem. Co. of Am., 193 F.3d 952, 955 (8th Cir. 1999). Under Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), "[s]ummary judgment is proper if the evidence, viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party, demonstrates that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Lynn v. Deaconess Med. Ctr.-W. Campus, 160 F.3d 484, 486 (8th Cir. 1998).

A. Discriminatory Discharge

Bogren advances theories of discriminatory discharge and hostile work environment in support of her Title VII claims against the state. As the district court recognized, her Title VII discriminatory discharge claim is analyzed under the well-recognized McDonnell-Douglas burden-shifting framework. See Roark v. City of Hazen, 189 F.3d 758, 761 (8th Cir. 1999) (citing McDonnell-Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973)). To survive summary judgment, a plaintiff must first demonstrate a prima facie case of discrimination. See id. A prima facie showing creates a legal presumption of unlawful discrimination and shifts the burden to the defendant to articulate a legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for the plaintiff's termination. See O'Sullivan v. Minnesota, 191 F.3d 965, 969 (8th Cir. 1999). If the defendant presents a nondiscriminatory reason, "the presumption of discrimination drops from the case" and the burden reverts to the plaintiff to show that the defendant's proffered reason for her termination is pretextual. Id. "The ultimate burden of persuading the trier of fact that the defendant intentionally discriminated against the plaintiff remains at all times with the plaintiff." Texas Dep't of Community Affairs v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 253 (1981).

Following the Supreme Court's recent decision in Reeves v. Sanderson Plumbing Prods., Inc., 120 S. Ct. 2097, 2108-09 (2000), a plaintiff's prima facie case of discrimination, combined with sufficient evidence from which a reasonable fact finder could disbelieve an employer's nondiscriminatory explanation and make the ultimate fact-finding that illegal discrimination occurred, may form the requisite evidentiary basis upon which to submit to a jury the question of an employer's intentional, unlawful discrimination. ³

The district court assumed, as we do on appeal, that Bogren set forth sufficient evidence to support a prima facie case of discriminatory discharge. The court concluded, however, that she failed to establish a genuine issue that the state's proffered reason for her termination was a pretext for discrimination. After a thorough review of the record, we agree with the district court and conclude Bogren has not demonstrated that the state's...