Bohannon v. Kan. City S. Ry. Co.
| Decision Date | 24 May 2022 |
| Docket Number | CIVIL ACTION NO. 21-805 |
| Citation | 604 F.Supp.3d 389 |
| Parties | Dustin BOHANNON v. KANSAS CITY SOUTHERN RAILWAY CO. |
| Court | U.S. District Court — Western District of Louisiana |
Bristol Alan Baxley, Rome Arata & Baxley, Pearland, TX, for Dustin Bohannon.
Bobby S. Gilliam, Holly C. Allen, Wilkinson Carmody & Gilliam, Shreveport, LA, Paul Michael Davis, Jr., John D. & Eric G. Johnson Law Firm, Minden, LA, for Kansas City Southern Railway Co.
MEMORANDUM RULING
Plaintiff Dustin Bohannon ("Bohannon"), an employee of Kansas City Southern Railway ("KCSR"), was injured while performing switching operations at a rail yard. Bohannon brings this action under the Federal Employers’ Liability Act ("FELA") and moves for partial summary judgment regarding KCSR's liability.1 For the reasons that follow, Bohannon's motion is granted in part and denied in part.
Bohannon worked as a conductor and railcar operator in KCSR's rail yard in Shreveport, Louisiana.2 He was responsible for conducting switching operations, meaning he separated railcars and subdivided those cars onto separate tracks.3 Bohannon moved the railcars via remote and pulled physical levers that detached the cars as they moved.4 These levers are called "pin lifters" and attach to "couplers" located on both ends of railcars.5 Couplers connect railcars and feature steel knuckles that automatically lock into place when linked together.6 To disconnect the couplers, rail workers pull the pin lifters, which in turn, open the knuckles and free the cars.7 On the day of the accident, Bohannon encountered a railcar8 he could not detach; the pin lifter would not raise, so the railcars would not uncouple.9 Bohannon continued to wiggle the lever, then stopped the cars with his remote.10 As the car stopped, he continued to grip the pin lifter.11 Bohannon claims he felt pain in his left elbow during the stop.12 No witnesses were present at the time of his injury.13
Following the incident, Bohannon filed this action against KCSR under the FELA. Bohannon alleges KCSR maintained a defective decoupling mechanism on the railcar that he contends was responsible for his injury. Among other claims, Bohannon argues that KCSR violated the Federal Safety Appliance Act ("SAA") and other safety regulations promulgated by the Federal Railroad Administration ("FRA"). Bohannon moves for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability and seeks a determination that KCSR is negligent as a matter of law. He also urges the Court to rule that KCSR's safety violation caused his injury in whole or in part. KCSR filed a response and sur-reply in opposition to Bohannon's motion.14
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a) directs a court to "grant summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Summary judgment is appropriate when the pleadings, answers to interrogatories, admissions, depositions, and affidavits on file indicate that there is no genuine issue of material fact and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Celotex Corp. v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322, 106 S.Ct. 2548, 91 L.Ed.2d 265 (1986). When the burden at trial will rest on the non-moving party, the moving party need not produce evidence to negate the elements of the non-moving party's case; rather, it need only point out the absence of supporting evidence. See id. at 322–23, 106 S.Ct. 2548.
If the movant satisfies its initial burden of showing that there is no genuine dispute of material fact, the non-movant must demonstrate that there is, in fact, a genuine issue for trial by going "beyond the pleadings and designat[ing] specific facts" for support. Little v. Liquid Air Corp., 37 F.3d 1069, 1075 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Celotex, 477 U.S. at 325, 106 S.Ct. 2548 ). "This burden is not satisfied with some metaphysical doubt as to the material facts," by conclusory or unsubstantiated allegations, or by a mere "scintilla of evidence." Id. (internal citations and quotation marks omitted). However, "[t]he evidence of the non-movant is to be believed, and all justifiable inferences are to be drawn in his favor." Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 255, 106 S.Ct. 2505, 91 L.Ed.2d 202 (1986) (citing Adickes v. S. H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 158–59, 90 S.Ct. 1598, 26 L.Ed.2d 142 (1970) ). While not weighing the evidence or evaluating the credibility of witnesses, courts should grant summary judgment where the critical evidence in support of the non-movant is so "weak or tenuous" that it could not support a judgment in the non-movant's favor. Armstrong v. City of Dall., 997 F.2d 62, 67 (5th Cir. 1993).
Local Rule 56.1 also requires the movant to file a statement of material facts as to which it "contends there is no genuine issue to be tried." The opposing party must then set forth a "short and concise statement of the material facts as to which there exists a genuine issue to be tried." W.D. La. R. 56.2. All material facts set forth in the movant's statement "will be deemed admitted, for purposes of the motion, unless controverted as required by this rule." Id.
Rail workers have long experienced a high-risk work environment. At the turn of the century, "the odds against a railroad brakeman's dying a natural death were almost four to one." Brotherhood of R. R. Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Va. State Bar, 377 U.S. 1, 3, 84 S.Ct. 1113, 12 L.Ed.2d 89 (1964) (citing Interstate Com. Comm'n, Third Annual Report of the Interstate Commerce Commission 85 (1889)). For railroad switchmen, the average life expectancy was less than ten years. Id. . Recognizing these issues and the general hazards railroad workers faced, Congress passed the SAA in 1893 to provide standardized safety regulations. A few years later, it also enacted the FELA to afford injured workers and their families a means for recovery if the worker's "injury or death result[ed] in whole or in part from the [rail carrier's] negligence." Norfolk, 538 U.S. at 144–45, 123 S.Ct. 1210 (quoting 45 U.S.C.A. § 51). The purpose of the FELA was to "shift part of the human overhead of doing business from employees to their employers." CSX Transp., Inc. v. McBride, 564 U.S. 685, 691, 131 S.Ct. 2630, 180 L.Ed.2d 637 (2011) (cleaned up). Since the FELA's passage, rail carriers have had a nondelegable duty to provide their employees with a reasonably safe workplace. See Shenker v. Balt. & Ohio R.R., 374 U.S. 1, 7, 83 S.Ct. 1667, 10 L.Ed.2d 709 (1963). Generally, a FELA claim is based on negligence; it requires a plaintiff to prove duty, breach, foreseeability, and causation. "In comparison to tort litigation at common law," however, "a relaxed standard of causation applies under FELA." McBride, 564 U.S. at 692, 131 S.Ct. 2630 (cleaned up). Specifically, a worker must prove only that the employer's negligence, however minimal, played some part in causing the harm. Id. at 694, 131 S.Ct. 2630.
But when a rail carrier violates safety regulations like the SAA, rail carriers are held strictly liable, and the plaintiff "is relieved of the burden of proving negligence." Crane v. Cedar Rapids & Iowa City Ry. Co., 395 U.S. 164, 166, 89 S.Ct. 1706, 23 L.Ed.2d 176 (1969). This is because rail carriers have an absolute duty under the SAA, and when that duty is breached, the rail carrier is negligent as a matter of law. To be sure, the SAA does not supplant the FELA as a separate cause of action. Instead, a "violation of the [SAA] suppl[ies] the wrongful act necessary to ground liability under the [FELA]." Carter v. Atlanta & St. Andrews Bay Ry. Co., 338 U.S. 430, 434, 70 S.Ct. 226, 94 L.Ed. 236 (1949). To recover on a FELA claim based on an SAA violation, a plaintiff must prove two elements: first, a plaintiff must show the defendant violated SAA. And second, a plaintiff must prove that his injury resulted "in whole or in part from the railroad's violation of the Act." Crane, 395 U.S. at 166, 89 S.Ct. 1706 (cleaned up).
Bohannon argues that KCSR violated the SAA because the railcars would not decouple when he engaged the pin lifter. The SAA mandates that rail carriers maintain specific equipment in a prescribed condition. Relevant here is the requirement that rail carriers use railcars only if they are "equipped with ... couplers coupling automatically by impact, and capable of being uncoupled, without the necessity of individuals going between the ends of the vehicles." 49 U.S.C.A. § 20302(a)(1)(A). Additionally, "[a] railroad may not place or continue in service a car" if the railcar has a coupler with a coupler lock that is "inoperative" or "broken." 49 C.F.R. § 215.123(f)(3)(ii) & (v).15 The general purpose of the SAA's coupler provision is "to assure the safety of railroad employees by requiring the railroads to furnish safe appliances for the coupling of cars." S. Pac. Co. v. Mahl, 406 F.2d 1201, 1203 (5th Cir. 1969). Moreover, Bohannon need not show he went "between the cars in order to uncouple them." Id. at 1205. Rather, "[t]he failure of a coupler to uncouple due to a defect therein is sufficient to establish liability under the [SAA]." Id. at 1204. "The test of compliance is the operating efficiency of the couplers with which the car is equipped." Id. (quoting Chi., St. P., M. & O. Ry. Co. v. Muldowney, 130 F.2d 971, 975 (8th Cir. 1942) ).
Bohannon provides competent summary judgment evidence showing KCSR violated the SAA. Bohannon first supplies a post-accident report authored by the Senior Mechanical Maintenance Manager, who wrote that the coupler's knuckle and lock "were found to be wore-out causing [the] lock to hit [the] coupler."16 That same manager later explained in a...
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